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ABSTRACT 
 
Empathy, Open-Mindedness and Virtue in Argumentation 
by 
Jonathan Anthony Caravello 
 
Disagreements continue over the most basic epistemic questions.  Which logic is correct?  
What makes an argument good?  We need a theory that can both explain the prevalence of such 
disagreements and evaluate the conduct and characters of those who participate in them.  I argue that 
formal theories cannot supply this need.  Circular arguments demonstrate the failure of formal 
approaches.  Circular arguments are often impeccable from a formal perspective, but circular 
argumentation is almost always criticizable.  A skilled arguer does not dismiss other viewpoints out 
of hand.  Instead, to reason with those who reject our most basic assumptions about the logic of 
argumentation itself or the norms we assume when evaluating arguments for cogency or coherence 
we must break out of the circle of our own opinions.  We must exercise a capacity for cognitive 
empathy. 
In chapter zero, I develop a virtue-theoretic account of argumentation centered around the 
virtue of open-mindedness.  I analyze open-mindedness in Aristotelian fashion as the mean between 
skepticism and dogmatism.  Open-mindedness consists in the skillful deployment of empathic ability, 
which is in turn understood as the capacity to simulate the perspective of another.  I use this same 
framework to analyze two more specific applications of cognitive empathy: sincerity and creativity, 
which are both essential to responsible argumentation.  Responsible argumentation requires sincerity 
in our forms of expression and creativity in our efforts to resolve those disagreements we must 
resolve for pragmatic reasons.  When it is understood as a "master virtue," open-mindedness is a way 
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of utilizing sincerity and creativity for appropriate ends, and it is the surest route to epistemic 
progress. 
In chapter one, I apply my virtue-theoretic account of argumentation to a dispute over the 
fallacy of begging the question.  According to Robinson (1971), question-begging is not fallacious 
because it’s fine from a formal perspective.  Sorensen (1996) replies that question-begging is 
fallacious because it compromises the rationality of whoever is begging the question.  By advancing 
the dialectic between Sorensen and Robinson, I aim to show that our argumentative practices must 
take the perspectives of others seriously, whether or not those perspectives are rational.  When you 
beg the question against someone you fail to empathize with her.  A tendency towards circularity of 
various sorts might be inevitable, but it needn’t compromise open-mindedness. 
In chapter two, I examine the connection between dogmatism and disagreement to address 
ongoing debates over the proper response to peer disagreement.  How should we respond when we 
find ourselves disagreeing with a colleague or epistemic peer?  According to the “equal weight view,” 
we should suspend belief in this kind of case.  I defend this ideal from two charges: (1) that it is self-
undermining, and (2) that it renders its adherents “spineless.”  Even widespread disagreement 
amongst peers wouldn't force those who endorse the equal weight view into persistent 
agnosticism.  We needn’t compromise conciliation and cooperation, even when we find ourselves 
arguing with dogmatists who reject these cognitive virtues. 
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Preface. The same aspect of human nature both pits individuals against individuals and 
individuals against themselves.  The necessity of submitting to the will of others (at least partially, at 
least sometimes) is something most of us are willing to live with.  Unfortunately, submitting to others 
requires deference, which sometimes involves a sacrifice of one’s own well-being.  If we aim to 
engage in reasonable discourse, including peer disagreements, we must at least sometimes submit to 
the will of others.  If my peer and I disagree about the effective course of action to resolve a conflict, 
yet we must decide on something to do, one of us must defer to the other, even if in doing so one of 
us sacrifices the satisfaction of their own interests.  There needn’t be deference in the sense of 
submitting to the will of another if we resolve the conflict by flipping a coin, allowing the loser to 
choose next time.  Regardless, practical necessity means at least submitting to the will of another for 
the moment.  Our natural tendency to associate spinelessness with submission forms one side of the 
force that works to tear us apart.  
When we agree you get your way this time and I get my way next time, then we can resolve 
the practical need in a reasonable way as virtuous reasoners.  In contrast, even the best reasoners of us 
must sometimes submit to the will of the individual in question for broadly utilitarian reasons.  When 
familial obligation requires care of a child or an elderly parent whose cognitive abilities are 
diminished, humoring them is the best we can do.  For people do not begin and end life as equals in 
dialogue. 
On the other hand, it is also necessary that we sometimes resist submitting to others, even 
when we regard them as peers.  It is sometimes right for someone to hold firm to their individuality 
and so it is sometimes right to satisfy one’s own interests to the detriment of the interests of others.  If 
my peer and I disagree about the effective course of action to resolve a conflict, yet we must decide 
on something to do, one of us must defy the other, even if in doing so one of us satisfies our interest 
to the detriment of the interests of others.  Einstein’s theories flew in the face of his peers’ accepted 
theories, but had he caved and gave up rather than defy the status quo, we might not have the 
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monumental innovations provided by his novel model of physics.  Our natural tendency to associate 
stubbornness with defiance forms the opposite side of the force that works to tear us apart.  
What makes these associations natural?  Submission is seen as a self-destructive weakness 
because it works directly against our individuality, forcing us to change ourselves in service of others.  
Defiance, on the other hand, is seen as an unduly self-serving way to seize control from others, a way 
of forcing them to change for us.   
There is a dual aspect of human nature: we want to live by carving out our own paths within a 
community of others who do the same.  We want individuality and togetherness.  We are, by nature 
both stubborn and spineless.   
But we needn't be.  If we can balance the two opposing forces of stubbornness and 
spinelessness, we can attempt to harness the force into something that can fundamentally change the 
way we think, interact, and live.  But we must do so while working within the confines of this force of 
human nature.  This dissertation is meant as a humble exercise on how we might go about doing this 
with regards to our practices of argumentation.  In short, I argue that we ought to aim to be open-
minded, sincere, and creative in discourse as in non-discursive aspects of social life.  Through humble 
confidence (or confident humility), self-reliant coordination (or coordinative self-reliance), and 
critical elaboration (or elaborative critique) we can evolve. 
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Figure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Above is a figure that maps the relations between (i) the force that tears us apart, (ii) three pairs of 
epistemic vices associated with each side of the force, (iii) the corresponding virtue for each of the 
three pairs, and (iv) the abilities or attitudes that enable us to balance the vices and that together are 
manifestations of their corresponding virtue.  The ‘+’ and ‘-’ symbols are intended to represent a 
magnetic-like relationship between (i) and (iv) (i.e. positive and negative charges attract, whereas 
positive and positive, or negative and negative charges repel.)  As an example, humility (+) allows us 
to move away dogmatism, open-mindedness’s epistemic vice of stubbornness (+), but at the same 
brings us closer to skepticism, open-mindedness’s epistemic vice of spinelessness (-).  On the other 
side, confidence (-) allows us to move away from spinelessness (-), but at the same time brings us 
closer to stubbornness (+).   
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Chapter 0. Introduction to Empathic Argumentation  
How should we respond when someone challenges our most basic 
assumptions?  What if these are assumptions about the logic of argumentation itself or the 
norms we assume when evaluating arguments for cogency or coherence?  Dogmatists insist 
that we can justly assert or rely on foundational norms or principles even when we know our 
interlocutors reject them.  I argue that these dogmatic responses are always irrational as they 
inevitably manifest some failure of “cognitive empathy,” a concept I analyze at length.  I go 
on to develop a virtue-theoretic approach to argumentation, highlighting the central role 
played by open-mindedness and related virtues in distinguishing good from bad arguments.  
Responsible argumentation requires sincerity in our forms of expression, open-mindedness in 
our attempts to simulate the perspective of another, and creativity in our efforts to resolve 
those disagreements we must resolve for pragmatic reasons.  When it is understood as a 
"master virtue," open-mindedness is a way of utilizing sincerity and creativity for appropriate 
ends, and it is the surest route to epistemic progress.  The resulting theory elucidates the 
pragmatic nature of argumentative circularity, offers normative guidance for those looking to 
improve their discursive behavior, and makes some progress towards resolving ongoing 
debates over the proper response to peer disagreement.  Conciliation and cooperation are 
stable virtues that we needn’t compromise, even when we find ourselves arguing with those 
who reject our cognitive values.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I do several things.  In section 1, I lay out the limits 
of formal theories of argument and focus in particular on the emergence of what I call the 
circularity problem in their attempts to give theories of argument goodness.  In section 2, I 
lay out and assess various formal and informal approaches to the normative status of 
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arguments, including logical and probabilistic, dialectical and epistemic approaches.  I argue 
that they all fail because they are susceptible to variations of the circularity problem.   
An argument that philosophers traditionally deem to be good might not speak one bit 
to my mom.  Does that make it bad?  No.  But “goodness” is a vague term in the sphere of 
argumentation.  Although an argument might be impeccable from a formal perspective, if it 
does not improve the epistemic status of my mother when I advance it to her, then the 
argument is flawed from the informal perspective.  An argument is bad, then, if it fails to 
communicate the arguer’s reasoning to the contested conclusion and the arguer’s reasoning is 
flawed if appreciating it does not convince the arguee of its conclusion.  
It is difficult to bring someone to appreciate one’s reasoning by arguing with them.  It 
usually takes time before someone changes their mind, but it also requires a willingness to 
change on their part.  The way one acts in the face of change is at least partly determined by 
how sincere, open-minded, and creative they are, that is, by how closely they resemble a 
virtuous arguer.  This is why an argument that results in the amelioration of my mom’s 
stubborn tendency is an improvement to her epistemic status.  In cultivating a bit of humility, 
my mom is in better position to appropriately react to the arguments and reasoning of other 
virtuous arguers. 
In section 3, I set the groundwork for my own approach to argumentation: an 
informal, virtue-epistemic approach that revolves around empathy.  My model diverges from 
other epistemic models by shifting the focus from the generation of knowledge or justified 
belief to epistemic improvement and self-development towards the cultivation of virtuous 
conduct and character.  This conduct is ultimately grounded in a concept I will elaborate on 
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at length: cognitive empathy, understood as the capacity to simulate the perspective of 
another.   
If we aim to argue responsibly, and if we need to empathize to do so, we ought also to 
empathize responsibly.  In section 4, I flesh out my approach and utilize Aristotle’s doctrine 
of the mean to characterize open-mindedness, sincerity, and creativity, all of which are 
essential to responsible empathic (rational) argumentation (REA), and their respective 
relations to the responsible use of empathy.1  REA requires sincerity in our forms of 
expression, open-mindedness in our attempts to simulate the perspective of another, and 
creativity in our efforts to resolve those disagreements we must resolve for pragmatic 
reasons.  When it is understood as a "master virtue," open-mindedness is a way of utilizing 
sincerity and creativity for appropriate ends, and it is the surest route to epistemic progress.   
1. The Limits of Formal Theories and the Circularity Problem 
 
What makes an argument good?  We need a theory that can both explain the 
prevalence of such disagreements and evaluate the conduct and characters of those who 
participate in them.  I argue that formal theories cannot supply this need.  For although 
circular arguments are often impeccable from a formal perspective, circular argumentation is 
almost always criticizable.   
 In his paper, “’P, Therefore, P’ Without Circularity”, Roy Sorensen (1991) argues 
against a purely syntactic theory of circularity in favor of a pragmatic theory of the 
                                                           
1 Not all argumentation is rational.  In those cases that are not, responsible empathic argumentation might be the 
ideal, but if it is, its virtues will shift.  Whereas in responsible empathic rational argumentation, things like 
irony and contempt obfuscate the issue at hand, they might be suitable, even virtuous elements in certain 
spheres of non-rational argumentation.  An example: a dispute between a fascist and an anti-fascist is typically 
not rational argumentation.  We might say that the dispute is really a clash in core values, where the fascist 
values ‘might makes right’ and the anti-fascist values ‘justice through truth’.  While one may engage in 
argumentation to support either of those values, rational argumentation, when it is defined in terms of empathy 
and other intellectual virtues, is only compatible with the latter.   
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phenomenon on which our charges of circularity must be “relativized to audiences with 
varying purpose, background beliefs, and inferential prowess” (247).2   Though my virtue-
theoretic analysis departs from Sorensen’s in some respects, it is similarly pragmatic insofar 
as it relativizes circularity to a speaker and her audience.  
 Consider the fallacy of begging the question.  Some think that question-begging 
arguments are fallacious and that their fallaciousness stems from a shared “formal” 
deficiency.  The syntactic theory of circularity is one such theory.  On a syntactic theory, all 
question-begging arguments are problematically circular because they all display a 
problematic syntactic schema of argument, say, ‘P, therefore, P’.  Syntactic features of 
argument are much too weak to fully capture our intuitions about question-begging 
arguments.  Consider, for example, the following: 
(II)  Some deductive arguments do not reason from general to particular.  
 
 Therefore, some deductive arguments do not reason from general to particular.  
 
The syntactic form of the above argument is ‘P, therefore, P’, yet it is arguably an instance of 
a good argument, since the argument instantiates or exemplifies the content of its 
conclusion.3   
 One feature of classical propositional logics (PL), to name just one family of logics, is 
that it is provable within PL that any inference utilizing only the syntactic rules to manipulate 
symbolic terms that are introduced in characterizing a PL is truth-preserving.  That is, we 
know that using these rules to construct a premise and conclusion argument out of the 
                                                           
2 Sorensen, R. 1991. `P, therefore, P’ without circularity. Journal of Philosophy 88/5: 245-66.  
3According to Sorensen (1991: 266) there is a long-neglected feature of argument that influences the normative 
status of certain arguments.  (II) and arguments like it are good, according to Sorensen, because they exemplify 
the content of their conclusion.  “Exemplification,” says Sorensen, “is a subconverse of denotation: a denoting 
predicate refers to its object, while an exemplar is an object that refers to its predicate and instantiates it” (252). 
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syntactic structures admissible in PL corresponds with one or more semantic relations of 
validity or truth-preservation that hold between the contents expressed by the premises and 
conclusion of an inference (where these contents are understood as truth values, or possible 
worlds, or functions from possible worlds to truth values, or Russellian or Fregean 
propositions which determine functions from worlds to truth values).  Knowledge of the 
semantics enables us to work under a theory or logic to determine whether any particular 
logical law holds for that theory or logic.  What justifies our use of the logical laws that hold 
in the system of a PL (where this includes both its characteristic syntax and semantics) 
depends in part on our justification for certain principles of interpretation that we utilize 
when constructing that semantics (e.g. the truth tables).   
 But what justifies our use of the principles of reasoning that guide us through our 
interpretation of a formal logical system like the PLs?  Consider "if”, the logical constant 
associated with conditional statements.  One plausible interpretation of “if” stems from our 
knowledge of its meaning, which we in turn acquire from (arguably) our competent use of 
the expression in language.  Our knowledge of its meaning is at least in part acquired through 
our knowledge of when conditional statements turn out true and when they turn out false.  
We may look to the standard truth tables for the conditional, for example, to guide our 
understanding of “if” by providing a model which includes truth evaluations under every 
possible truth value assignment of the conditional’s antecedent and consequent.  Of course, 
one might accept the classical truth table on the authority of logicians or by thinking through 
cases and testing the model with intuitions.  A comprehensive justification for utilizing an 
inferential rule associated with the conditional (e.g. Modus Ponens) would involve some 
theses about the meaning of the expression we use to articulate the premises and conclusions 
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of these inferences.  Thus, a full justification for using  Modus Ponens requires a particular 
interpretation of its main logical constant, namely, an interpretation under which we can 
reasonably infer the consequent of a conditional statement just in case we have good reason 
to take the conditional and its antecedent to be true.  Our semantics must cohere with our 
epistemology. 
 The traditional truth tables introduced by Wittgenstein, represent a proposition as 
either true or false (but not both).  This aspect of Wittgenstein’s early foray into model theory 
is rejected by many theorists.4  Some theorists reject the classical model theory of 
propositional logic by allowing indeterminacy in the truth of a proposition, truth value gaps 
and the like.  This requires interpreting the logical connectives in a different, even if only 
slightly different, way.  Under a non-traditional interpretation of one of the logical 
connectives, certain inferential rules that turn out to be valid in PL are not so in the 
alternative logic.  Famously, if propositions can be indeterminate in truth, the classical law of 
excluded middle will not hold of them, though variants on it will.  For example, though an 
indeterminate proposition is neither true nor false, it is not true.  So the claim that all 
propositions are either true or not, might still hold.  Famously, higher-order vagueness, 
threatens even this formulation of the law.  For it might be neither true nor false that a 
proposition is indeterminate.5  
 The existence of alternative logics does not imply anything on its own.  But so long 
as different logicians advance differing logics as uniquely good, valuable or worthy of use in 
mathematics or science there will exist real disputes that hinge on a disagreement between 
                                                           
4 See Forbes. 1983. 
5 One might think that this is absurd and insist that ‘either we can determine the truth value of a proposition, or 
else we cannot.’  But, of course, any such reasoning would rely on some formulation of the law of excluded 
middle. 
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theorists about which arguments are valid and which are invalid.  To consider a simplified 
example, whereas the classical logician would accept the conclusion of an argument which 
involves essential use of double-negation elimination, an intuitionistic logician will not.   The 
intuitionist is no bogey man, or even like the classical epistemic Skeptic.  There are real 
people who reject excluded middle and double negation elimination.  Of course, the classic 
model theoretic proof of the validity of modus ponens rests on the least controversial theses 
regarding the meaning of “if”: i.e. that a statement of the form “If p, q,” cannot be true if p is 
true and q is false.  And modus ponens is not rejected in practice by any philosopher, 
mathematician or logician as a general rule.  Nevertheless, some theorists have argued that 
the principle is not valid in full generality.6 
 Now consider, in this light, a rule-circular argument, i.e. an argument for why the use 
of a certain rule of inference in argument is epistemically rational that depends on the use of 
that very rule.  Although the circularity exhibited by such an argument may be benign in the 
sense that the use of the rule is not strictly prohibited (a priori) in arguing for its justified use, 
it would provide nothing in the way of rationally persuading someone who was skeptical of 
it.  If one were to offer an argument to the conclusion that, say, following the inferential rule 
associated with Modus Ponens is always epistemically rational, and utilize MP in the 
process, then it would be unreasonable to expect that someone who rejects its validity would 
be rationally persuaded by it.  Such an attempt would be irrational on the grounds that it 
constitutes an empathic failure on the part of the arguer, who advances an argument for the 
validity of a rule to someone whose position they should know precludes the possibility of 
                                                           
6 See Priest. 1979.  
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consistently believing in the justified use of the rule.  A formal theory of an argument’s 
inability to ground such a judgment constitutes the circularity problem.   
 My theory attempts to utilize the existence of apparently reasonable disagreements of 
this type as a catalyst for philosophical discovery by highlighting how we ought, rationally 
speaking, to approach, process, and resolve such disagreements in argumentation.  In chapter 
1, I utilize the theory I develop in this chapter for a dialectical case study, where I explain the 
character and conduct of two participants to a debate surrounding the existence and status of 
question-begging arguments.  In chapter 2, I utilize my theory for an epistemic case study, 
arguing that the right response when we find out our epistemic peer disagrees with us is 
conciliation, not dogmatism.  Both case studies depend on an informal theory of virtuous 
argumentation on which good arguments are the ones that would rationally persuade a 
virtuous arguer, i.e. the open-minded, sincere, and creative arguer.  All else equal, one should 
prefer the theory of discursive excellence which aligns our judgments about the goodness and 
badness of arguments with an approximation of our actual argumentative practices.  In short, 
a good theory should hold itself accountable.  My virtue theoretic account is an attempt at 
this. 
 Before laying out my theory, let’s take a look at a few theories of argument, which all 
highlight criteria on which we can judge an argument good or bad.  All of these theories, I 
argue, are susceptible to the circularity problem because they lack the power to fully capture 
the character and conduct of those engaged in disputes about the normative status of 
arguments.  This will set us up to shift the perspective from argument to arguer. 
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2. The Good and Bad of Argument 
When is an argument good/bad?  Can we determine an argument’s normative status 
by examining its formal features?  Formal theories of argument attempt to delineate the good 
arguments from the bad ones by appealing to formal features of the argument.  Informal 
theories admit the need for something more to fully capture the normative status of 
arguments.  In what follows, I consider several distinct criteria of good and bad argument, 
including formal logic, probabilistic coherence, cogency, dialectical effectiveness, and 
knowledge-generation, before ultimately arguing in favor of an informal approach that 
differentiates the good from the bad arguments by considering whether an argument would 
be accepted by a virtuous arguer.   
The Formal/Logical Approach 
 Under what we may call the standard logical approach to argumentation (LAA), an 
argument is good just in case it meets some formal, logical standard and bad just in case it 
fails to meet this standard.  Let us say that an argument is deductively valid just in case it is 
logically impossible for its premises to be true while its conclusion is false.7  (There are 
notorious complications that arise when we try to explicate the sense of impossibility at 
issue, but I will put them to the side in what follows.)  Undoubtedly there is something good 
about deductively valid arguments.  I can know, for instance, that the inference is truth-
preserving, i.e. that the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.  Indeed, 
if the argument is formally valid, it is arguable that I can know its validity “a priori” or 
                                                           
7 Why do we characterize validity in terms of “logical” impossibility?  Because our analysis of validity isn’t 
sufficiently “formal” otherwise.  It is impossible that “x is water” is true at a world at which “x is H2O” is false.  
But intuitively, the latter does not follow logically from the former, and a direct argument from the former claim 
to the latter one does not qualify as a logically valid deduction of this conclusion until its set of premises is 
augmented with the necessary truth “water is H2O.”  See Kripke (1980) for arguments in favor of countenancing 
the a posteriori necessity of “water is H2O” and similar claims. 
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without substantive observation and experimentation.  Moreover, if I know that an argument 
is valid and I know its premises, then, assuming closure under known entailment, I can know 
the conclusion.  But even though the deductive validity of an argument might be a virtue of 
it, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for an argument’s goodness.  If it were necessary, then 
no non-deductive argument would be good.  Acceptance of this criterion would thus issue in 
a negative evaluation of a great deal of scientific reasoning, as scientists often use abductive, 
probabilistic and statistical inference to support hypotheses.   
If the formal criterion were sufficient for an argument’s goodness, then no valid argument 
would be bad.  But just as there are good invalid arguments (e.g. any good inductive or 
abductive argument), there are bad valid arguments, as evidenced by the following: 
1. Barack Obama is the current president of the United States of America. 
2. There is only one current president of the United States. 
3. Barack Obama is not Donald Trump. 
4. Therefore, Donald Trump is not the current president of the United States of America. 
Validity is too weak to be the criteria on which we base our normative judgments of 
arguments.  The above argument, though formally valid, is problematic because its first 
premise is false and because someone who rejected its conclusion would not accept this first 
premise. 
 What about soundness?  Let’s say an argument is sound just in case it is valid and it 
has true premises.  Soundness, like validity, is too weak to capture good and bad of 
argument.  Consider: 
5. Donald Trump is the current president of the United States of America. 
 
6. Therefore, Barack Obama is not the current president of the United States of 
America. 
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The above argument is sound, and would remain sound were it augmented in the obvious 
way to secure formal validity, but it has no persuasive force in most, if not all, contexts.  In 
chapter 1 I argue that the overly minimalistic view of argument evaluation that attempts to 
reduce the number of ways an argument can fail to two (invalid or false premise) fails 
because it permits the construction of bad, sound arguments, either because they are 
question-begging or because they are self-defeating. 
Disagreements in Logic  
Insofar as logic can be used to elucidate the normative nature of arguments, it might 
be thought that our discovery of the “one true logic” could provide the basis for a set of laws 
or rules we ought to abide by when theorizing, reasoning, and arguing.   
But logicians disagree about which logic is the correct logic (and, in fact, whether 
there is one true logic).8  One way to settle the dispute is to provide arguments that justify our 
uses of certain of our most basic logical laws (e.g. the law of excluded middle, the law of 
non-contradiction).  Some instead attempt to justify the choice of a single logic by pointing to 
implication principles (e.g. logical consequence/implication, logical consistency) that 
legitimize the use of a distinguished set of rules of reasoning (e.g. reasoning according to 
Modus Ponens, conditional proof), which are then supposed to uniquely enable to 
construction of arguments that can be known to be semantically good (i.e. truth-preserving or 
valid) a priori.   
                                                           
8 And some have ran with it.  Beall & Restall (2006), for example, defend what they call “logical pluralism, the 
view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, and that this plurality arise not merely 
because there are different languages, but rather arises even within the kinds of claims expressed in the one 
language” (3). 
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This might seem to suggest that arguments are good or bad only relative to a choice 
of logic, so that one argument can be both good relative to classical logic and bad relative to 
intuitionistic or paraconsistent logic.  Gillian Russell urges against this move.  According to 
Russell, “pairs of logics where one is a sublogic of the other need not be thought of as 
rivals.”  If our pair includes the modal logic S5 and truth-functional classical logic (a 
sublogic of S5), we can say that the two logics “need not be thought of as disagreeing on the 
sets of valid and invalid arguments, but can be considered to be two different attempts to 
define them.”  What about in the case where a logic is developed as a rival, such as 
intuitionistic logic?  Russell says that even in such cases, “we have the option of reconstruing 
their purpose, for example as an offering to a logical sub-project: that of isolating 
constructively valid arguments from the rest.”9 
But even if Russell is right that rival logics need not be thought of as grounding a 
disagreement about the set of valid and invalid arguments, the fact remains that there exists 
disagreement about how to argue for one’s methods of argument evaluation.  And if these 
methods rely on one’s underlying logical theory, then one could not rationally persuade 
someone who didn't already accept that theory. 
 What if we could justify our use of certain basic laws of logic as uniquely good and 
universally appropriate?  Russell takes there to be three potential justifications for our 
endorsing basic laws of logic: either (i) we argue that the logical truths we can derive from 
these laws are analytic, (ii) we argue that the logic in question is central to the web of our 
beliefs, or (iii) we argue that reasoning in accord with these principles – rather than the truths 
of logic we can derive from them – is epistemologically basic.10  Russell argues for the third 
                                                           
9 Russell (2008: 593-594). 
10 Russell (2015: 794-797). 
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approach, saying that the justification for our most basic laws of logic “rests of the 
justification for certain principles of theory choice.”11  Our claims about formal logic, 
according to Russell, are justified by principles of reasoning which are epistemologically 
basic, principles like “[a]ll things being equal, one should prefer the theory which does the 
best job of explaining diverse phenomena in a unified fashion” and “[a]ll things being equal, 
one should prefer the theory which is most elegant.”12  We may then, according to Russell, 
justify our basic laws of logic by investigating the epistemologically basic principles of 
reasoning that, according to Russell, turn out, on investigation, to be grounded in or based on 
our preferences related to theory choice. 
 I agree with Russell that if our claims about formal logic are to be justified, they 
cannot be justified by a formal logic itself, but rather by certain epistemologically basic facts 
about reasoning.  Where I diverge from her picture, however, is in which facts are most basic 
to our reasoning.13  Whereas Russell focuses on various theoretical virtues like elegance and 
unified explanatory power, I opt to focus on virtue-theoretical, epistemic-argumentative 
character traits.  For it seems obvious to me that disagreements will arise about which 
theoretical characteristics can be invoked as virtues when we try to justify our most basic 
laws of logic.  Indeed, even if we were to agree that, say, elegance is one of those virtues, 
disagreements about what constitutes elegance would emerge.  And even if we agree on the 
nature of elegance and agree that it is a theoretical virtue, disagreements will arise over how 
elegance should be weighed against other virtues in the evaluation of arguments of any 
complexity.  These are familiar lessons from the literature on aesthetic and ethical evaluation.  
                                                           
11 Russell (2015: 802) points out the connection between her views and those defended by Harman (1986), who 
argues for the priority of reasoning over logic though what he calls “principles of belief revision” (3). 
12 Russell (2015: 802). 
13 My project also does not involve justifying the use of any laws of logic as basic or uniquely good. 
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Though these disagreements are perhaps less common in mathematics and logic, they exist in 
these domains.  Again, if we rely on an a priori, formal criterion of argumentative excellence 
we fail to recognize cogent challenges that will inevitably arise for the chosen criterion.  
When such challenges are articulated, we find ourselves stuck in limbo.   
For example, our over-reliance on formal theoretical tools puts us in the unfortunate 
position where we are unable to account for the badness of circularity and other related 
argumentative failures.  This is unfortunate not just because it leaves our theory woefully 
incomplete, but because it seems to lead to what appear to be reasonable disagreements 
between epistemic peers who are content to let others treat their disagreements as either 
trivial or insoluble.  Viewing such practices of argumentation – where theorists “agree to 
disagree” – as an inevitable result of ideal human reasoning leads to isolated intellectual 
bubbles viewed by outsiders as grossly elitist.   
A theory which focuses on the pragmatic aspects of argument just as much as the 
logical aspects when attempting to provide argument evaluations, however, explains the 
existence of such disagreements without the ugly side effects identified above.  The existence 
of reasonable disagreement should not work as an impediment to our analyses; it should not 
fracture a community in such a way that its members feel the need carve out their own 
(incompatible) paths.  It should work as a catalyst for cooperative attempts to learn, improve, 
and discover.  But doesn’t philosophy thrive on “mapping out logical space”?  For example, 
why not allow the classical logicians “to do their thing,” the intuitionists to do theirs and so 
on?  My answer is that although philosophical discovery requires knowing the various paths 
forward, philosophy (and by extension its corresponding argumentative practices) thrives on 
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actually moving forward.  Absent a major discovery or a drastic change in our material 
circumstances, our way forward will involve looking inward.  
Probabilistic Coherence as the Normative Basis of Argument  
 Might probabilistic coherence serve as suitable test for sound reasoning/arguing?  
Suppose an inference from premises to conclusion is probabilistically coherent just in case 
there is a truth-probabilfying relation between the statements therein expressed.  According 
to many formal epistemologists (viz. probabilists), Kolmogorov’s theory of probability (with 
its widely accepted axioms) can be converted into a formal theory of reasoning by 
interpreting probabilities as degrees of belief or credence and adding Bayes’ theorem, which 
is interpreted as describing the uniquely best way to update our degrees of belief or credence 
in light of new evidence.14  But Bayesian accounts of reasoning of this sort also fail to fully 
capture all instances of bad argument/reasoning.   
 Historically, Bayesian epistemologists have attempted to give a formal account of our 
reasoning by appealing to the deductive laws of logic and the laws of probability.15  It is 
thought that the deductive laws can provide us with both synchronic and diachronic rational 
constraints on belief.  Synchronic constraints concern rules about the rationality of a belief 
set (e.g. Principle of Consistency), whereas diachronic constraints concern rules about the 
rationality of changes in belief (e.g. various deductive rules of inference).  And it is thought 
that the laws of probability provide additional rational constraints on degree of belief, 
                                                           
14 Bayes, T. 1764. An essay toward solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London 53, 370-418. Ramsey, Frank P. 1926. Truth and probability. in Richard B. 
Braithwaite (ed.), Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essay, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1931, pp. 156–198.  There are many different variations on this general approach, but their details will not 
concern us in what follows. 
15 Easwaran & Fitelson (2015) diverge from traditional approaches which treat probabilistic logic as a 
generalization of deductive logic.  Fitelson now believes that the norms of rationality derivable from 
Bayesianism are “weaker” than this insofar as they do not entail deductive or logical consistency.   
  
16 
namely, probabilistic coherence standards on our set of beliefs and probabilistic rules of 
inference on our modifications.16 
 But there are reasons to suspect probabilistic coherence is inadequate to serve as a 
criterion of good argument.  Consider the lottery paradox.17  Suppose I buy a lottery ticket 
that I know to have a 1 in a million chance of winning.  The inference from the evidence to 
the belief that my ticket won't win seems to be a good one.  But then, if I form similar 
individual beliefs for every ticket, it seems as though I could justifiably infer that no ticket 
will win, a conclusion I know (per assumption) to be false.  As Gilbert Harman puts it, 
“[a]lthough one believes that one could win, one could also infer, for any ticket that that 
ticket won't be the winning ticket” (71).18 
 How can we evade this problem?  Harman’s (1986) proposed solution starts by 
conceiving of the inferences from the evidence about any given particular ticket’s chances of 
winning the lottery to the conclusion that it won't win the lottery as probabilistic inference.  
Here's what he says: 
There is no actual contradiction here.  To say one can infer this of any ticket is not to 
say one can infer it for all.  Given that one has inferred ticket number 1 will not win, 
then one must suppose the odds against ticket number 2 are no longer 999,999 to 1, 
but only 999,998 to 1.  And after one has inferred that ticket number 2 will not win, 
one must change the odds on ticket number 3 to 999,997 to 1, and so on.  If one could 
get to ticket number 999,999, one would have to suppose the odds were even, 1 to 1, 
so at that point the hypothesis that this ticket will not win would be no better than the 
hypothesis that it will win, and one could infer no further.  (Presumably one would 
have to have stopped before this point.) But the order of inference really matters here, 
since one could have inferred that ticket number 999,999 won't win if only one had 
made this inference early enough.19 
                                                           
16 Talbott, W., Bayesian epistemology. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/epistemology-bayesian/>. 
17 The original construction of the lottery paradox is from H. Kyburg (1961) Probability and the logic of 
rational belief, Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 
18 Harman, G. 1986. Change in view. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
19 Harman, G. (1986: 71). 
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Of course, since there is nothing incoherent about someone who reasons validly from known 
premises to a conclusion they antecedently disbelieve, no actual contradiction arises.  It is not 
as if the reasoner is stuck with a contradictory set of beliefs.  The rational response would be 
to resolve the inconsistency by reflecting on the argument to look for a flaw or by giving up 
the antecedently held belief that one ticket will win the lottery.  Harman, however, claims 
that if we conceive of our reasoning in probabilistic terms, the problem does not arise.  We 
are responsible reasoners who are careful when inferring along probabilistic lines and make 
sure to update our evidence base each step of the way.  At some point in the chain of 
inferences, our updated evidence base would make any subsequent inference irrational.   
 His diagnosis of the problem as merely apparent, however, has the unwelcome side 
effect that two people could come to reasonably disagree about which tickets won't win.  If 
one were to start with ticket 1, one could reasonably infer that ticket 2 won't win, since the 
revision to the evidence base would not be significant enough to result in a premise’s failure 
to probabilify the conclusion.  If one were to start from the last ticket in line and proceed 
backwards, one would be able to reasonably infer that ticket number 999,999 will not win, 
but proper updates to one’s evidence base will prevent reasonable inferences to the 
conclusion that ticket 2 won't win.  This is problematic because it implies that two people 
could come to disagree about which tickets will not win the lottery by using the same type of 
reasoning from what is initially the same body of evidence.  But since one could not justify a 
choice of starting points, their respective instances of reasoning would be at worst biased or 
otherwise irrational and at best entirely arbitrary.  Strictly speaking, there may be, “no 
contradiction here,” as Harman says, but the problem does not go away.  If the above-
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described reasoners disagree about the losing tickets upon learning how the order of 
inferences matters, then despite the probabilistic coherence of their inferences, their 
reasoning has failed them.  Insisting that these tickets (as opposed to those tickets) won't win 
the lottery is no less irrational than holding a set of contradictory beliefs.  A theory which 
holds probabilistic coherence as the ideal of argument fails because it cannot capture the 
irrationality of such reasoning. 
The (Informal) Epistemic Approach 
On the epistemic approach to argumentation (EAA), an argument is good just in case it 
produces knowledge or some other epistemic good.  Such approaches allow us to evaluate 
arguments by examining whether it satisfies the aim of generating knowledge (or some other 
epistemic good) in the user of the argument.  It is important to note that epistemic theories 
evaluate arguments not as purely abstract objects, which are in turn comprised of other 
abstract objects (e.g. propositions) as the logical approaches to argumentation do, but as “a 
sequence of events” consisting of a person’s argumentative acts.20  Unlike on the logical 
approaches, an argument’s goodness or badness cannot be gleaned from the internal features 
of the argument alone.   
Consider the following argument, which could be found in a basic logic or critical 
thinking book.  
(i) All people are reptiles 
(ii) All reptiles are butterflies 
(iii) Therefore, all people are butterflies 
                                                           
20 I borrow this from Biro and Siegel (2008) p. 92. 
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At most, such arguments, which allow students to more easily discern the logical features of 
an argument, are pedagogically useful.  But, according defenders of EAA, the argument fails 
because it does not (and, in fact, cannot) produce knowledge for those who endorse it. 
Nor would such an argument be suitable in producing justified belief.  According to 
Alvin Goldman (2003) “…what makes a good argument good is its suitability to produce 
justified belief in its conclusion by means of justified beliefs in its premises….In other 
words, a good argument is one that can transmit justification from premises to conclusion 
(and justification vis-à-vis the premises does not require prior justification of vis-à-vis the 
conclusion” (58).21  Thus, the above argument would be bad on his account as well. 
 But the argument only seems flawed because we have a difficult time conceiving of a 
context in which advancing such an argument would be reasonable.  Such contexts, however, 
do exist.  If, for example, I am arguing with someone who, for whatever reason, believes that 
all people are reptiles and that all reptiles are butterflies, but rejects that any one person is a 
butterfly, such an argument might very well come to persuade them of something.  Although 
the argument may not generate any new knowledge, it may pressure someone to change their 
beliefs in a way that benefits them epistemically.  For before encountering the argument, our 
imagined reasoner held an inconsistent set of beliefs (i.e. (i), (ii), and ~(iii)).  After hearing 
the argument, she may come to question one or more of those beliefs, perhaps resolving the 
inconsistency by coming to believe the conclusion.  Yes, the conclusion is patently false, but 
at least she would be more consistent than before. 
                                                           
21 Goldman. 2003. An epistemological approach to argumentation. 
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Cogency 
So knowledge-generation (or even justified belief-generation) is much too strong a 
standard to be a normative criterion on argument.  Not only might arguments like the reptile 
argument be good for epistemic-pragmatic reasons (like reinforcing certain ideals of 
reasoning like consistency), we can imagine a litany of examples of arguments that are by all 
measures good arguments that nevertheless do not provide us with new knowledge or 
justified belief.  If, for example, someone advances an argument to the conclusion P that is 
impeccable from my perspective, but I also have considered an argument to the conclusion 
~P that I find equally compelling, I won’t be able to generate knowledge or justified belief in 
P.   
What is wrong with the following argument? 
(iv) Either pigs fly or induction works. 
(v) Pigs don't fly. 
(vi) Therefore, induction works. 
Under the assumption that the reader accepts the second premise, I kindly ask you to imagine 
that you do not already accept the conclusion.  Now, do you have reason to accept the first 
premise?  In all likelihood, you will concede that whatever warrant you might have for (iv) is 
dependent for its warrant on (vi).  In other words, our actual warrant for (iv) comes from the 
fact that we know its second disjunct is true.  But the second disjunct of (iv) just is the 
conclusion.  If you were to advance this argument to your interlocutor in an attempt to sway 
them away from being skeptical about induction, you would fail miserably.   
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According to Crispin Wright, an argument is cogent when “someone could be moved 
[by it] to rational conviction of the truth of its conclusion”.22  Wright’s definition of cogency 
enables him to utilize the notion of warrant transmission to make better sense of our 
normative judgments about arguments.  Consider a question-begging argument.  One obvious 
defect in such an argument is that one’s belief in the premises would not be justified (i.e., the 
premises would not be acceptable) unless one’s belief in the conclusion was already justified.  
In Wright’s words, warrant fails to transmit over the inference of the argument.   
To illustrate the point further, consider Wright’s famous “soccer inference”, in which 
we are told to imagine seeing a player being congratulated after kicking a ball into the net 
and then considering the following inference:  
(vii) A goal has just been scored. 
(viii) A game of soccer is in progress.23 
The problem with the above inference understood as an argument is that it fails to transmit 
warrant from premise to conclusion.  Whatever warrant I have for the inference’s premise I 
have only because I already have warrant for its conclusion.  That I saw a ball kicked through 
the net by a player who then received congratulations from his teammates serves as evidence 
for (vii), but this observation is only evidence for (vii) under the assumption that a soccer 
game is in progress.  For, as Wright rightly points out, if I were to find out that a soccer 
movie was being filmed on the field, my warrant for (vii) would be defeated.  
Consider another famous example from Dretske (1970) that is given as potential 
problem for closure under known entailment, unlike the soccer inference. 
                                                           
22Wright. 2000. Cogency and question-begging: some reflections on McKinsey’s paradox and Putnam’s proof. 
Noûs 34: 140-63. 
23Wright. 2002. (Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 65: 330–348. 
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(ix) That is a zebra. 
(x) So, that is not a cleverly disguised mule.24 
This inference, like the soccer inference, fails to transmit warrant from premise to 
conclusion.  If I know that the black-and-white-striped animal I am looking at while at the 
zoo is a zebra, then my knowledge provides me with no extra reason to believe (ix).  It's true 
that (x) follows from (ix)—and can be made to follow “logically” from (ix) by adding as a 
premise that no zebra is a mule—but as I have argued already, this fact is not enough to 
ensure the goodness of a given argument.   
Now, I do not want to deny that one may know (x) on the basis of one’s perceptual 
evidence.  But since (ix) is warranted in the very same way, the zebra inference is not cogent.  
For no one could be “moved to rational conviction of the truth of its conclusion” without 
evidence or reasoning independent from the argument itself. 
Being moved to rational conviction of truth does not mean gaining knowledge, for 
one could be moved to rational conviction of the truth of a false proposition.  What then does 
Wright have in mind by “moved…to rational conviction”?  He says, “a transmissible warrant 
should make for the possible advancement of knowledge, or warranted belief,” so the 
possibility of an argument being such that it can move someone to rational conviction of the 
truth of its conclusion requires that the argument be comprised of a set of premises and 
conclusion and an inference that transmits warrant such that someone who has warrant for 
the premises could also come to have warrant for the conclusion.25  In short, to be moved to 
rational conviction is to be persuaded in the right way – i.e. to be rationally persuaded.  An 
argument that transmits warrant provides a new warrant for belief in the conclusion.  An 
                                                           
24 Dretske. 1970. Epistemic operators, Journal of Philosophy, 67: 1015–1016. 
25 Wright (2002: 332). 
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argument's cogency amounts to its potential to rationally persuade someone of said 
argument's conclusion (in certain argumentative contexts). 
 Although cogency brings to bear the kind of epistemic-pragmatic notions that I think 
are necessary for a good theory of argument, it is important to note that cogency does not, by 
itself, serve as a suitable criterion of good argument.  One issue to consider is that an 
argument that is cogent from my perspective might not be from someone else’s perspective.  
Another issue is that an argument may be cogent but nevertheless bad.  For instance, an 
argument to the conclusion that no one will win a large enough lottery has acceptable 
premises, relevant to the conclusion that together move one to rational conviction of the truth 
of its conclusion.  Or at least these premises would rationally persuade one of its conclusion 
if one did not already reject that conclusion.  In fact, under certain definitions, a paradox is 
“…an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from 
apparently acceptable premises.”26  So a paradoxical argument might have premises that, 
when reasonably believed, rationally compel one to accept a conclusion one knows to be 
false.   
The Dialectical Approach 
Like the epistemic approaches to argumentation, dialectical approaches to 
argumentation (DAA) agree that we must appeal to features of arguments that are not internal 
to the argument.  In other words, dialectical approaches take into account pragmatic features 
of arguing to assess the relative goodness of any given act of arguing.  In Fallacies, Hamblin 
suggests that fallacy theory should shift its perspective from argument to dialectic.27  By 
shifting from the context of arguments to the context of dialogues, we have set ourselves up 
                                                           
26 Sainsbury (1995). Paradoxes Second Edition Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1. 
27 Hamblin (1970).  
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to construct a dialogical model on which we can formulate the rules of dialogue.  The model 
will provide us with evaluations not of an argument, but of “a technique of argumentation 
that is used wrongly.”28  For when an argumentative maneuver is “used in a 
counterproductive way to steer discussion away from its proper goals or even in an 
aggressive attempt to close off the effective possibilities of an adversary’s critical question in 
dialogue,” the maneuver is fallacious (258).  
Consider one view that falls under the DAA: Douglas Walton’s Pragmatic View.  For 
Walton, our evaluations of reasoning conform to traditional logic, but our evaluations of 
argument are pragmatic.  Logic is thus seen as obviously ill-equipped to give us an account 
of any theory belonging to a larger theory of argumentation.  The distinction is borne out of 
his respective definitions of reasoning – “propositions…joined into steps of inference by a 
warranted inference,” and argument – “a use of reasoning to contribute to a talk exchange or 
conversation called a dialogue.”29   
According to Walton, we engage in various types of dialogues, all of which have 
distinct goals.  The goal of critical discussion, for instance, “is to resolve a conflict of 
opinions” and the goal of inquiry “is to prove whether a particular proposition is true (or 
false).”30  Some types of dialogues, like negotiations – where it “is not truth or falsity, but 
rather money or some kind of goods, economic resources, or other items of value that are at 
issue” – are not exactly epistemically relevant.”31  
                                                           
28 Walton. 1995. A pragmatic theory of fallacies. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press. p. 238. 
29 Walton (1995: 254). 
30 Walton (1995: 99-100). 
31 Walton. 1998. The new dialectic: conversational contexts of argument. Toronto; Buffalo: University of 
Toronto Press. p. 100. 
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Walton distinguishes between fallacies and less serious argumentative mistakes.  An 
argumentative technique counts as fallacious “if it twists some scheme or theme of argument 
rightly used in some context of dialogue to the advantage of the participant who has made the 
move or sequence of moves in (possibly another) context of dialogue.”32  Take, for example, 
the fallacy of begging the question.  Here is Walton’s characterization:  
To commit the fallacy of begging the question is a serious matter that involves an 
aggressive attempt by one participant in a context of dialogue to use a circular 
sequence of argumentation to try to convince another participant erroneously and 
misleadingly that he (the first participant) has properly met the burden of proof 
appropriate for this context.  Thus to commit a fallacy involves more than just 
inadvertently arguing in a circle.33 
 
But according to Walton, inadvertently arguing in a circle is not counted as a fallacy, but as a 
blunder, a less egregious argumentative move.  This undercuts the original motivation for 
shifting to the dialectical perspective: that theories focused on arguments (rather than 
dialogues) will be forced to relativize judgments of fallaciousness to individuals.  The 
pragmatic view will be forced to relativize our judgments about fallacies (viz., begging the 
question) to individual motivations, just as an epistemic approach would have it. 
Under the dialectical approach, if an argument is bad, it is bad because it breaks a rule 
of some dialogue.  If it is good, it is good because it contributes to satisfying the goals of the 
dialogue in question; whether the arguer accepts the argument is beside the point.  On this 
model, an argument is a tool that is used by an individual to satisfy some goal of the dialogue 
in which they participate.  The goal will depend on the type of dialogue, according to most 
theories, but since I am concerned only with argumentation, I will narrow my scope and 
assume that the goal in question is the rational persuasion of one’s interlocutor, the resolution 
                                                           
32 Walton (1995: 235). 
33 Walton (1995: 234). 
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of a disagreement, or something else that leads to an epistemic improvement for at least one 
of the arguers.  (This leaves out dialogues like negotiations as characterized by Walton). 
There are two problems with the dialectical approach.  First, it falsely assumes that 
whether an arguer accepts the argument in any given dialogue is irrelevant to the argument’s 
goodness.  The way we argue suggests that it does matter whether our interlocutors accept 
the arguments they advance.  If I discover my colleague accepts the argument she advances 
when I reject its conclusion, the fact that she disagrees with me should play a role in figuring 
out how to progress.  The fact that one’s peer accepts an argument one rejects is evidence (at 
least a little) against the rationality of one’s rejection.  And this makes sense: we take our 
peers, primarily, as pursuers of truth, understanding, or some other epistemic good, not mere 
persuasion.  (Of course this is not so when we know our interlocutor is putting on a show).  If 
I advance an argument I don't accept, then my interlocutor would think that I did accept it.  
And if she is rational, this would play a role in whether she accepts the argument.   
Second, the dialectical approach presupposes that there is such a thing as an ideal 
model of rational discourse, and furthermore, that such a model will depend ultimately on the 
goals of a given dialogue.  Suppose we came to determine that the ideal of rational discourse 
involved the eradication of some or other problematic belief.  It might be in our best interest, 
pragmatically speaking, to get others to give up said belief by any means whatsoever.  But 
recall that our pragmatic interests here correspond to whether an argument contributes to the 
goals of the dialogue.  So, if the primary goal of the dialogue is to resolve disagreement, it 
might also be in our epistemic best interest to employ non-rational persuasive tactics in an 
attempt to get others to fall into line and give up the problematic belief in question.  I do not 
see, however, how non-rational persuasive tactics (like pounding one’s fist, or threatening 
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one’s interlocutor, etc.) would count as rational argumentation, even if they contributed to 
the satisfaction of the goals of the dialogue. 
The goals and methods of the dialectical approach are interrelated.  There are certain 
methods that are intuitively rational in a context and others that are not.  Pounding one’s fist 
or threatening, for example, are irrational means of persuasion when they persuade.34  But the 
dialectical theorist says that we should do whatever is necessary to achieve the goal of the 
dialogue in question, and that doing so is rational.  In other words, acting rationally in 
argumentation requires that one choose whatever methods are necessary to satisfy the goal.  
But this seems to leave open the problematic possibility that threatening one’s interlocutor is 
the most rational move to make in a rational dialogue.  Any good account of rational 
argumentation should count such actions as irrational. 
Ultimately, I think dialectical approaches to argument/argumentation make the same 
mistake as logical approaches: in an effort to make sense of normative judgments in the 
sphere of argumentation, they abstract away from the actual features of argumentation to 
some idealized abstract entity like argument (for logical approaches) or dialogue (for 
dialectical approaches).  Proponents of the dialectical approach are right to shift the focus 
away from arguments, but the notion of dialogue is no less abstract than argument.  Even if 
we were to assure ourselves that the individuals who participate with us in dialogue were 
conceiving of the dialogue in the same way we were (i.e. our goals lined up) and even if we 
were confident that they were not attempting to persuade us through coercion, we would still 
need to know the dialogical rules of rational argumentation to check our judgments.  And, 
                                                           
34Unless one is trying to persuade one’s interlocutor that people do in fact pound their fists, etc.  I have already 
discussed how arguments via exemplification pose a challenge to formal characterizations of argumentative 
excellence and will have more to say about them in what follows. 
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just like the logical theory, the dialectical theory inevitably reveals deep disagreements about 
those rules, disagreements that would be unresolvable, since the dialogue’s participants 
would permit or prohibit different dialectical maneuvers based on their respective accepted 
rule sets. 
Pragma-Dialectics 
 
 All approaches so far have been approaches developed (largely) by and for analytic 
philosophers.  There are other approaches, however, that eschew the analytic bend for a more 
interdisciplinary feel.  I won’t rehearse all the details here, but I would like to discuss an 
alternative which I find to be of importance to the project at hand: the pragma-dialectical 
view.  
The pragma-dialectical approach aims to bridge the gap between the normative and 
descriptive aspects of argumentation by refocusing our discussion on the “functional 
rationale” of argumentation.35  The approach is only a piece of a larger pragma-dialectical 
project that consists in (i) developing a model of acceptable argumentation from an ideal 
model of philosophical reasonableness, and (ii) conducting empirical investigations to make 
sense of how we actually argue.  On PDA, individual arguers play a role as nodes in a larger 
network; PDA aims to explain how the network functions and provide us with the tools to 
strategically maneuver within it.  Although I find the project as a whole, and this piece in 
particular, to be fascinating, it diverges from mine along the rational dimension.  I intend my 
theory to also provide evaluations of individual argumentative acts that are not bad because 
inefficient or otherwise detrimental to the functional rationale of the system, but because they 
are manifestly irrational. 
                                                           
35 Van Eemeren (1995: 133). 
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PDA, like DAA, suffers from potential irresolvable disagreements about the 
correctness of the norms associated with argumentation.  Since PDA takes argumentation to 
be part of a larger whole (critical discussion) which is supposed to work towards resolving 
disagreements, we might also wonder what constitutes a resolution of a disagreement.   
Van Eemeren (and Houtlosser) have begun to attempt to rectify the early 
shortcomings of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation by introducing the notion 
of “strategic maneuvering,” which brings in rhetoric features of argumentation (like the fact 
that most people argue not to resolve disagreements, but to resolve them in a way that 
benefits our own interests).  As Tindale puts it, “strategic maneuvering is the attempt to 
monitor reasonableness (seen in dialectic) and effectiveness (seen in rhetoric).”36  When I 
think of strategy, I think of a game or of war.  There is no doubt in my mind that the typical 
conception of argument – the one that permeates through philosophers and non-philosophers 
alike – is one that is framed on a metaphor of war.  And in one way, I am happy to admit that 
there is something right about the metaphor.  We philosophers who desire to engage in 
rational argumentation have a common enemy.  That enemy takes many forms – the 
authoritarian, the solipsist, the global skeptic, the sophist – but one thing they all have in 
common is that they inhibit our freedom to argue responsibly and to solve problems without 
resorting to violence, insofar as we can.37  Though it may sometimes seem like it, this is not a 
game. 
                                                           
36 Tindale, C. 2015. The philosophy of argument and audience reception. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. p. 16. 
37 I don’t want to make any controversial claims about the role violence might or might not play in interpersonal 
communication at large, or argumentation in particular. Although pervasive quietism is a vice, staying quiet on 
certain issues at certain points in our dialogue can be permissible.  And although dogmatism is a vice, being 
dogmatic on certain issues at certain points in our dialogue can be permissible. 
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Similar to the way LAA centers on “the argument” as their object of investigation, and 
similar to the way DAA centers on “the dialogue” as theirs, PDA focuses in on the ideal of 
“critical discussion”.  But like LAA and DAA, PDA leaves out certain dynamics of 
argumentation that inevitably play a role relevant to our ratio-argumentative successes and 
failures.  Consider the following example to see why. 
Suppose I know Sarah and Dillon very well. I have practiced seeing things from 
their perspectives and I know the types of arguments they like and the ones they 
dislike. Suppose further that I come to find out that they disagree with me about 
the truth of theory T.  I simulate Dillon’s perspective to the best of my ability and 
judge that the most efficient way of rationally persuading him of T is to advance 
argument X, whose premises he has no antecedent reason to reject. I then 
simulate Sarah’s perspective to the best of my ability and determine that the most 
efficient way of rationally persuading her of T is to advance argument Y, whose 
premises she has no antecedent reason to reject.  But, as it turns out, argument X 
includes a premise that I have good reason to believe Sarah would reject and 
argument Y includes a premise that I have good reason to believe Dillon would 
reject. 
 
So, what should I do? On the one hand, I could attempt to argue with them right then 
and there.  But then when I advanced argument X to Dillon, he might piggyback on Sarah’s 
rejection of the premise, a premise he now has at least some reason to reject (on account of 
Sarah rejecting it.).  This would frustrate my chances of rational persuasion.  And the same 
can be said for when I advance argument Y to Sarah in the presence of Dillon.  Maybe this is 
the best I can do, rationally speaking.   
On the other hand, I could get each of them alone and attempt to rationally persuade 
him or her in isolation.  Per assumption, advancing argument X to Dillon and Y to Sarah is 
the most efficient way to rational persuasion.  And, at least on the face of it, I have some sort 
of responsibility to make available to my interlocutors what I see are the most damning 
critiques to their beliefs from their perspective.  If I anticipate that they won’t take these 
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arguments as seriously when in the presence of one another, then perhaps getting them alone 
is, after all, the most rational thing to do.38 
But there also seems to be something insincere, disingenuous, even manipulative 
about responding in this way to increase my chances of persuading them.  If it became a 
widespread practice to get others alone to argue with them, people might then start to 
deliberately surround themselves with people who will vociferously defend their beliefs on 
their behalf.  This might lead to a type of irrational deference to others, eroding one’s self-
confidence, stability, even sanity. 
What about in a case where my correspondence with Dillon does not overlap with my 
correspondence with Sarah?  Suppose, for instance, that Sarah and I debate the truth of T on 
Sunday morning.  In such a case, I don’t seem to be acting irrationally if I advance an X-like 
argument.  And if Dillon and I talk in that evening after Sarah leaves, I am not acting 
irrationally in advancing Y-like arguments in attempting to persuade him of T.  How am I 
irrational when I advance X to Dillon after I intentionally get him alone, but not irrational to 
advance it to him in a situation that is the same except lacks intentionality?  
On my account, the irrationality arises from my insincerity in the “premeditated” 
case.  Sorensen says that “[r]ationality, like fitness, is relative to environment” (EC: 504). 
Similarly, we might say that epistemic rationality is relative to the epistemic environment.  
Since other agents are necessarily part of our epistemic environment, the relations that hold 
between us play an important role in our rationalities.  When I am arguing in an insincere, 
                                                           
38 In this case, if they come to find out that they now agree with me (and each other) about theory T, they might 
ask each other why, before finding out that they believe T for different reasons – reasons that the other rejects!  
And this might undercut the force of my original arguments.  But it’s also possible that they never talk about it 
in the future, in which case this would not even come up.  
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close-minded, or otherwise irrational way, I am not simply expressing my internal flaws, I 
am impressing them onto others.  My irrationality wouldn’t come from flouting the 
“functional rationale”, or from breaking a rule of rational dialogue, or from dialectical 
inefficiency, or from a logical flaw, but from the coercive epistemic attitudes I embody. 
The Virtue-Epistemic Approach 
The only approach that is adequate to coherently diagnose the above type of case is 
one that concentrates on how we connect as epistemic or rational agents.  Under my virtue 
theoretic approach to argumentation, a premeditated argumentative maneuver like the one I 
described above is insincere (and coercive).  And, as far as I can tell, no other view but a 
virtue theory can adequately handle nuanced cases like these.  I propose that a virtue 
argumentation theory centered on empathy and open-mindedness can do this.  The correct 
shift, I think, is from arguments to arguers and so the normative status of arguments is 
inextricably linked up with how we, as agents, interact when arguing.  (In this way, an 
argument written down and an argument uttered in discourse might differ in their normative 
status, even if they are equivalent tokens of the same argument type.)  On my account, a good 
argument is one that exemplifies a success in empathy on the part of the arguer, where 
empathy is understood as the capacity to simulate the perspective of another.  Imaginatively 
understanding an interlocutor allows one to contribute to the goals of the dialogue and 
improve the epistemic status of that participant.  Cognitive empathy therein promotes a 
defensible argumentative ideal: constructing an argument that would persuade a virtuous 
arguer.  A virtuous arguer grasps the minds of her audience and appropriately responds to 
their content, where “proper” response is defined in terms of open-mindedness and allied 
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virtues.  When wrought in this way, changes in the audience’s beliefs are not coerced, and 
this is the essence of rational persuasion.   
A formal theorist might object right away and say that a theory of argument should 
allow us to judge an argument as good or bad regardless of whether it in fact persuades 
someone.  The formal theorist insists that they can abstract away from the pragmatic features 
of argumentation and rely on an unbiased perspective to give a fair evaluation of the 
argument.  For example, if someone who believes Utilitarianism is false considers the best 
argument for Utilitarianism, they are still able to judge the argument as “good,” even if they 
take there to be overwhelming evidence against the truth of the theory and see no way of 
being rationally persuaded by it.  But wouldn't the virtuous arguer just be the one who 
accepts all the arguments that support the correct views?  And if utilitarianism is false, 
wouldn't the virtuous arguer reject any argument that supports it, especially the best ones?   
I believe that such an objection follows from a misunderstanding of my theory.  The 
mistaken assumption made by the formal theorist above is that we can imagine the cognitive 
architecture of the virtuous arguer.  We can only, however, simulate the minds of individuals 
whose cognitive architecture is by and large the same as ours.  And an idealized virtuous 
agent understood as one who accepts all the correct theories is an idealization we as humans 
could never live up to.  In short, the virtuous arguer is infallible; it is an unattainable ideal 
because we, by nature, are fallible.   
Instead of attempting to simulate the virtuous arguer, I suggest we simulate a virtuous 
arguer.  A good argument is one that a virtuous arguer would be (rationally) persuaded by 
given a certain worldview or mindset.  There is nothing incoherent if I conceive of a virtuous 
arguer who accepts utilitarianism, even if I know utilitarianism is false.   
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In figuring out whether a virtuous arguer would accept a given argument, I must 
attempt to accurately simulate the perspective of the idealized (or as close to idealized as 
possible) version of a utilitarian.  Maybe I know someone who is one and so I talk to them in 
an effort to understand.  Maybe I read John Stuart Mill’s work fifteen more times.  At any 
rate, the more I understand the utilitarian’s perspective, the easier it is for me to discern the 
arguments that would be judged good from the utilitarian’s perspective.   
If we relativize the notion of cogency to individual world-views or mindsets (or 
something similar), we can say that the attempt to accurately simulate the perspective of a 
virtuous arguer (given some worldview or mindset) essentially involves the construction of 
cogent arguments from their perspective.  And since cogency amounts to potential to 
rationally persuade, rational persuasion will also be relativized to a perspective, as it should 
be.   
3. Empathy and Virtue in Argumentation (The Good and Bad of Arguing) 
A virtuous arguer should aim to be open-minded, creative, and sincere by walking the 
line between two incompatible irrational attitudes – stubbornness and spinelessness – that 
threaten to derail our practice of rational argumentation.  To cultivate these virtues, the 
arguer should at once be both confident and humble with respect to herself as an epistemic 
agent, she should engage in both critique and reflection when she revises her epistemic 
attitudes, and she should be both self-reliant and coordinative in her attempts to improve her 
own or another's epistemic status through argumentation and other forms of discourse. 
The virtuous arguer thinks for herself and with others.  Her ability to engage in the 
practice of empathic simulation allows her to best approximate the perspectives of others in 
such a way that is neither egocentric nor otherizing.  Working with others, of course, requires 
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coordination.  Working on one’s own requires self-reliance.  Both require trust.  Sincerity, 
which can be defined as the mean between the epistemic vices of mimicry and manipulation, 
enables one to construct arguments that represent one’s defense of a position on some matter 
in such a way that one can be understood by one’s interlocutors.  Just because an argument is 
rationally persuasive from one’s own perspective does not mean that it will be rationally 
persuasive from one’s interlocutor’s perspective.  So, if one is attempting to rationally 
persuade, one must construct an argument that is rationally persuasive from one’s 
interlocutor’s perspective.  If one is unwilling to take the perspective of one’s interlocutor, 
then one will have a hard time rationally persuading anyone.  If one is too willing, one will 
be too easily persuaded.  Instead, one must be open-minded, attempting to hit the mean 
between stubborn dogmatism and spineless skepticism.  Since arguing is a discursive practice 
that is typically employed as a means to rational persuasion, and rational persuasion can be 
defined as changing minds in a rational way, the construction of a good argument requires 
the epistemic virtue of creativity, defined as the mean between the two vices of stagnation 
and instability.  One must utilize creativity to construct one’s arguments in such a way that 
they will provide a new way of seeing things for one’s interlocutor.39  In rational 
argumentation with a dissenting epistemic peer, one resists crumbling into isolationist 
skepticism or insisting dogmatism, opting instead for cooperation through conciliation.  We 
can actively avoid persistent agnosticism by reflecting on the original evidence together; re-
evaluating the degree to which it supports our original beliefs together; and trying to explain 
to one another exactly how it could be that we, as “peers,” independently drew contrary 
conclusions from this same body of evidence.  If the explanation comes down to our 
                                                           
39 I have followed my own advice and have included virtue diagrams in the preface of this dissertation. 
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speaking from importantly unique perspectives, perhaps we can help each other see the 
evidence in a new light.  Even better, we might attempt to reconcile our disagreement by 
engaging someone who we both consider an epistemic peer, or search for a new, less biased 
perspective to help us negotiate our impasse. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I investigate these epistemic virtues and vices: a set 
of epistemic attitudes and actions relevant to our argumentative activities.  In particular, I am 
interested in questions concerning the relative rationality of individual arguers who engage in 
the cooperative activity of rational argumentation.  In argumentation, people advance and 
respond to arguments.  The arguments are intended to represent the arguer’s view (i.e., their 
attitudes, beliefs, actions) on some matter and they are advanced in an attempt to positively 
influence another.  When two people argue in good faith in an effort to rationally persuade 
one another, they engage in what they conceptualize as rational argumentation.  But two 
people can conceptualize their discourse as an attempt at rational argumentation while 
criticizing each other for the irrationality of the arguments to which they give voice.  These 
allegations are legion, but I am particularly interested in the allegation that one party to a 
dispute has undermined the rationality of her argument by indulging in “circularity” of some 
sort.  I analyze “circularity” as a charge brought against the normative status of an argument 
whose goodness depends on whether the person advancing that argument committed an 
empathic failure of some sort.   
The Mean 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean says that a virtue is the mean between two extremes: 
one, which is an excess, and the other a deficiency in a given magnitude.40  I hypothesize that 
                                                           
40 Aristotle. Niomachean Ethics: 1106a26-b28. 
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we can extend this idea from moral practice to the practice of argumentation and say that a 
good arguer finds the mean between two extremes: stubbornness and spinelessness.  The 
former is reflected in question-begging arguments, whose acceptance results in a deficiency 
of humility (or, equivalently, excessive confidence).  The latter is reflected in self-defeating 
arguments, whose acceptance results in an excess of humility (or, equivalently, a deficiency 
of confidence).  The epistemically appropriate balance of humility and confidence is 
exemplified by the virtue of open-mindedness. 
Open-mindedness consists in the skillful deployment of empathic ability, which is in 
turn understood as the capacity to simulate the perspective of another.  I use this same 
framework to analyze two more specific applications of cognitive empathy: sincerity and 
creativity, which are both essential to responsible argumentation.  Responsible argumentation 
requires sincerity in our forms of expression and creativity in our efforts to resolve those 
disagreements we must resolve for pragmatic reasons.  When it is understood as a "master 
virtue," open-mindedness is a way of utilizing sincerity and creativity for appropriate ends, 
and it is the surest route to epistemic progress. 
Sincerity helps us understand ourselves because it requires us to act and present as 
ourselves when arguing so that our actions are accurate representations of what we think and 
the rational basis for why we think it.  This self-understanding gives us a better idea of when 
to rely on ourselves and when to coordinate with others.  And creativity, which requires us to 
cut loose from the ropes that bind our typical patterns of thinking, allows us to explore 
ourselves.  In this way, creativity can be a catalyst to novel discovery: if we learn to utilize 
the malleability of our minds, we will be more amenable to changes in our patterns of 
thinking in the appropriate circumstances.  The same virtue-theoretic treatment given to 
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open-mindedness will be given to both sincerity and creativity.  First, however, we must lay 
the foundation for what is to come. 
Empathic Argumentation 
Imagine you are talking to a friend about philosophy and that you are quite familiar 
with her argumentative actions/reactions.  For instance, suppose she is hypercritical of X-
type arguments because of her standing philosophical commitments and that you are justified 
in believing this based on past occurrences in which you attempted to argue in favor of some 
claim by appealing to an X-type argument.  (In other words, you have good reason to expect 
how she will react to X-type arguments when they are advanced in the setting of rational 
argumentation.)  On one occasion, however, your friend seems all too willing to accept that 
your X-type argument is a good one.   
What is the rational response in such a situation?  I submit that basking in the glory of 
having (finally) gotten through to her would be objectionably dogmatic given your 
expectations of how your friend would respond to X-type arguments.  Rather, you should 
rehearse what you thought your friend would say in an effort to remind her of what she 
usually says about X-type arguments.  For if you took her opinions seriously in the past, then 
her (all-too-willing) acceptance of your argument at this juncture should make you give 
pause to the assumption that you actually have gotten through to her. 
In what does this rehearsal of your friend’s way of thinking consist in?  Roy Sorensen 
suggests that in the activity of empathic simulation is essential to successful argumentation.  
As he puts it: 
When I argue with you, I try to advance an argument that is rationally 
persuasive from your perspective. The arguments fail because they cannot be 
perceived as good arguments by their intended audience. To this extent, 
`rationally persuasive argument' is response-dependent. A rationally 
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persuasive argument must be such that it can be perceived as such by those it 
is directed at. Thus part of the arguer's task is to step into his adversary's shoes 
and appraise the argument from his opposed viewpoint.41 
 
Sorensen extends this line of thinking to give an empathic analysis of the fallacy of begging 
the question.  A failure to advance an argument in order to persuade one’s interlocutor that 
“can be perceived as [rationally persuasive] by those it is directed at” is an empathic failure, 
a failure to appropriately simulate one’s interlocutor in the context of argumentation. 
If the arguer is to appreciate and appropriately respond to the perspectives of others in 
argumentation, the arguer must perform a perspective shift.  The idea of a “perspective shift” 
is elucidated by appeals to our natural ability to empathize with one another, in the broad 
sense of “empathy” on which it denotes the capacity to appreciate and appropriately respond 
to perspectives of others.  First and foremost, this requires charitable interpretation.42  The 
principle of charity (PC), extended to argumentation, rationally requires an arguer, S1, to 
interpret her interlocutor, S2, as “rational” or “coherent” in her articulated views.  Typically, 
in communication, PC requires S1 to interpret S2’s beliefs, desires, intentions, and other 
relevant cognitive states as being part of a coherent system that helps S1 “make sense” of 
S2’s actions.  The resulting model will not be perfect, since necessarily S2’s cognitive states 
are (at best) transparent to S2 and no one else.  But the model gives S1 the best chance to 
take seriously the perspective of S2, to understand what S2 believes and the rational basis for 
those beliefs. 
                                                           
41 Sorensen (1999). An empathic theory of circularity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 508. 
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Empathic Simulation 
Not much argument is needed in defense of why we should try to understand one 
another’s perspectives when, or even before, we argue.  But how should one respond to the 
perspective of other without direct or introspective access to their cognitive states?  On 
theory-theory, we access an already held theory of human behavior, a so-called “folk 
psychology,” which we then utilize to reason theoretically to conclusions about another's 
mind.43  On simulation-theory, the activity is not theoretical, but instead involves an 
imaginative episode of mental projection where one simulates the perspective of another 
(Gordon 1986, Goldman 1989, 2006).44  Although there is considerable discussion 
surrounding this debate, arguing for simulation theory is not within the scope of this work.45  
In what follows I will give enough of the broad strokes of simulation-theory for the reader to 
understand its usefulness to the current project.  I will not get into complicated and detailed 
accounts about how our minds or nervous systems enable us to engage in exercises of 
simulation, and I will only briefly touch on debates surrounding different theories of 
simulation.46   
How does the process of simulation work?  Let us consider an example that might 
help us answer this question.  Suppose that Sally believes that (1) All cats like to knock over 
glasses of water and that (2) Scribbles is a cat.  Now, Suppose Fran, who knows that Sally 
believes (1) and (2), attempts to simulate Sally’s perspective and in doing so attributes to 
                                                           
43 Defenders of the theory-theory include Carruthers & Smith. 1996. Simulation and self-knowledge: a defense 
of theory-theory, in Carruthers & Smith (eds.) 1996, 22–68.   
44 Gordon (1986), Goldman (1989, 2006).   
45 For a nice layout of the debate, see Heal (1994), Simulation vs theory-theory: what is at issue? in Christopher 
Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of 
Mind (Proceedings of the British Academy, 83), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 129–144. 
46 Goldman (2006) is a good place to survey such accounts. 
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Sally the further belief that (3) Scribbles likes to knock over glasses of water.  Gordon and 
Goldman disagree about the role introspection plays in a simulation like this. 
Goldman believes introspection plays a key role in simulation.  On his model, there 
are three stages of the process.  In the first stage, Fran imagines herself believing (1) and (2).  
In the second stage, she introspects on these simulated states and feeds them into an off-line 
reasoning process.  In the third stage, Fran attributes to Sally (3) on the basis of its being an 
output from feeding in the products of stage one into the reasoning mechanism in stage two.  
According to Goldman’s theory, the entire process of what I have been calling “simulation” 
involves a projection stage, what Goldman calls “the act of assigning a state of one’s own to 
someone else” (40).  When the simulation is completed, that is, after the empathizer 
successfully generates a simulated mental judgment, she must “pop out” from the simulation 
and attribute the state to the owner of the simulated perspective.   
Gordon, on the other hand, believes that introspection plays no role at all in 
simulation.  Instead, simulation starts by Fran imagining to be Sally by executing an “ego 
shift” so that “I” now refers to “Sally”.  So, in the context of the simulation, Fran believes (1) 
and (2), which produces in her the belief that (3).  According to Gordon, by asking herself 
whether she believes that (3), and upon answering in the affirmative, the simulation 
concludes with “I believe (3).”  Since Fran is just a simulated stand in for Sally, by making 
this judgment, she successfully represents Sally’s mental states without having to utilize 
introspection.  Rather, Fran simply performs an ego shift so she is centered back on herself. 
Instead of getting caught up in this debate, I will rely on the readers’ ability to 
intuitively grasp the idea that to simulate another’s perspective is to imaginatively adopt it.47  
                                                           
47Imaginatively adopting another’s perspective is much the same as thinking through a thought experiment.  
Other proponents of the simulation theory will point to psychological evidence about the workings of motor and 
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In truth, I lean towards Goldman’s view, but the details don’t matter much for the project at 
hand.  What’s important is that we recognize the toxicity of egocentric errors and our 
potential to assuage this toxicity through quarantining. 
So let us suppose that simulation theory of some sort is the correct view of our 
“mindreading” capabilities, that is, the ability to represent the mental states of another in our 
own minds.  When simulating the perspective of our interlocutors, we can think about it as 
running our reasoning capabilities “off line”, much like we can run our perceptual capacities 
“off line” when ensconced in an episode of visualization.48  After all, we do not actually 
come to adopt the mental states of our interlocutors when arguing with them, just as we do 
not actually see the shapes we are visualizing.  If we desire to empathize responsibly, we 
should attempt to quarantine certain of our own beliefs (and other mental states) to the best of 
our abilities. 
Simulation-theory holds that we initiate the simulation process by utilizing our own 
cognitive architecture.  But to construct an argument that would be judged cogent from 
someone else’s perspective, one must imaginatively perform a mental action within the 
simulated perspective.  We do not actually adopt the mental states of another person, but we 
must hold them in our minds to the extent that we can make judgments from the perspective 
that are affected by the imaginatively adopted mental states.  In order to do this, we must in a 
sense partition off our own mental states to the extent that it is possible so that they don’t 
unduly influence (i.e. distort) our simulated judgments.49  According to Goldman, we must 
                                                           
visual imagery to stress the ubiquity of the creative, imaginative aspect of empathy.  See: Currie & Ravenscroft. 
1997. Mental simulation and motor imagery. Philosophy of Science, 64(1): 161–80; Currie. 1995. Visual 
imagery as the simulation of vision. Mind and Language, 10(1–2): 25–44.  
48 Currie (1995). 
49 Gordon (1995), Goldman (2006). 
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“[quarantine our] own genuine states that don’t correspond to states of the target, that is, 
keeping such states from intruding into the simulation” (41).  To the extent that we fail to 
quarantine our own mental states, we run the risk of being susceptible to egocentric errors, 
attributing to our interlocutors simulated judgments that we would make in such a scenario 
but they would not.  Given the pervasiveness of such errors, simulation-theory’s ability to 
account for and offer guidance to avoid such errors speaks in its favor. 
One such bias is the “curse of knowledge,” on which our own knowledge of some 
matter infects our judgments about whether others know it as well.50  In short, we are more 
likely to attribute knowledge to someone else if we already have said knowledge.  A simple 
experiment conducted by Elizabeth Newton (1990) demonstrates this phenomenon.51  In the 
experiment, some subjects were asked to tap out the melodies of some well-known songs 
while others were asked to guess the song.  When asked whether the listeners would get it 
right, the tappers routinely overestimated the listeners’ ability to guess correctly, suggesting 
that the tappers had a difficult time quarantining their own mental states surrounding the 
tapped melodies.  
Responsible Simulation 
So how should we empathize when arguing?  A first pass would involve constructing 
a model by making predictions based on generalizations about how one’s interlocutor thinks.  
We can think of such a procedure as similar to theory-theory, on which we access a folk 
theory of psychology before reasoning theoretically about the target mind.  Or we can think 
of it as closer to Gordon’s model on which the simulator transforms herself into the 
                                                           
50 Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber. 1989. The curse of knowledge in economic settings: an experimental 
analysis. Journal of Political Economy.  
51 Story about Newton via Chip and Dan Heath. The curse of knowledge. Harvard Business Review.  
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simulated in her imagination before reasoning within the simulation.  The problem with such 
a procedure is that it would be susceptible to cognitive biases of which the arguer is not 
aware in its very first stage.   
How about a “bottom-up” approach on which one constructs a model of one’s 
interlocutor’s perspective by using oneself as a base model and assuming the cognitive states 
of one’s interlocutor are largely similar to one’s own before proceeding to tweak the model in 
light of any available evidence about the differences between the two?  According to 
Sorensen, since “[t]he broadest area for divergence between structurally similar people is 
variation in belief and desire,” once a base is set, the arguer can tweak her model for known 
differences in cognitive states relevant to the issue at hand.52  Such a procedure is more akin 
to Goldman’s theory. 
Does this procedure allow for differences in inference or reasoning patterns?  
Although I agree with Sorensen’s claim that “[m]any apparent divergences in inference 
patterns can be explained in terms of hidden disagreements and unshared goals,” I doubt all 
hidden disagreements and unshared goals can be easily explained through appeals to 
differences in belief and desires.  So when it comes to understanding another’s perspective 
through empathizing, one may need to do more than simply imagine a mind similar to one’s 
own plus or minus a few beliefs and desires.  In fact, contrary to Sorensen’s claim, I think we 
often encounter people whose reasoning patterns are largely incongruous with our own.  
(Perhaps complete incongruity is incompatible with our sharing a common language with 
which to frame our disagreements.)  If we have a chance at rationally persuading these 
parties (and to refrain from simply labeling them irrational) we must violate the principle of 
                                                           
52 Sorensen. 1998. Self-strengthening empathy. p. 85. 
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humanity (PH), which roughly says that “others reason from their perspective as I reason 
from mine,” since, at least sometimes, it is clear that others do not reason from their 
perspective as I reason from mine.53   
A person’s self-conceptions include a conception of her own epistemic agency, and a 
person’s sense of her epistemic agency depends on how she views herself in relation to 
others in the epistemic community.  Examples of “epistemic communities” might be 
academic departments, classrooms, or chat rooms.  If many of the members of a given 
epistemic community successfully represent themselves to a participant as being experts in 
the domain discussed by that community, she will likely view herself as less capable than she 
would have had those members represented themselves as merely competent to contribute to 
discussion or even incompetent for these purposes.  Of course, sometimes, we are less 
competent than those we debate; sometimes more.  Often competence is itself hard to define 
much less measure.  When members of a group convince a participant that they are less 
competent than they really are, she will likely develop an inflated sense of her own 
credibility.  If many of those she takes to be her peers treat her as an epistemic inferior, when 
in fact she is not, she might stop trusting herself.  If her peers, on the other hand, treat her as 
an epistemic superior when in fact she is not, she might develop an inflated sense of her own 
credibility, perpetuating myths and promulgating errors she would have corrected had she 
developed the habits of self-criticism that come from internalization of an expert’s 
perspective. 
In feminist epistemology, standpoint theory has highlighted the epistemic importance 
of perspectival differences that arise from one’s social location.  Standpoint theory supports 
                                                           
53 R. Sorensen. 2004. Charity implies meta-charity. 312.   
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the claim that one’s epistemic perspective depends on social and material location.54  As an 
example, consider people of color in the United States of America who have had to deal with 
the structures that maintain and reinforce systemic racism their whole lives.  People of color 
know what it is like to deal with racism all the time.  They have a sense of how white people 
see them and this affects how they see themselves.  In contrast, many white people don’t 
have to think about how people of color see them as they might not find themselves 
depending for the cooperation of people of color for the satisfaction of their ends.  More 
generally, a member of a marginalized group in a community has an epistemic privilege on 
account of bearing certain social and material relations to her environment that are not shared 
by people outside her group.  (This might lend to the explanation for why white people have 
such a tough time understanding systemic racism.)   
Since a person’s self-conception as a reasoner or an arguer is tied up with her self-
conception of her epistemic agency (a construct which includes her level of confidence), her 
self-conception as a reasoner or arguer will be affected by her standing in her epistemic 
community.  It may be that were the other members of the community to adopt her 
perspective, different issues would arise in their communications, leading to a transformative 
shift in the functioning of the unit.  For example, the issues considered pressing in analytic 
philosophy might look a whole lot different if the discourse had been shaped by the 
perspectives of people in marginalized groups.55  Although it is only anecdotal, it seems to 
me that white people in America are much less likely than people of color to believe certain 
                                                           
54 For a good overview of Standpoint theory, including more recent developments in the field, see selected 
pieces from Harding (2004) The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader, including from black feminist thought 
(Collins, Harding, hooks). 
55 West, C. 1989. The American evasion of philosophy: a genealogy of pragmatism. Madison: University of 
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obvious truths about race, e.g. that racism exists.  This does not mean that white people (or 
men) cannot come to achieve the black or brown American (or feminist) standpoint.  It just 
means that they need to reflect on how the social and political structures in their communities 
relate to their own lived experiences so to avoid ego- and ethnocentric practices.  More 
determinately, white men need to listen to women and black and brown people to learn what 
they are experiencing.  In “starting out thought” from the perspective of the marginalized, 
perhaps members of the dominant group will be able to realize how their unexamined beliefs 
about race constructed from the confines of their own perspectives might negatively 
influence the direction of their intellectual endeavors to the detriment of the marginalized and 
themselves.  The resulting shared perspective may be more balanced, more just, and more 
reasonable.56  It may, to borrow from bell hooks, transform us, “individually, collectively, as 
we make radical creative space which affirms and sustains our subjectivity, which gives us a 
new location from which to articulate our sense of the world.”57  
Rather than manipulating a base model that favors our own perspectives or running 
the risk of bias in generalizing, we should start with a base model that is adaptable enough to 
represent the perspectives of ourselves and the perspectives of others, even if they disagree 
with us and even if they lack the reasoning skills we try so hard to live up to.  Why?  
Because our epistemic standing is partly dependent on the perspectives of others.  If our 
epistemic self-conceptions of our own epistemic agency are affected by social factors, so too 
are our self-conceptions of our own reasoning and argumentative practices.  Since empathic 
simulation plays such an integral role in taking the perspectives of others seriously, our base 
                                                           
56 For an excellent introduction to the considerable amount of literature on epistemic justice, see Fricker (2007). 
Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
57 hooks (2004). Choosing the margin as a space of radical openness. In Sandra G. Harding (ed.), The Feminist 
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models in responsible empathic simulation might also be affected by social factors.  Sure, 
over time we can revise the model, but its foundations will always be rooted in a perspective 
whose construction is susceptible to egocentric errors and limiting constraints based on 
others’ perspectives of you, perspectives which themselves are affected by racism and 
sexism.  
This third alternative route to empathy lays the groundwork for a three-step process 
of responsible empathic argumentation (REA).  In the first step of REA, the arguer should 
assume that her interlocutor’s perspective falls in the set of reasonable perspectives, unless 
she has good reasons to think otherwise.58  If she were to assume that her interlocutor’s 
perspective falls outside the set of reasonable perspectives, then argumentation would never 
get off the ground.  And if she were to advance an argument that is obviously rationally 
persuasive from her own perspective, but whose construction pays no mind to the differences 
in beliefs and inference patterns of her interlocutor, she would be irrational because 
dogmatic. 
What is involved in our counting each other’s perspectives as falling within the set of 
reasonable perspectives?  In essence, I conceive of the set of reasonable perspectives as those 
                                                           
58 This can be understood as requiring quite a bit in the way of epistemic virtue.  Can you argue with someone 
you know isn’t reasonable?  Well, if you have good reasons to think the other person’s perspective falls outside 
of the set of reasonable perspectives – say, if you know that the person’s position is internally inconsistent – you 
might still be able to argue with them, just not rationally.  For if cogent arguments are impotent against your 
interlocutor, you would have to resort to non-rational means of persuasion (viz., coercion) to make any progress 
in resolving a dispute.  These tactics are utilized for both good and bad purposes.  On the one hand, we can 
think of the NRA, which preys on people’s fears and insecurities to persuade people that they should be wary of 
attempts to amend our gun control policies.  But on the other hand, we can think of Kendrick Lamar, who, in his 
song “Alright,” raps “and we hate po-po, wanna kill us dead in the street for sho’.”  Both instances might be 
based in sentiments that are very real, but neither is an attempt at rational persuasion.  Often, when rational 
persuasion is off the table, and we want to avoid violence, our only remaining option is to participate in a 
discursive struggle for power.  This might come in the form of hyperbole, like in the case of the NRA, or in the 
form of art, like in the case of Kendrick Lamar.  When a fascist, whose perspective falls outside the set of 
reasonable perspectives, attempts to ‘debate’ an anti-fascist, anything from subtle manipulation to overt 
coercion should be favored over (the threat of) violence.  
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perspectives which are at least minimally rational.  This includes, at the very least, arguing in 
good faith, being open to other perspectives, and being willing to change your mind when 
engaged in rational argumentation.  If someone’s perspective leads them to dismiss the 
possibility of rational argumentation, if it precludes them from understanding their 
interlocutor, or if it seals itself off from counter evidence, then the perspective fails to live up 
to the minimal rationality requirement.  Since these failures are depressingly commonplace, 
“minimum rationality,” as I have defined it, is still quite substantive.  It should not be 
confused with notions of minimal rationality linked to very possession of a mind, perspective 
or intellect.  As I have defined it, minimal rationality is what a virtuous reasoner must assume 
her audience possesses if she is to fruitfully reason with them in a virtuous manner.  
Engaging in rational argumentation with individuals who lack minimal rationality (so 
understood) is fruitless.  Individuals in this class may still be persuadable, but they cannot be 
induced to change their minds through rational means—the means a virtuous arguer would 
employ.  When faced with such an audience, virtuous arguers must make an all-things-
considered choice as to whether or not to disengage or utilize non-rational, less-than-ideally 
virtuous tactics of argumentation.  This choice will crucially depend on the moral or practical 
importance of changing minds on the issue at hand and the costs of employing less-than-ideal 
means to this end.  For example, PETA uses shocking imagery to alter opinions on cruelty to 
animals.  While this display of shocking imagery is not itself rational argumentation, and not 
the kind of persuasion a virtuous epistemic agent would use in rational discourse between 
open-minded people, it may be justified “all things considered,” given the great suffering it is 
designed to mitigate.   
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The second step of empathic argumentation requires the arguer to manipulate her base 
model to account for those differences between the parties to the dispute, which thereby 
increases the chances of rationally persuading her interlocutor.  If, for instance, I know you 
tend to be more skeptical than me, then I should amend my (simulated) attitude to reflect this.  
Failing to amend my attitude would frustrate my chances of constructing a (potentially) 
persuasive argument, i.e., an argument you would not dismiss on account of your skeptical 
leanings.  But making accurate adjustments to one’s base model can be tricky, as we will see 
in a few short moments.  
The third and final step of empathic simulation requires the arguer to judge potential 
arguments from her simulated perspective.  As I say above, if the arguer wants to increase the 
likelihood of rational persuasion, she would be wise to construct arguments that would be 
judged as rationally persuasive, not by her, but by her interlocutor.  Empathy allows her to do 
just this, at least if she is successful in her attempts to make adjustments so that her resulting 
simulation closely resembles her interlocutor’s state of mind.59 
Egocentricity, Otherization, and Isolation 
As I alluded to above, a problem arises in the second step of this model of rational 
argumentation when an arguer attempts to make accurate adjustments to address the 
difference between her own and her interlocutor’s perspective.  If the speaker fails to tweak 
her base model enough and models her interlocutor’s cognitive states as too similar to her 
own, she runs the risk of being egocentric in her persuasive tactics.  If she overcompensates 
                                                           
59 In a courtroom during a trial, lawyers on opposing sides are not trying to convince each other, but are both 
trying to persuade a judge or jury.  In such cases we can say that they are arguing on behalf of others (the 
plaintiff and the defendant) in an attempt to persuade a third party (the judge or jury).  Because there is a third 
party in these cases, the arguers needn’t simulate the perspectives of one another if they want to be successful, 
but they should simulate the perspectives of the third party that both are attempting to persuade. 
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and models her interlocutor’s cognitive states as more different from her own than they 
actually are, she runs the risk of being otherizing in her persuasive tactics.  Both errors 
frustrate the goal of rational argumentation and both lead down a path that ends in isolation. 
The dangers of egocentricity in our persuasive tactics are twofold.  First, when 
constructing an argument in an attempt to persuade, failing to respect the perspective of one’s 
interlocutor can result in extreme difficulties in successful persuasion as evidenced in the 
cases where people continue to argue when it is clear to all disinterested parties that there is 
no point to their doing so.  For example, recall the earlier case of the lottery where two 
people reason in similar ways to different conclusions about who won’t win the lottery even 
though their total evidence is the same.  They reach different conclusions only because they 
start their reasoning with different tickets.  Attempts to persuade one another about which 
tickets won’t win the lottery would never gain a footing because the dispute lacks rational 
grounds.  Like I said above, insisting that these tickets (as opposed to those tickets) won't win 
the lottery is no less irrational than holding a set of contradictory beliefs.  And second, one 
who fails again and again in her attempts to persuade but nevertheless resists accepting her 
interlocutor’s judgment might resort to either pounding her fist in a fit of objectionable 
dogmatism or, worse, employing other non-rational methods of persuasion like violence.  
Now, a frustrated debater might feel justified in employing these methods.  He or she might 
say: “Those people just won’t listen to reason – I tried to explain it to them.  What more do 
you want from me?”  The answer we should give if we know the party in question is 
minimally rational in the ways imagined is: empathize better and try again.  If we extend the 
idea of empathic failure to the domain of philosophy, in which our main tools of persuasion 
are arguments, such methods of persuasion, in conjunction with an overly dogmatic attitude, 
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could result in intellectual isolation from one’s peers.  “No chance for persuasion?  No 
chance for discussion.” 
So there is at least one case in which an arguer is egocentric in her persuasive tactics, 
a case in which she models her interlocutor ‘s cognitive states as more similar to her own than 
they actually are.60  When, if ever, do we assume that our interlocutor is more different from 
us than they in fact are?  We are probably guilty of this kind of behavior more than we would 
like to admit.  Often, when one thinks one’s interlocutor’s rational capacities are 
compromised, it leads one to presuppose that the interlocutor’s perspective lies outside of the 
set of rationally persuadable perspectives.  For instance, when one is engaged in rational 
discourse with someone who disagrees with her about the truth of her most firmly held 
beliefs, she might tweak her model of her interlocutor’s cognitive states in such a way that the 
interlocutor responses are outlandish or absurd in the simulation-produced model.  The 
implications of otherization may pull one either toward relativism – if one accepts the 
interlocutor’s position as one that is rationally on a par with one’s own – or toward skepticism 
– if one infers from the insoluble disagreement that neither is rational.  In the worst case, 
one’s perceived understanding of the interlocutor’s perspective as one that makes it impossible 
for the interlocutor to engage in rational discourse might motivate one to isolate said 
interlocutor from the rational community at large.  For instance, when a speaker is engaging 
with an interlocutor who rejects her most firmly held beliefs, she may therein characterize 
her interlocutor as outlandish or absurd (or “crazy”).  (The anthropologists are at pains to 
                                                           
60 And I imagine there are many more.  A defining characteristic of conspiracy theories, for example, is that 
they construe evidence against them as evidence in their favor.  The conspiracy theorist fails to appreciate the 
evidence from the perspective of someone who is skeptical of her theory.  B. Keeley. 1999. Of conspiracy 
theories. The Journal of Philosophy 96: 109-26. 
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warn us of this error when we are trying to communicate with the members of highly foreign 
cultures.)  Such disregard of another’s beliefs, though, foments resentment in the disregarded.   
In the worst case, the speaker’s perceived understanding of the interlocutor’s 
perspective as radically other might motivate her to discount everything the interlocutor has 
to say: in effect, isolating said interlocutor from the community of which the speaker is a 
member.  But we are doing something wrong if our argumentative practices make it 
impossible for us to get through to each other.  If we want to be successful arguers, we must 
be willing to simulate positions – positions that do not preclude us from fruitfully reasoning 
with them in a virtuous manner – even when we firmly believe (or even know) those 
positions are rationally flawed in other ways.  
If we desire to interpret our interlocutors as reasonable (and we do) we must find a 
balance between interpreting them as thinking exactly like us and interpreting them as 
thinking in such a way that compromises their rationality.  Sometimes this is impossible; our 
interlocutors place themselves in positions which are wholly incongruent with our way of 
thinking.  But in some such cases we are nevertheless justified in believing that their 
positions are faulty and we are rational in attempting to persuade them of this.  But to do so 
requires simulating irrational perspectives.  Sometimes we must break out of the circle of our 
opinions so we can pull others in.  In the following chapter, I provide a concrete example of 
this, which surrounds a debate about the fallacy of begging the question.  In the concluding 
section of the current chapter, I will tie together the various threads that run throughout its 
first three sections and arrive, finally, at my new theory of virtue argumentation. 
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4. Belief Entrenchment, Rational Argumentation, and A New Virtue Theory of 
Argumentation (The Good and Bad of Arguers) 
 
I openly confess my recollection of David Hume was the very thing which 
many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my 
investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction.  I 
was far from following him in the conclusions at which he arrived by 
regarding, not the whole of his problem, but a part, which by itself can give us 
no information.  If we start from a well-founded, but undeveloped, thought 
which another has bequeathed to us, we may well hope by continued 
reflection to advance farther than the acute man to whom we owe the first 
spark of light.61 
 
Before he encountered Hume’s problem (regarding the origin of our concept of cause) 
Kant was presumably satisfied with the direction of his own investigations.  But upon being 
awoken by Hume’s insights, his direction changed course.  At its core, philosophy is a 
cooperative activity aimed at bringing us closer to the truth.  Historically, it has at times 
stood in direct opposition to the kind of religion that promises truth through faith (not reason) 
and to sophism, which uses reason as a mere means to persuade.  Philosophy thrives on 
defiance over submission, its practitioners using reasons to argue in an effort to rationally 
persuade. 
When Kant awoke from his slumber, his once confident swagger was reduced to a 
tepid walk.  His epistemic stance had changed because the beliefs and actions that were once 
to a high degree entrenched in him became much less so.  Let’s say that a belief B is 
entrenched in S to a degree of 1 if and only if B is incorrigible for S, i.e., S cannot be 
persuaded in such a way that results in the loss of B.  As the degree of entrenchment 
approaches .5 (equally balanced between B and its negation), S becomes more and more 
likely to give up B in the face of purported counterevidence.  Note that degree of 
entrenchment is not the same as degree of confidence where the latter is measured 
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phenomenologically (i.e. how certain one feels) or behaviorally (e.g. how much one is 
willing to bet on the truth of a decidable claim).  Whether the degree to which B is 
entrenched is .9 or .51, S may very well be just as confident in B in phenomenological and 
behavioral terms.  Degree of entrenchment is a relation between believers, beliefs, and how a 
believer would modify those beliefs in the face of purported counterevidence.62  In short, it is 
a representation of how much we are tied to our beliefs. 
Sorensen takes ‘rational’ to be an “absolute” concept, one defined by the absence of 
certain features.  (E.g., cleanliness is the absence of dirt, flatness the absence of bumps in a 
surface, etc).  In particular, Sorensen thinks rationality can so be defined as “the absence of 
irrationalities, such as “bias, circularity, dogmatism, and inconsistency.”63  Elsewhere, he 
defines rationality simply as efficiency.  
We are fallible agents with limited time and cognitive resources.  We inevitably 
generate some false beliefs, even inconsistent sets of beliefs.  Because of these facts about 
our agency, we are rationally exploitable.  Non-rational attempts to persuade (e.g. 
propaganda, sophistry, advertisements, etc.) take advantage of these facts and in doing so can 
further entrench us in our natural deficiencies, like our susceptibility to bias, circularity, 
dogmatism, and inconsistency. 
Whereas formal theories have difficulties accounting for the badness of certain 
circular arguments, my account gestures towards a way of characterizing each type of 
irrationality (although I narrow the scope to circularity) as a problem regarding belief 
                                                           
62 Degree of a belief’s entrenchment is helpfully defined and distinguished from three other measures of belief: 
(i) willingness to risk things on the truth of a claim, (ii) phenomenological measures and (iii) the degree to 
which the information in question has been assimilated into the mind or brain of the subject in question in 
chapter 2 of A. Zimmerman. 2018. Belief: a pragmatic picture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
63 Sorensen (1991). Rationality as an absolute concept. Philosophy 66/258: 473. 
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entrenchment.  Empathic failures result from steadfast reinforcements of our already 
entrenched commitments.   
Conceptions of Degrees of Belief 
The sense of degree of belief I have in mind when I talk of belief entrenchment is best 
understood when we contrast it to other conceptions of degree of belief.  One common 
conception sees degree of belief as degree of risk, often measured on the basis of betting 
behavior.64  On this picture, degree of belief is said to be equivalent to one’s credence on a 
scale of 0 to 1, where 0 is complete lack of confidence and 1 is certainty.  If one allows for 
talk of full on belief, we can say that when one’s credence falls below a threshold closer to 0 
than 1, she disbelieves the proposition and when one’s credence surpasses a threshold closer 
to 1 than 0, she believes it.  Although I am not endorsing this move, notice how natural it 
seems to extend this picture from betting behavior to assertion.  When beliefs are 
conceptualized as assertions or their inner analogues (judgments), risk can be equated with 
asserting what is believed.  The higher the credence in a proposition in a context the more 
likely one is to assert it in that context.   Hesitancy in assertion is modeled as lower degrees 
of credence between .5 and 1.  The refusal to assert either a proposition or its negation (and 
therein risk one’s reputation should it be shown false) would be modeled with degree of 
credence .5.  Numbers between .5 and 0 would then be used to represent the disposition to 
dissent from the proposition’s truth or even assert its negation.   
Another common conception of degree of belief is one that appeals to 
phenomenological measures.65  I have no doubts whatsoever that there is a difference in the 
                                                           
64 Ramsey. 1931. Truth and probability, in The Foundations of Mathematics, R.B. Braithwaite (ed.), London: 
Routledge and Keegan Paul, pp.156-98. 
65 A relatively recent example is provided by Cohen. 1992. An essay on belief and acceptance, Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
  
57 
feeling between doubt and belief.  On such a picture, degree of belief would really break into 
two distinct though intimately related notions, degree of belief and degree of doubt.  One 
might simplify things by demarcating the two (perhaps at suspension of belief, where one’s 
degree of belief and one’s degree of doubt balance each other) so that one could not both 
believe and doubt a proposition simultaneously. 
A third conception of degree of belief is a more recent development along pragmatist 
lines.66  On the pragmatic picture, degree of belief involves how a given body of information 
is assimilated into our minds when we engage in an activity, physical or not, that requires 
controlled and attentive thought.  If, for instance, “You bring a given body of information to 
bear when paying full attention to the activity you’re engaged in, we can say that you have at 
least minimally assimilated the information that guides you in that endeavor.”  The 
information that guides you in an endeavor is maximally assimilated, on the other hand, "if 
you act or reason on that same information when your attention is fully diverted to other 
things.”67 
I propose to focus on degree of entrenchment and the ways in which the propositions 
or information we act, reason and argue on can be differently entrenched in the minds of 
those who so act, reason and argue.  Consider the following story: 
Suppose that Sally and Fran are genuine believers in God and the Christian faith.  Both attend church regularly 
and both serve as assistants for a twice-a-week bible study.  When asked to describe their devotion, both 
describe themselves as devout.  In an activity that their church holds, both were asked to attempt to convert 
other members of the group who were role playing as non-believers.  It was easy for Sally and Fran.  Both had 
recited arguments to themselves many times to ready themselves for occasions such as these, where they need 
to assert and support their beliefs to a non-believer.  They are rarely questioned about their faith, but each has a 
                                                           
66 Following the lead of Pierce, The fixation of belief, Popular Science Monthly, 12 (November 1877), pp. 1-15. 
67 Zimmerman (2018: 7). 
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niece who often ask questions regarding their shared religious beliefs and both Sally and Fran do their best to 
instill the correct beliefs in their respective nieces.  Sally and Fran also act on their beliefs regarding God and 
religion.  In high school, both were pressured to try some pot, but both turned it down because it was 
inconsistent with their way of life.  During the evolution portion of their biology classes, both paid enough 
attention to get a good grade, but never really took seriously the theory. Suppose further than Fran, but not 
Sally, becomes much more skeptical of her devotion in the face of purported counter evidence to her beliefs.   
The point of the above story is this: although the religious beliefs of Sally and Fran 
are similar in the degree to which they are willing to bet on their truth, and in the degree to 
which they guide their respective actions and assertions, and the degree to which they induce 
feeling of conviction or certainty, we can coherently imagine the two aunts nevertheless 
differing with how they respond to purported counterevidence.  How is this possible?  One 
possibility is that Sally has sealed herself off from any future purported counter evidence, 
discounting any counter-evidence as illusory or misleading precisely because of its 
inconsistency with her religious commitments.  Or perhaps Fran simply blindly accepts what 
others say if they are assertive enough with her.  Or maybe both.   
In either event, the difference between the beliefs of Fran and Sally would consist in 
their differing degrees of entrenchment.  On my account, spinelessness with respect to some 
belief, view, course of action, etc. results when the corresponding degree of entrenchment 
reaches a sufficiently low threshold.  On the flip side, stubbornness results when the 
corresponding degree of entrenchment reaches a sufficiently high threshold.  In the above 
story, either Fran is spineless, Sally is stubborn, or both. 
Rational Argument(ation) 
My discussion of belief entrenchment was meant to bring out an important fact about 
rational persuasion, namely, that rational persuasion is as much about belief revision as it is 
  
59 
about belief entrenchment.  Given that we take each other’s beliefs as evidence for the truth 
of some matter, we can become each other’s tools for revising, altering and eliminating 
beliefs we should not hold.  By changing our minds in these ways we provide one another 
with a model of how someone may reasonably think something different.  The view of 
argument I endorse is epistemic, insofar as the aim of argumentation is rational persuasion 
and rational persuasion leads to the improvement of at least one person’s epistemic standing.  
Rational persuasion can work as a method of entrenchment, like when I come to believe the 
conclusion of an argument about a topic I had never considered.  Or rational persuasion can 
work as method of revision, as when an argument rationally compels me to modify my 
methods of investigation.  In cases of the former type, I might acquire a new piece of 
knowledge (or justified belief), the acceptance of which I would subsequently integrate into 
my set of beliefs and actions relevant to the topic.  And in cases of the latter type, I might 
learn something that compels me to shed some false (or unjustified) beliefs.  In cases of both 
types, my epistemic standing improves.   
So persuasion is “rational,” in the sense defined in terms of argumentative discourse, 
just in case at least one of the arguer’s epistemic standing is improved by the act.  If an 
arguer’s perspective constrains them in such a way that their views are immune to rational 
persuasion, then their perspective precludes an improvement in epistemic standing through 
rational argumentation.  Given that rational argumentation is one primary forum for eliciting 
epistemically positive changes in belief, a person with such a perspective undermines the 
function of rational argumentation when attempting to participate in it.  For example, a 
conspiracy theorist who counts any purported counter evidence to their view as further 
evidence for its truth does not meet this minimal rationality requirement for rational 
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argumentation.  As such, one cannot engage in rational argumentation with such an 
individual where the proposition under dispute is the conspiracy theory itself.68  In chapter 2, 
I examine a few plausible minimal rationality requirements for peer disagreements, a special 
case of rational discourse.  
Might there be certain beliefs or principles almost all of us regard as obvious that are 
such that it would be rational to ignore any evidence presented against it?  I have in mind 
here claims like the ones Wittgenstein calls “hinge principles,” claims like “I have hands,” 
“The Earth is round,” or “2+2=4.”  Now, in almost all contexts any evidence presented 
against such claims could be ignored without sacrificing one’s rationality.  After all, if we are 
to think and act effectively, we must make some assumptions, assumptions that “[give] our 
way of looking at things, and our researches, their form” (211).  
But I think that the introduction of radical skeptical worries might change the subject 
and therein render these assumptions problematically dogmatic when they usually 
aren’t.  The radical skeptic just is questioning how we think about reality.  But what does it 
mean for one to really questions reality?  It is not enough to pretend to do so in the 
epistemology classroom.  One can play the role of the skeptic as much as they want, saying 
things like “Do you really know there is a tree there?” in response to others’ claims to 
knowledge.  But if they go home and rely on beliefs of similar kinds to navigate their world, 
they are all bark and no bite.   
It seems that Wittgenstein too recognizes such contexts as well when he says, “[w]e 
know that the earth is round.  We have definitively ascertained that it is round.  We shall 
                                                           
68 I want to make clear that this does not mean that the conspiracy theorist cannot be rationally persuaded out of 
their theory.  We might, for example, engage in rational argumentation about the truth of some other proposition 
that is importantly related to the conspiracy theory.  If the conspiracy theory becomes less confident in one such 
belief, they might, upon reflection, become compelled to question how solid the conspiracy theory really is. 
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stick to this opinion, unless our whole way of seeing nature changes” (291: my emphasis).  
Such a change, however, would be achieved through a monumental discovery, not the 
rehashing of skeptical concerns in the classroom.  Now although Wittgenstein thinks it 
possible for us to be shaken from our hinges, his justification for standing fast on them 
bottoms out in the fact that he sees no alternative.  For the quote continues with the imagined 
dialogue, ““[h]ow do you know [that the Earth is round]?” – I believe it.”  As he says earlier 
on in On Certainty, “[t]o be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end.” 69  If 
I wish to persuade the skeptic who really does not believe that the Earth is round, then I must 
figure out how to argue with him.  But doing so requires an understanding of his perspective, 
a perspective that sees nature in a wholly different way than my own.  I do not owe the 
radical skeptic, who argues that we know nothing, an argument that we do know something, 
for their perspective rules out the possibility that any such argument will have rational 
persuasive force.  Moreover, I myself am skeptical that self-described radical skeptics, who 
all seem to take for granted the world’s existence when living their lives and interacting with 
it, really do doubt the world.  So although a more reserved skeptic, like a skeptic about the 
external world who categorically doubts our claims that we have knowledge of the external 
world but also accepts that we have some knowledge, may yet be moved by one of the 
various arguments leveled against him.  For a view of the world that rejects a specific domain 
of our knowledge is less radical than a view of the world that rejects all domains of our 
knowledge, and so requires a less substantial shift in the skeptic’s way of seeing nature.  By 
                                                           
69 That certain of our epistemic practices “come to an end” is a theme in On Certainty.  In addition to saying the 
practice of giving justification comes to an end (192), Wittgenstein says the same of: testing or giving grounds 
(110) and justifying the evidence (204), the end of which is “an ungrounded way of acting”, explanation (189), 
the end of which is “mere description,” knowledge (378), the end of which is “based on acknowledgement”, and 
giving reasons (612), the end of which “comes persuasion.”  And it is clear that he thinks doubt comes to an end 
as well, for he says that “[a] doubt without an end is not even a doubt” (624).  
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utilizing premises that the skeptic would accept, one can construct arguments that are 
rationally persuasive from the skeptic’s point of view.  So long as the skeptic is open to 
changing his view, such arguments might move him to doubt his previously established view 
of the world.  
Argument, as I conceive of it, is a methodological practice that we can engage in 
either alone or in the presence of one another in an effort to improve at least one of our 
epistemic standings.  When practiced alone, argument simply collapses into reasoning.  
During reflection and revision of my beliefs, for instance, I attend to some of them and make 
inferences from them and in the process learn something new, either as a new piece of 
knowledge about the world outside myself or, at the minimum, as an item of self-knowledge 
or self-understanding revealing something about my own views.  When practiced together, in 
the presence of a dispute between at least two individuals, the practice of argument becomes 
the activity of argumentation.  If arguers are sincere and arguing in good faith, then they may 
engage in (more or less) rational argumentation.  This is argumentation that is 
conceptualized as rational by those engaged in it, even if they differ in some of their 
inference rules or the norms they utilize to criticize and evaluate arguments.  Rational 
argumentation, when it is defined in this idealized sense, can be seen as a cooperative activity 
in which at least two individuals involved in a dispute (or disagreement) aim to improve their 
epistemic standing through forms of persuasion they conceptualize as rational.  In the ideal 
case, when both arguers are epistemically virtuous and seek to conform to norms of 
argumentation that support these virtues, the activity of argumentation can resemble a kind of 
cooperative reflective equilibrium between the participants’ ways of seeing the world.   
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Good Faith/Bad Faith 
A person S argues in good faith just in case (i) S’s arguments are sincere 
representations of things S believes and the rational basis for why S believes it and (ii) S 
argues in an effort to rationally persuade (and so improve the epistemic standing of) her 
interlocutor.  The person who argues in bad faith, then, either does not advance arguments 
that are sincere representations of her beliefs and their rational support or does not argue in 
an effort to rationally persuade.  Typically, a bad-faith arguer utilizes the practice of 
argument as a vehicle to persuade, but does not require that persuasion to be rational.  In 
short, the difference between someone who argues in good faith from someone who argues in 
bad can be explained by a difference in interests.  Whereas philosophers value argument as a 
practice because it can help us gain insight into the truth, the sophists, as an example, value 
argument because of the persuasive influence it can have over a person (and perhaps because 
they see rhetoric as being better than other kinds of force).  (Consider also the Pyrhonnian 
skeptics, who seem to argue in an effort to procure tranquility, or perhaps move others closer 
to it).70  The philosopher values knowledge or wisdom in part because she takes truth to be 
inherently valuable.  For both, argument is a way of getting others to see the world in a 
certain way.  But whereas the philosopher aims to do it virtuously arguing in an effort to 
rationally persuade another person that the world is a certain way71, a way discordant with 
that other person’s view, the sophist is interested only in persuasion.  
                                                           
70 Annas, J. & Barnes, J. (eds.). 2000. Sextus Empiricus: outlines of scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
71 Now this conception relies on the assumption that we can be right/wrong about the certain way the world is. I 
take it even if there are more than one correct ways of seeing the world, as a pluralist might say, there is only 
one way the world is. (I think the pluralist would agree). 
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Is the sophist, then, rationally (or epistemically) condemnable?  I say “yes” for 
several reasons.  First, in caring only about persuasion and not rational persuasion, though 
they might sometimes present an argument that actually causes an improvement in their 
interlocutor’s epistemic standing, they sometimes use their knowledge of how people think to 
exploit someone’s rational blind spots or susceptibility to fallacious reasoning, just to give a 
few examples.  Rather than spreading knowledge, or helping someone develop her 
worldview in a reasonable way, the sophist is out to simply persuade someone of something.  
Second, the sophist spreads lies.  When the activity of argumentation is conceived by its 
participants as rational, these participants almost always present arguments whose premises 
they accept and whose inferences from these premises are found sufficiently compelling to 
warrant acceptance of their conclusions as either truths or rationally permissible objects of 
belief.  But sophism does not abide by such a norm.  This means that the sophist sometimes 
presents arguments she does not accept simply because she thinks that doing so enables her 
to persuade her interlocutor of some point.  Such a practice is disingenuous and insincere.  It 
is reasonable for one to assume that the sophist accepts the premises of her argument because 
it is reasonable to assume (absent evidence to the contrary) that anyone who engages in the 
activity of argumentation does so in good faith.  So when the sophist advances, for instance, 
an argument whose premises she does not accept, her interlocutor in all likelihood would 
form a false belief that the sophist believes the content of the premises.  Third, the sophist 
reinforces our bad epistemic habits, like being disposed to biases or fallacious reasoning.  If 
the argument the sophist advances is fallacious and persuasive to her interlocutor, and the 
sophist knows this, then she is deliberately exploiting her interlocutor’s failures in reasoning 
rather than pointing them out in an effort to help break bad habits. Fourth, the sophist 
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misrepresents herself not just by seemingly accepting premises she actually rejects.  If the 
sophist recognizes the fallaciousness of her argument and advances it anyway, and her 
interlocutor spots the fallacy, her interlocutor will think the sophist is a worse reasoner than 
she actually is.  Not to mention, the sophist will have a difficult time persuading practiced 
reasoners who see through their bullshit. 
It seems obvious to me that if we want to achieve anything we have set out to achieve 
in doing philosophy, we must argue in good faith – i.e. we should typically advance 
arguments that we accept in an effort to rationally persuade.72  This precludes the type of 
effortful deception that underlies the sophist’s attempts to persuade.  But it also precludes a 
type of rational imitation that may lead someone to blindly accept the arguments of her 
interlocutors.  What the rational deceiver and the rational mimicker have in common is that 
both are forms of insincerity.  Arguing in good faith, again, requires sincerity on behalf of the 
arguers who are aiming to rationally persuade.  Sincere, rational argumentation allows us to 
assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that our interlocutors accept the arguments they 
advance and reject the arguments they say they reject. 
The Aretaic Turn 
In recent times, virtue-theoretic accounts in epistemology have been developed to 
offer an interesting and important alternative to more traditional theories.  Cohen (2007) and 
Aberdein (2010) have recently attempted to extend this virtue-theoretic framework into an 
approach to argumentation theory.73  Aberdein believes the development of these accounts 
                                                           
72 This comes with a caveat. There are special circumstances in which one is rationally permitted to advance an 
argument one does not accept. Namely, circumstances where the only path to rational persuasion involves 
advancing an argument one does not accept, one is rationally permitted to do so. I discuss this in chapter 1. 
73 Aberdein. 2010. Virtue in argument. Argumentation 24: 165-179.  Cohen, Daniel H. 2007. Virtue 
epistemology and argumentation theory, in David Hitchcock (ed.), Dissensus and the Search for Common 
Ground. OSSA. 
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indicate a turn in epistemology, which he takes to have benefited the discipline, stating that it 
“has been promoted as cutting through entrenched positions to provide new solutions to old 
debates,” including novel definitions for epistemic concepts like knowledge, justified belief, 
and truth.74  Depending on the theory, the list of epistemic virtues may vary, but Aberdein 
divides them up into two camps: Ernest Sosa’s virtue reliablism, on which the virtues are 
reliable processes and Linda Zagzebski’s virtue intellectualism, on which the virtues are 
acquired excellences.75  The former takes notes from epistemological reliablism, which 
counts a belief as knowledge just in case its source reliably produces true beliefs.  Visual 
perception, memory, deduction, and various forms of induction all count as epistemic virtues 
on Sosa’s theory.  On the other hand, since Zagzebski characterizes the epistemic virtues as 
acquired excellences, taking more guidance from traditional discussions of virtues (in 
particular, Aristotle’s list of the intellectual virtues), her list of virtues includes things like 
“the ability to recognize the salient facts; sensitivity to detail; open-mindedness in collecting 
and appraising evidence; fairness in evaluating the arguments of others; intellectual humility; 
intellectual perseverance, diligence, care and thoroughness; adaptability of intellect; the 
detective’s virtues: thinking of coherent explanations of the facts; being able to recognize 
reliable authority; insight into persons, problems, theories; the teaching virtue: the social 
virtues of being communicative, including intellectual candour and knowing your audience 
and how they respond” (Zag, 1996, 114).76   
                                                           
74Aberdein (2010: p. 167). 
75 Sosa, E. 2007. Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume 1: a virtue epistemology, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
76 She also includes further virtues, including “intellectual courage, autonomy, boldness, creativity, and 
inventiveness” (1996: 220, 225). 
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Whether we lean closer to Sosa’s or Zagzebski’s theory, one thing is clear: to apply a 
virtue-theoretic framework to argumentation theory, we must eschew the traditional focus of 
argument appraisal from acts to agents.  The question becomes: Is this the kind of argument 
that a virtuous interlocutor would use to a good faith audience in an effort to rationally 
persuade?  If we define good and bad arguments as the arguments made by good and bad 
arguers, whether any given act of arguing is good or bad will depend on whether the user of 
that argument was virtuous or not in advancing a given argument.  This does not mean that 
one who is in general dogmatic or skeptical cannot sometimes argue well.  Just as a generally 
bad or vicious person can do something good or virtuous, a stubborn or spineless interlocutor 
might still produce a good argument from time to time.  In fact, allowing for the possibility 
that people can improve their argumentative practice by more closely resembling our shared 
ideals of virtuous argumentation requires that people be able to argue well even when they 
aren't yet ideally virtuous.  
Does shifting the focus from argument appraisal to evaluation of the arguers force us 
into committing the ad hominem fallacy?  The fallacy ad hominem is an argumentative 
maneuver, which consists in an appeal to facts about the arguer in an attempt to discredit the 
arguer’s argument in the eyes of the arguer’s audience.  It certainly seems like condemning 
an argument on the grounds that its advocate was vicious in her presentation of it would 
amount to arguing ad hominem.  There is, however, far from a consensus on whether all 
instances of ad hominem are fallacious.77  As Aberdein succinctly puts the points: “…if the 
alleged facts about the arguer are relevant to the persuasive force of his argument, where is 
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the fallacy in using them to appraise his argument?”78  And it seems as if we know a person 
to be generally dogmatic in arguing, and we engage them in argumentation only to be unable 
to rationally persuade them, we have good reason to criticize them for arguing as they have.  
Absent evidence to the contrary, we can criticize their arguments as well.  To adopt this 
stance is not to rule out the possibility that a normally dogmatic interlocutor has this time 
produced a good argument.  It is appropriate to use our experience with a person to shape our 
expectations of their future behavior.  This needn’t license unconditional dismissal or a 
refusal to reconsider the judgment in the light of new evidence should it arise. 
Virtue Argumentation Theory 
Daniel Cohen (2009) motivates his discussion of the epistemic virtues of 
argumentation by highlighting two contributions theories of argumentative virtue can make 
to the field of epistemology on the whole.  First, he supposes that a large portion of the 
philosophical community passes on to their students approaches to argumentation that can be 
understood as deriving from what he calls a “methodological bias towards skepticism.”79  
According to Cohen, this type of approach rears its head when the novice student stands fast 
on her already held opinions.  But the link that Cohen attempts to draw between skepticism 
and conservatism is counterintuitive, as it seems a methodological bias towards skepticism 
would undermine the student’s already held opinions.  Second, Cohen motivates his project 
by appealing to cognitive states that have not gotten the attention in epistemology one might 
expect since they are often assumed to not be the kinds of states with a justificatory status.  
                                                           
78 Aberdein, (2007: 118) Virtue argumentation.  See also Gascon, J. 2016. Virtue and arguers. Topoi 35 (2):441-
450. 
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According to Cohen, though, “[v]alues, attitudes, understandings, feelings and other 
cognitive states are things that can be justified” (53). 
Let me just make a few remarks about where I stand on these issues.  I could not 
agree more with Cohen that there is something deeply wrong if a philosophy student (or 
anyone, for that matter) makes a presumption that her interlocutor is wrong if the interlocutor 
disagrees with her already held beliefs.  But unlike Cohen, I would describe the attitude that 
underwrites these behaviors as both skeptical and dogmatic, rather than a methodological 
bias towards skepticism.  Perhaps what Cohen has in mind here is that philosophers often 
skew critical rather than constructive.  It is not difficult to imagine how a dogmatic attitude 
about one’s own beliefs, along with a skeptical attitude towards anyone who disagrees, might 
manifest in an apparent favoring of criticism in activities of argumentation. 
I agree wholeheartedly with Cohen’s second piece of motivation, namely, that 
cognitive states like values, attitudes, understandings, etc. have been relegated to the 
sidelines of epistemological theorizing for far too long and should play more of a central role.  
This point provides positive motivation for the aretaic turn in epistemology and, more 
recently, in argumentation theory. 
The Virtues of Argumentation 
Recent studies in virtue argumentation theory have produced several worthwhile 
discussions about open-mindedness.  In this section, I attempt to contribute to the discussion 
about open-mindedness and kickstart similar discussions about sincerity and creativity.  
Sincerity has played a huge role in social epistemology and is typically discussed in 
conjunction with testimony, trust, and reliability.80  With regards to sincerity, I intend to shift 
                                                           
80 And their discussions concerning sincerity understood in this way are important and fruitful.  See Burge 
(1993), Fricker (1994), Moran (2006). 
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the focus away from the content of what is said and onto how it was said by the speaker.  In 
some ways, my conception of sincerity is more in line with Confucian ‘cheng’ or Aristotleian 
truthfulness.81  As for creativity, although there has been a recent surge in philosophical 
interest regarding it, epistemic studies are, unfortunately, barely getting off the ground.82 
Sincerity, open-mindedness, and creativity are epistemic-argumentative virtues that 
play a role important to our rationalities.  They are epistemic because they enable us to turn 
our gaze inward and engage in rational self-modification aimed at truth, knowledge, and 
other epistemic goods.  They are argumentative because they enable our epistemic 
communities to progress toward greater understanding, truth and knowledge despite myriad 
obstacles that arise from conflicts in those beliefs or values we evince in argument.  In what 
follows, I further extrapolate the roles these three virtues would play in an ideal sphere of 
argumentation.   
Being Ourselves and Sincerity in Argumentation 
We should not argue all by ourselves: argumentation requires cooperation to succeed.  
Cooperation, however, precludes complete deference.  The trivialist, who accepts every 
argument presented to him, does nothing but offer empty approval to the arguer.  He does not 
count as cooperating in the activity of argumentation.  Cooperation also precludes complete 
dismissal.  The logical skeptic, who rejects every argument presented to him, does nothing 
but agitate his interlocutors with unfounded dismissal.  Both arguers must embody full-
bodied reasoners when engaged in argumentation, relying on their own skills to navigate  the 
                                                           
81 “In philology, both 'sincerity' and 'cheng' primarily mean, 'to be true to oneself'.”  An, Yanming. 2004. 
Western 'sincerity' and confucian 'cheng'. Asian Philosophy 14 (2):155 – 169.  
82 In a fairly recent collection of essays, there are sections devoted to the intersection of creativity with 
philosophy of art, value theory, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of education.  Paul 
and Kaufman (2014). The philosophy of creativity: new essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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activity.  But they must also coordinate in such a way that their own skills don't go to waste; 
to do this they must take steps to ensure that there is a relatively high level of mutual 
understanding between them about what they believe and why they believe it.  Excessive 
coordination, however, leads to irrational deference, or mimicry.  The mimic exemplifies 
insincerity because he fails to give his interlocutor a genuine representation of what he 
thinks, opting instead to parrot what his interlocutor thinks.  Similarly for the manipulator, 
who exemplifies a deficiency in coordination (or, equivalently, an excess of self-reliance).  
The manipulator, too, is insincere since he misrepresents what he actually thinks.  And the 
sophist, who advances arguments he doesn't accept if he thinks it will contribute to satisfying 
his goal of persuading his interlocutor, is insincere in a manipulative or mimicking way 
depending on what serves to satisfy his goals.  He presents as someone he is not and instead 
of treating his interlocutor’s beliefs as evidence, he treats them only as potential ammunition 
to help him persuade.   
In Book IV, Chapter 7 of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle applies the doctrine of the 
mean to identify an epistemic virtue important to our social lives, where people “pursue truth 
and falsity in what they do.”83  Aristotle tries to identify a virtue in this sphere that has no 
name84, but could nevertheless be identified with a description of the person who exemplifies 
it.   He says, “The person at the mean, however, is straightforward, and truthful in life and in 
what he says, since he acknowledges no more and no less than the qualities he has.”  
Aristotle is of course contrasting the person at the mean with the people who sit at one of the 
two vicious extremities.  The virtue is elucidated through the prism of its corresponding 
                                                           
83 Aristotle. Nicomachean ethics: 1127a-1127b33. 
84 In the very same chapter, Aristotle at point calls the person who sits at the mean “truthful.”  He also speaks of 
the truthful person in regards to justice, however, which may explain his timidity in attributing the virtue a name 
at the beginning of the chapter. 
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vices.  The more common vice is exemplified by the boastful person, who “seems to be the 
sort to lay claim to esteemed qualities that he either does not have or has to a lesser degree 
than he claims.”  The other, less common extreme, is exemplified by the self-deprecator, who 
“seems to disclaim those he has or to play them down” (76).  The unnamed virtue of 
accuracy in self-representation is a mean between these two extremes. 
I suggest that Aristotle’s discussion of the (moral) virtue that sits at the mean between 
boastfulness and self-deprecation is a good model on which to explain the epistemic virtue of 
sincerity.  Sincerity can be understood as an epistemic-argumentative virtue because it is a 
precondition for rational argumentation.  And just as Aristotle gained insight into the virtue 
by examining the vices that surround it, we can do the same.  Sincerity, I claim, is the virtue 
at the mean between rational mimicry and manipulation, the first of which is spineless in 
nature and the latter of which is stubborn. 
Suppose an arguer, who knows his interlocutor is susceptible to making a certain kind 
of mistake in reasoning, advances an argument he knows to be bad in an effort to persuade 
his interlocutor.  This type of arguer is akin to Aristotle’s boastful person, since he lays claim 
to the esteemed quality – being connected to the truth – when in fact his argumentative 
actions do not show he has such a quality.  Such a person, on my view, exemplifies the vice 
of manipulation within the sphere of rational argumentation.  This person might gain 
adoration, reputation, and credibility, but all would be undeserved.  Rather than be sincere, 
he shirks the requirement on rational argumentation that one argue in good faith in an effort 
to rationally persuade. 
A similar diagnosis holds for the person who verbally assents to arguments of his 
interlocutor, when he actually rejects them or who verbally rejects arguments he actually 
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accepts.  For such a person manipulates his interlocutors into thinking that they have brought 
him closer to the truth when they haven’t, or that they have failed to bring him closer to the 
truth when they have.  The former imbues his interlocutor with an unearned boost in 
confidence, and the latter with an undeserved boost in confidence.  In both cases, the 
insincere person is being manipulative. 
At the other extreme, the “self-deprecator,” in the sphere of argumentation, 
exemplifies the vice of rational mimicry.  Rather than give himself the credit he deserves by 
actually thinking for himself, he simulates the perspective of someone else and uses it as a 
model on which to base his interactions with his interlocutor.  
Suppose that a student, when asked about the explanation for Donald Trump winning 
the 2016 U.S. presidential race, rehearses what he has heard his professors say, although he 
does not buy the explanation.  If all the teacher cared about was that the student was able to 
rehearse such explanations when queried, then it seems as though the student succeeds in 
answering the question.  But if the teacher desires that the student learn that his rehearsed 
explanation is the explanation of why Trump won the race – that is, if the teacher cares for 
the student to believe that it is the correct explanation – then the teacher will be dismayed if 
she finds out the student does not actually accept the explanation.  In this case, the student is 
insincere in a mimicking way, rehearsing an explanation as if he endorses it when in fact he 
does not.  Similarly in argumentation.  The kind of person I have in mind who resorts to 
mimicry in argumentation is the one who simply rehearses the arguments he hears someone 
else endorse or those he thinks someone else would endorse.  In both cases, the arguer would 
be irrational because he resorts to mimicry rather than sincerely representing what he thinks 
by being truthful in what he says and what he does.  And in both cases, rather than think for 
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himself, the arguer utilizes a model of another person to stand in as a representation for his 
own argument.   
Sincerity + Empathy 
There is reason to think mimicry is a trait humans could not do without.  Given the 
way children learn, it is easy to see how experiences of others’ actions give them a model on 
which to base their own actions.  Now I am not saying that the child consciously constructs 
the model or applies it when acting.  But there is precedent for the idea that our sympathetic 
contagion makes “the minds of men…mirrors to one another.”85  As Sorensen puts it in his 
discussion of this Humean notion of sympathy: “As David Hume observes, and as is richly 
and somewhat embarrassingly corroborated by classic social psychology experiments, we 
adopt the moods and ways of our company.  Identification, motor mimicry, vicarious 
feelings, and emotional contagion sweep us into solidarity…”86 
It is important to make a note here that though “sympathy” and “empathy” are often 
used interchangeable, these terms are not best interpreted as picking out a singular or unified 
psychological capacity.  The con man, who excels at empathizing with others, may very well 
feel no compassion at all for the person he intends to manipulate.  His empathy consists in his 
ability to explain and predict the minds of other people by adopting their perspectives.  But 
one can have this capacity without feeling happy for the triumphs of others or sad for their 
suffering and so lacking sympathy in the intended sense.  The expert chess player, too, may 
empathize with an opponent in order to determine what move might best work in his favor, 
all the while keeping an emotional distance.  And sympathy can existence in the absence of 
empathy.  Someone may sympathize with migrants displaced by the Syrian battles in Aleppo, 
                                                           
85 Hume, D. 1888. A treatise on human nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 365. 
86 Sorensen (1998: 79). 
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yet be utterly at a loss as an affluent white person in her attempt to empathize with them or 
adopt their perspectives from the “inside.” 
What about manipulation?  Unfortunately, as long as people see benefits in taking 
advantage of others, instances of manipulation seem inevitable.  Rather than cooperate, we 
look to outwit one another.  Rather than work to reconcile our differences, we work to drive 
further wedges that divide us.  But, if we are careful, there is hope that we can at the very 
least expose the manipulators and warn others of their activities. 
At minimum, being sincere is acting and presenting as oneself.  Does this mean that 
one cannot “try on different hats” when engaged in rational argumentation?  No; it means 
simply that a person should be upfront and honest about trying out a view or persona when 
this is what she is doing.87  Both forms of insincerity – mimicry and manipulation – have 
negative epistemic impact on an insincere person's audience.  If an agent is insincere in 
argumentation, she thereby violates the implicit trust we have in one another to present and 
act as ourselves when engaged in rational argumentation. 
Given that we take each other’s beliefs as evidence for the truth of some matter, we 
can become each other’s tools for de-entrenchment, providing one another with a model of 
how someone might reasonably think something different from what we do.  But if I 
deliberately make others think that what I believe is something other than what I actually 
believe, and they discover this, then they would be right to distrust me and largely discount 
me as a suitable partner for argumentation.  If I were to verbally object to an argument while 
at the same time finding it rationally persuasive, then I could rightly be condemned for 
                                                           
87 There is one exception to this rule.  Namely, when a person holds a view that precludes the possibility of the 
construction of arguments that might persuade her rationally, the rational response may involve persuading her 
from her own irrational perspective.  In such cases, there is a tradeoff between rational persuasion and sincerity.  
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manipulation.  Given that we take each other’s beliefs as evidence, if you trust me, my verbal 
objection may very well make you question your acceptance of the argument.  If I were to 
verbally accept your argument while at the same time actually finding it not at all rationally 
persuasive, then I could rightly be condemned for mimicry.  Again, if you trust me, then my 
verbal acceptance of your argument would make you more confident than you should be 
about your own acceptance. 
To sum up: we should aim to be sincere when arguing with one another in an effort to 
escape two epistemic vices: mimicry, which is exemplified by spineless deference to one’s 
interlocutor, and manipulation, which is exemplified by stubborn dismissal of one’s 
interlocutor.  Insincerity in argumentation is bad because it can lead to the domination or 
alienation of one’s interlocutor.   
Sincerity can be defined as the epistemically appropriate balance of coordination and 
self-reliance. (Coordination alienates, self-reliance dominates.) These two states of being are 
intimately linked.  A person who relies only on themselves, for example, is lacking in the 
kind of coordination that would allow them to relate to and collaborate with others.  And a 
person who is too coordinative lacks the self-reliance needed when no one else is around and 
they need to pull themselves together.  Equivalently, then, we can use either of the two 
aforementioned states to define sincerity as the mean between two extremes: manipulation 
and mimicry.  Since manipulation can be equivalently described as excessive self-reliance 
and mimicry as a deficiency in self-reliance, we can say that sincerity is the mean between an 
excess and deficiency in self-reliance.  Or, since mimicry is the excess of coordination and 
manipulation is the deficiency of coordination, we can say that creativity is the mean 
between two extremes, the excess and deficiency of coordination.   
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Open-Mindedness in Argumentation 
Once satisfied that our interlocutor is arguing sincerely, how might we treat our 
disagreement?  Insofar as we count other’s beliefs and arguments as evidence, we should 
treat one another’s arguments open-mindedly, for a mindset that is dogmatic or skeptical can 
undermine education, contribute to intellectual isolation, preclude the discovery of new 
truths, and halt epistemic progress.  Moreover, dogmatism can lead us down philosophical 
rabbit holes that waste our intellectual abilities; skepticism can lead us to give up hope, 
leaving our abilities to rot. 
Daniel Cohen (2009) is one of many who has recently applied a virtue-theoretic 
account to argumentation theory.88  In his version, open-mindedness counts as a critical 
virtue, where critical virtues are those traits that contribute to the various goods and  
accomplishments that can be achieved by engaging in argumentation.  Cognitive virtues are 
different from critical virtues in that they are “aides on the way to cognitive achievements” 
rather than achievements in argumentation (54). 
Open-mindedness puts our beliefs on the table for discussion.  Even though 
open-mindedness is consistent with strong commitment to our beliefs, simply 
allowing that they be up for discussion calls them into question – and calling 
beliefs into question, even ones that are well-justified, runs the risk of losing 
them.  Open-mindedness, then, is most important for people whose beliefs are 
mostly unjustified or wrong.  For people whose beliefs are mostly in order, 
however, it is epistemologically risky, unnecessary, and unwise (57). 
 
For Cohen, whether open-mindedness is an epistemic virtue is a contingent matter 
based on facts about human epistemic agents such as whether our beliefs are by and large 
true, whether our instances of reasoning are not post hoc rationalizations, and whether our 
original judgments are more reliably true than our reflective judgments.  If our belief sets 
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include, by and large, true beliefs, then being open-minded is risky.  If our instances of 
reasoning are indeed post hoc rationalizations, then being open-minded might vary between 
people and situations.  If our original judgments are more reliable than our reflective ones, 
then “the willingness to revise our beliefs might in fact be more negative than positive” (58).  
Carter and Gordon (2014) attempt to argue that the connection between open-
mindedness and truth is tenuous and highly conditional since there are situations where being 
open-minded is not truth-conducive.  For example, writing about a person’s set of beliefs 
about physics, which they label “P,” The state that “whether it is comparatively more truth-
conducive to be openminded or dogmatic with respect to P, depends on whether the beliefs in 
P are true.”  On the one hand, if the beliefs are (mostly) true, “being dogmatic has the upshot 
of making one resilient to giving up one’s true beliefs and falling into error.”  On the other 
hand, if the beliefs in P are (mostly) false, “it is better to be openminded and accordingly led 
from error” (208).   
Both Cohen and Carter & Gordon, however, fail to treat open-mindedness with the 
nuance that it deserves.  Carter and Gordon (2014), for instance, construe open-mindedness 
as the “Aristotelian ‘midpoint’ between credulity and dogmatism” (207).89  Consider an 
example:  If I have a set of beliefs about a subject, all of which are true, and I encounter a 
dozen experts on the subject matter who all assure me that many of my beliefs are false, then 
I would be irrational to hold to my beliefs.  For holding onto my beliefs in the face of such 
glaring counterevidence (in the form of the experts’ opinions) would be objectionably 
dogmatic.  On the flip side, if I have a set of beliefs on some matter, most of which are false, 
and I encounter a dozen experts who assure me that my beliefs are correct, then giving them 
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up (absent any independent reasons) would be objectionably skeptical.  Yes, it is true that in 
the first case I would hold onto a host of true beliefs that I would have otherwise lost if I had 
capitulated to the experts.  And yes, it is true that in the second case, holding onto my beliefs 
would preclude my ridding my mind of error.  But losing a few beliefs (or holding onto a few 
false ones) when the evidence seems to suggest that doing so would be rational, is a small 
price to pay for being perceived as credible by the respective experts. 
Cohen seems to be equating open-mindedness with willingness to revise one’s beliefs.  
As he says: “Part of open-mindedness is the ability to listen carefully, the willingness to take 
what others say seriously, and, if called for, the resolve to adopt them as one’s own,” but also 
“the willingness, ability, and resolve to re-examine one’s own beliefs and, if called for, to let 
them go” (56).  If Cohen is right that open-mindedness can be given a virtue-theoretic 
treatment by applying Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, then the two corresponding vices of 
open-mindedness would be total willingness to revise one’s beliefs and total unwillingness to 
revise one’s beliefs.  Based on his analysis, it makes sense why Cohen would think it natural 
to say that a person can be too open-minded.   
But if we take seriously the context in which Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is 
utilized, we can see that Cohen’s analysis must be mistaken.  Consider courage, a moral 
virtue, as an example.  For Aristotle, courage is defined by being the mean between two 
extremes, one the excess (rashness) and the other a deficiency (cowardice) in a given 
magnitude.  Suppose a person walking by a burning building overestimates her abilities and 
the need for intervention, and underestimates the dangers involved, and so runs into what is 
in fact an empty building to save the innocent people she falsely assumes are trapped inside.  
If she dies moments later when the building collapses, we will not say that she was too 
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courageous.  Instead, we say that she was rash.  Similarly with open-mindedness.  If a person 
is too willing to revise her beliefs, we should not say that she is too open-minded, but instead 
that she is spineless, just as we would say of the person too unwilling to revise her beliefs 
that she is stubborn.   
Cohen does seem to agree that skepticism has something to do with the picture here.  
His reasons for why he thinks open-mindedness is not an epistemic virtue have to do with the 
fact that whether it improves our epistemic standing is highly dependent on the context and 
situation.  In certain situations, he claims, great damage can be done to the epistemic project 
as a whole if one is open-minded.  For if we were to apply open-mindedness “globally and 
without any sense of proportion,” it would lead us into full-on skepticism.  But if I am right 
and we should define open-mindedness as the mean between skepticism and dogmatism, then 
we can say that only the most spineless of minds will be taken in by global skepticism.  For 
when it comes to arguing, global skepticism gains traction only if there is a proponent 
willing to argue in favor of it.  But if someone were willing to argue in favor of global 
skepticism, the skeptic’s interlocutor would be able to rationally condemn the skeptic (or the 
skeptic’s use of the argument, at least) on the grounds that her position is spineless. 
Open-Mindedness + Empathy 
Jack Kwong (2015) argues against Cohen’s treatment of open-mindedness.  Kwong 
instead construes open-mindedness as the willingness to take a novel viewpoint seriously and 
in the process of defending this view he gives a better characterization of the benefits of this 
trait of mind.  If we understand this idea of taking a novel viewpoint seriously as something 
necessary for rational argumentation, we can see that open-mindedness too has deep 
connections to empathy.  But whereas our sincerity revolves around how we present and act 
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in argumentation, whether in constructing our own arguments or responding to others, open-
mindedness concerns how we process the information we acquire through our interlocutor’s 
argumentative actions.   
Open-mindedness can be defined as the epistemically appropriate balance of humility 
and confidence.  These two attitudes are intimately linked.  A person who is too confident, 
for example, can be described also as lacking the appropriate degree of humility.  And a 
person who is too humble lacks the appropriate degree of confidence.  Equivalently, then, we 
can use either of the two aforementioned attitudes to define open-mindedness as the mean 
between two extremes: dogmatism and skepticism.  Since dogmatism is the excess of 
confidence and skepticism is the deficiency of confidence, we can say that open-mindedness 
is the mean between two extremes, the excess and deficiency of confidence.  Or, since 
skepticism can be equivalently described as excessive humility and dogmatism as a 
deficiency, we can say that open-mindedness is the mean between an excess and deficiency 
in humility.  
 Changing our Minds and Creativity in Argumentation 
In the right epistemic circumstances our rationality enables us to more or less resist or 
accept change in the face of new evidence, be it new information we gain from interacting 
with our environment, evidence acquired through careful observations, knowledge secured 
through reasoning, or understanding through deep reflection.  We can choose, to some degree 
to check out completely from REA, either utilizing argument only when it suits our needs 
and with no regard for others or letting others do the arguing while we choose the “winning” 
side.  We can choose to some degree to seal our minds off from outside influences, utilizing 
argument only to bolster our defenses or attack our adversaries.  The good thinker, though, 
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does not merely exercise her rational capacities to inquire, evaluate, reason, and argue; she 
turns them in on themselves to check and improve herself.  As rational agents we are imbued 
with the ability to, upon reflection, change not only what we think but how we think by 
attending to our own and others’ epistemic perspectives.   
Unfortunately change isn’t always up to us.  Though every person is imbued with a 
natural rational ability, what we think/believe is often the product of socialization, our 
upbringing and our environment, and our cognitive proclivities and deficiencies.  We can 
mitigate the influence of many of the things that cause our beliefs to become more or less 
entrenched in us through education, practice, and therapy (among other things).  So if we 
really aim to be more virtuous arguers, we need to become better empathizers, so we can 
reach out to others when the world works in our favor. 
When is it epistemically appropriate to accept or resist change?  The answer to this 
question will depend on the agent and her epistemic situation.  The question I aim to answer 
is different: what type of epistemic character and conduct enables an agent to make the 
epistemically appropriate changes when needed?  The epistemically virtuous agent aims to 
hit an equilibrium by accepting or resisting change to her beliefs, attitudes and actions when 
it is epistemically appropriate to do so.  In other words, the virtuous agent’s beliefs are such 
that they are entrenched to an epistemically appropriate degree, given her overall epistemic 
state.  The virtuous agent’s beliefs (and actions) should not make it impossible for her to 
change herself in the future.  There may be times where she seems to be more or less stable 
and her epistemic states more or less balanced, but in some such cases that balance is 
ephemeral.  With new information comes the need for critique, reflection and revision.  
Resisting change in a dynamic environment inevitably leads to stagnation.  But accepting 
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change upon the slightest breeze would be epistemic suicide.  We are fallible rational agents 
ecologically constrained by our cognitive resources and limited time; how we think should 
reflect this fact.  In order for an epistemic agent to make rational changes when integrating 
new information, her views must be dynamically grounded.   
Creativity, understood as an epistemic virtue, can be defined as the mean between 
stagnation, a stubborn epistemic state, and instability, a spineless one.  It is the virtue that 
gives us a sort of rational malleability.  The amelioration of instability is elaboration; the 
amelioration of stagnation is critique.  The direction of Kant’s investigations were likely 
grounded in beliefs he had settled on, after much deep philosophical investigation, which 
served as elaborative scaffolding for the rest of his thinking.  But those beliefs were clearly 
not entrenched to a degree of 1 in Kant as evidenced by his being shaken by Hume’s 
problem.  The subsequent critique of the direction of his own investigations enabled him to 
exercise his creativity to modify their direction, first by engaging in some self-critique, and 
second by elaborating on his new direction.  Had he not been open to Hume’s arguments, he 
would not have been able to modify the direction of his investigations to avoid stagnation.  If 
he had been too open to them, he would have followed Hume in thinking that the habits that 
contribute to our methods of investigation are a sheep to the dog of custom, which might lead 
to the type of hyper skeptical empiricism that says we have no say in the matter when it 
comes to how we think.  (The degree to which Hume succumbed to radical skepticism 
continues to be the subject of a great deal of scholarly debate.) 
In most cases, an argument’s conclusion is something on which we have already 
formed an opinion.  If you disbelieve the conclusion until I persuade you of it, then you 
probably have other beliefs, attitudes, and actions that hang together with your now shaken 
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disbelief.  These other beliefs, attitudes, and actions, however, might make it impossible for 
you to know (or be justified in believing) the conclusion of my argument.  If you were to 
accept the conclusion of my argument despite the fact that it is incompatible with a great 
number of your already held beliefs, has your epistemic position improved?  Suppose you tell 
me that you believe the conclusion of my argument, yet everything else you do, say, or 
believe makes it reasonable for me to attribute to you a disbelief in the conclusion.  Have I 
really rationally persuaded you?  Have I even persuaded you?  What if the apparent 
inconsistency between your stated belief about p and your actions associated with your acting 
on p ultimately drive you mad?  Still?  My point is simply that rational persuasion amounts to 
more than getting someone to verbally accept the conclusion of an argument in seeming 
sincerity.  If we understand rational persuasion as the function of rational argumentation, we 
can say rational persuasion is defined by a relationship between an argument and the arguers 
who utilize it, with the end of getting someone to reflect and revise their overall states so that 
their epistemic position improves.  One of my main points in this dissertation is that how we 
argue with each other deeply affects our chances of genuine epistemic improvement.  If we 
really expect others to improve epistemically, we need to give them time to recalibrate.   
Creativity + Empathy 
In “An Empathic Theory of Circularity,” Roy Sorensen seems to hit on something 
close to what I conceive of as creativity when he describes the adaptive role the successful 
arguer plays: 
The successful arguer must inhibit many natural reactions; he must abstain 
from attractive paths of reasoning and decline to use well known propositions 
as premises.  The arguer needs to act out the role of his adversary in much the 
same way as an actor takes on a character.  Part of this is a matter of knowing 
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who you are simulating.  But there is also the task of restraining 
knowledge…90 
 
If we desire to be responsible epistemic agents, we must be stable enough to express what we 
think to all types of people, but malleable enough to allow us to successfully empathize with 
others.  In cases where our interlocutor pushes us to our extremes, when “attractive paths of 
reasoning” fall flat and using “well known propositions as premises” gets us nowhere, we 
need to get creative.   
Creativity is needed in three areas of REA.  First, when one sets off to construct an 
argument in an effort to rationally persuade one’s interlocutor, one should attempt to simulate 
the perspective of one’s interlocutor to the best of one’s ability.  One’s ability to empathize 
and subsequently simulate another’s perspective allows one to more or less experiment with 
simulated arguments until settling on something one reasonably judges to have a good 
chance of rational persuasion.  By exercising what Sorensen calls “the less cognitive aspect 
of successful argumentation,” one is able to treat the opinions of one’s interlocutors as 
reasonable by doing one’s best to see the issue from their perspectives, which are in part 
constituted by the opinions in question.  In short, I must “break out of the circle of my own 
opinions” to construct an argument that is rationally persuasive from the perspective of my 
interlocutor (508).  This involves letting go of my own opinions and views to such an extent 
that they do not affect my judgments about which arguments would be rationally persuasive 
from my interlocutor’s perspective.   
The second area of argumentation in which creativity is vital is when I look to modify 
my own beliefs and actions in order to avoid inconsistency or other irrationalities.  What 
should I do when someone successfully persuades me with an argument?  Should I calculate 
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a measured response to the argument and deploy when my opponent is at his weakest?  No.  I 
should take some time to think it over, while also learning more about my interlocutor, 
seeking out the opinions of others, and forming habits that can help attenuate any residual 
effects from my previously held belief so as to avoid inconsistency in belief and action.  If I 
aim to be virtuous, I must respond to that argument with a critique of my own views in light 
of my newly acquired evidence in such a way that I can elaborate that view to myself and 
others.   
Third, creativity is vital in figuring out how we should proceed after conciliatory 
resolutions to peer disagreements.  Suppose that S1 and S2 are engaged in rational 
argumentation, which hinges on a disagreement about the truth of a theory T.  Suppose 
further that, though they sometimes disagree, they argue very often with one another and 
often end up adopting similar views.  In fact, suppose that they are peers with respect to all 
things related to T, perhaps because they are both experts.  When S1 comes to realize S2 is 
an epistemic peer and that they have arrived at contrary conclusions on the basis of the same 
evidence, the rational response for S1 is conciliation.  Minimal conciliation rationally 
requires a person to reduce confidence in her own view and increase confidence in her peer’s 
view.  In cases where her peer’s view is just the negation of her view, the reduction of 
confidence in her own view and increase in her peer’s view are conceptually connected.  
Maximal conciliation rationally requires a person to treat one’s interlocutor’s beliefs in the 
same way one weighs one’s own.  This might lead to the resulting state where both 
individuals suspend on their original beliefs.  By weighing one’s interlocutor’s views in this 
way, they can be seen as a critique of one’s own views in the very same way a piece of 
(counter) evidence learned through empirical observation or a priori reasoning would enable 
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internal critique.  But internal critique need not lead to internal conflict; through self-
reflection one can resist persistent agnosticism enough to get a footing going forward.  
Creativity comes in when trying to determine how to proceed.  In ideal circumstances, both 
peers would conciliate and proceed through cooperation and collaboration.  Discoveries are 
difficult to come by for any one person, but two minds are often better than one, at least 
when it comes to epistemic progress.   
Creativity can be defined as the epistemically appropriate balance of critique and 
elaboration.  (Critique erodes; elaboration reinforces.)  These two states of being are 
intimately linked.  A person who is too critical, for example, is lacking in the kind of 
elaboration that would allow them to articulate their views.  And a person who is too 
elaborative is less wont to exercise critique when the circumstances call for them to revise 
their views.  Equivalently, then, we can use either of the two aforementioned states to define 
creativity as the mean between two extremes: stagnation and instability.  Since stagnation can 
be equivalently described as excessive elaboration and instability as a deficiency in 
elaboration, we can say that creativity is the mean between an excess and deficiency in 
elaboration.  Or, since instability is the excess of critique and stagnation is the deficiency of 
critique, we can say that creativity is the mean between two extremes, the excess and 
deficiency of critique.   
I am here taking some pretty familiar tools of the philosophical tool-belt in 
“elaboration” and “critique” and utilizing them to generate something novel and of 
philosophical value.  I did similar (or at least I sought to) with humility and confidence, and 
with self-reliance and coordination.  All three pairs were utilized to see what I call the 
epistemic virtues in a new light.   
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In Book IV, Chapter 8 of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes a virtue in the 
sphere concerned with “tasteful social conduct” as the mean between an excess and 
deficiency in the use of humor, or what he calls buffoonery and boorishness.91  The buffoon, 
Aristotle says, “will do anything for a laugh, and care more about this than speaking decently 
and not offending those who are the butt of their jokes.”  The boor, on the other hand, 
“contributes nothing and takes objection to everything, even though relaxation and 
amusement are thought to be a necessary part of life.”  If we extend this virtue-theoretic 
framework to the sphere of argumentation, the virtue of quick-wittedness, which Aristotle 
ascribes to “[t]hose who joke in a tasteful way…as if they are quick-to-turn,” can serve as a 
model for what I have been calling creativity. 
Why does excessive elaboration lead to stagnation?  Why does excessive critique lead 
to instability?  The overly elaborative reasoner or arguer is too often adding nuance to bolster 
their view instead of considering alternatives.  They can construct a view, but once they’ve 
started down one path, there’s no turning back.  On the other hand, the overly critical 
reasoner or arguer is too concentrated on considering alternatives to ever solidify a position 
of their own.  But if one strikes a balance between elaboration and critique, one can achieve 
(or at least approach) the type of dynamic stability required for creative epistemic and 
argumentative behavior.   
5. Conclusion  
Although I have been talking in terms of being virtuous, I of course allow greater and 
lesser degrees of discursive virtue in general and the particular virtues I’ve identified in 
particular.  So virtue theoretic evaluation is often appropriate even when we know or suspect 
                                                           
91 Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics: 1127b34-1128b9. 
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that we are incapable of achieving these ideals in full.  There is no doubt in my mind that it is 
impossible, at least psychologically, to be maximally sincere, open-minded, and creative all 
the time.  At most, what we can do is aim towards the ideals we use these words to express.  
If the Aristotelian approach to the analysis of these ideals is correct, we can best promote the 
associated virtues in ourselves by balancing ourselves between the corresponding vices.  
(Indeed, in each case, Aristotle identifies the more common failure to achieve virtue, whether 
it be the associated excess or deficiency, and advises his pupils to overcompensate at first, 
by, for example, begin acting rashly if one is now cowardly, so as to arrive at courage.  I 
have not provided similar advice in the discursive realm.  But the more general point 
remains.  The impossibility of perfection does not drain the utility from critique.  Our 
inevitable imperfection should not stop us from criticizing those who advance irrational 
arguments or engage irresponsibly in argumentation.  We should all be learning together. 
This initial chapter of the dissertation was intended to be constructive, by offering an 
alternative framework under which we can make normative judgments about arguers, 
arguments, and argumentative actions.  The next two chapters are case studies for my 
framework.  The first is aimed at providing justification for our judgments concerning a 
particular type of bad argument, namely, a question-begging argument.  The second provides 
justification for our judgments concerning the irrationality of being steadfast in the face of 
peer disagreement.  I argue that such behavior – both circular argumentation and 
steadfastness in the face of peer disagreement – is symptomatic of dogmatism, which itself 
reflects a failure in cognitive empathy on the part of the dogmatist. 
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Chapter 1. Breaking out of the Circle92 
What’s wrong with begging the question?  Some philosophers believe that question-
begging arguments are inevitably fallacious and that their fallaciousness stems from a shared 
“formal” deficiency.  In contrast, some philosophers, like Richard Robinson (1971) deny that 
begging the question is fallacious at all.  And others characterize begging the question as an 
“informal” fallacy of reasoning that can only be understood with the aid of epistemic (as 
opposed to syntactic and semantic) notions.  Roy Sorensen (1996) joins this last camp by 
offering a powerful argument against both Robinson’s skepticism and fully formal 
approaches to the phenomenon.  According to Sorensen’s view, question-begging is 
fallacious because it compromises the rationality of the question-beggar’s position.  Though 
his argument forces Robinson into a peculiar dialectical position, it does little to elucidate the 
reasons why Robinson’s position is unstable and it fails to embody Sorensen’s own 
conception of rationally persuasive argumentation.  I utilize this conception to show how 
Robinson is left with no principled basis on which to deny the fallaciousness of begging the 
question.  By advancing the dialectic between Sorensen and Robinson, I aim to show that our 
argumentative practices must take the perspectives of others seriously, whether or not those 
perspectives are rational. 
1. Introduction 
 
Suppose Sally loves chocolate ice-cream, but Fran does not.  Might it be appropriate 
or unobjectionable for Sally to attempt to persuade Fran that chocolate ice cream is 
delicious?  The answer to this question will depend on their perspectives.  We can suppose 
                                                           
92 An earlier version of this chapter is published in Argumentation.  The final publication is available at 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10503-017-9426-x 
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that Fran has tasted chocolate ice cream and hates the taste.  Now it may be that Sally should 
know about Fran's aversion to chocolate, perhaps because Sally has seen Fran gag when she 
tried it in the past.  We can imagine the conversation going something like: 
Sally: "Mmm, this chocolate ice cream is delicious. You should try some!" 
Fran: "But I hate the taste of chocolate. Didn't you see me gag the last time I tried it?" 
Sally: "Yes, but you should try it!" 
Or maybe Sally has never seen Fran try chocolate, but Fran has assured her that she hates the 
taste. 
Sally: "Mmm, this chocolate ice cream is delicious. You should try some!" 
Fran: "As I've told you many times, I hate the taste of chocolate." 
Sally: "But this chocolate is the best, Fran. You should try it!" 
Maybe Fran has never told Sally about her distaste for chocolate, but she has always turned it 
down in the past. 
Sally: "Mmm, this chocolate ice cream is delicious. You should try some!" 
Fran: "No, thanks. Haven't you seen me turn down chocolate in the past?" 
Sally: "Well yes, but this chocolate is the best, Fran. You should try it!" 
Are Sally's attempts to persuade Fran appropriate or unobjectionable?  If Sally knows 
(or should know) that Fran does not like the taste of chocolate and knows that Fran’s 
aversion is relatively non-malleable, it would be irrational for her to insist that Fran try the 
dessert; indeed, since chocolate isn’t essential to health it would be wrong for Sally to try in 
more subtle ways to impart her love of chocolate to Fran.   
Why are Sally’s attempts to persuade objectionable?  An attractive diagnosis would 
attribute Sally’s attempt to an empathic failure.  Sally should recognize that the actions she 
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undertakes in order to persuade Fran will not work for a particular reason.  Sally’s attempt 
fails because she did not take into account how chocolate ice-cream tastes to Fran.  Fran’s 
palate is partially constitutive of Fran’s perspective.  A failure to consider Fran’s palate is 
therefore an empathic failure in a suitably broad sense of “empathy” on which it denotes the 
capacity to appreciate and appropriately respond to the perspectives of others. 
Now, suppose Sally has reason to think that Fran’s judgment is entirely ungrounded.  
Maybe Fran was brought up in a culture whose people viewed sweet, cold treats as 
disgusting, although Fran has never tasted chocolate of any kind.  If Sally knows this, then 
her insistence that Fran try some might work to persuade Fran that chocolate ice-cream is 
delicious.  Now of course this depends on whether Fran will actually like the taste of 
chocolate ice-cream, but surely we should not blame Sally for her attempt.  Such attempts at 
persuasion, if they are appropriate, require the persuader to comprehend the prospective 
persuadee’s perspective. 
In what follows, I apply the same analytic framework to elucidate the pragmatic 
nature of argumentative circularity.  If successful, my analysis will shed light on the fallacy 
of begging the question, argument evaluation, and rational persuasion.   
Question-Begging 
 
What’s wrong with begging the question?  Some philosophers believe that question-
begging arguments are inevitably fallacious and that their fallaciousness stems from a shared 
“formal” deficiency.93  In contrast, some philosophers, like Richard Robinson (1971) deny 
that begging the question is fallacious at all.94  And others characterize begging the question 
as an “informal” fallacy of reasoning that can only be understood with the aid of epistemic 
                                                           
93 Defenders of the formal approach include Walton (1994) and Woods (1992). 
94 Robinson (1971). Begging the question. Analysis 31: 113-17. 
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(as opposed to syntactic and semantic) notions.95  Roy Sorensen (1996) joins this last camp 
by offering a powerful argument against both Robinson’s skepticism and fully formal 
approaches to the phenomenon.  According to Sorensen’s view, question-begging is 
fallacious because it compromises the rationality of the question-beggar’s position.96 
In this chapter, I endorse the view that what is wrong or objectionable with question-
begging is that it constitutes the same form of objectionable dogmatism evidenced in 
attempts to persuade of the type I describe above.  In section 1, I lay out the complex 
dialectic between Sorensen and Robinson.97  Though Sorensen’s argument forces Robinson 
into a peculiar dialectical position, it does little to elucidate the reasons why Robinson’s 
position is unstable and it fails to embody Sorensen’s own conception of rationally 
persuasive argumentation.  In section 2, I improve upon Sorensen’s case by arguing that 
Robinson’s view is self-defeating.  Robinson must either accept my argument or reject it, but 
he can do neither without endorsing a contradiction.  His only other option is to abandon his 
formal characterization of fallacious argumentation.  And this leaves Robinson no easily 
identifiable grounds on which to deny the fallaciousness of begging the question.  By 
advancing the dialectic between Sorensen and Robinson, I aim to show that our 
argumentative practices must take the perspectives of others seriously, whether or not those 
perspectives are rational.  Finally, in section 3, I examine a bit more in depth the connection 
between empathy and circularity.  Though the tendency towards circularity might be an 
inevitable feature of the human condition, empathy offers a way to break out. 
                                                           
95 Defenders of the epistemic approach, which rely on pragmatic features like knowledge, belief, justification, 
and presuppositions, include Sanford (1972) and Ritola (2006). Wright’s (2000) approach, which focuses on the 
argument’s cogency, i.e., its ability to rationally persuade, probably falls into this camp as well.  
96 Sorensen (1996). Unbeggable questions. Analysis 56: 51-55. Sorensen (1999). An empathic theory of 
circularity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 498-509. 
97 Sorensen. Cf. Teng, Truncellito and Ritola. 
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2. Unbeggable Questions 
 
Richard Robinson (1971) argues that there is no fallacy of begging the question – that 
a prohibition on the practice is just a “rule of an old-fashioned competitive game” (116).98  
Roy Sorensen (1996: 51) disagrees and propounds the following argument against Robinson: 
(A) There is a fallacy of begging the question. 
Therefore, there is a fallacy of begging the question. 
The basic idea is this: Robinson must either condemn (A) or accept it as a good argument.  
He cannot accept (A) as a good argument, as that would commit him to the content of A’s 
conclusion: the fallaciousness of begging the question.  But if Robinson condemns (A), he 
must do so on the grounds that (A) begs the question or because (A) is either invalid or 
unsound.  But if he condemned (A) on the grounds of begging the question, Robinson would 
have to acknowledge the fallaciousness of at least one question-begging argument and 
therein concede the point at issue.  Robinson’s only option, then, is to reject (A)’s premise.99  
I will argue (in section 2) that rejecting (A)’s premise does Robinson no favors.  But before I 
do, I want to investigate Sorensen’s reasons for claiming that Robinson cannot condemn (A) 
on these grounds as (according to Sorensen) argument (A) does not beg the question.   
Argument Evaluation 
 
                                                           
98 Robinson is talking here of Aristotle’s dialogical game Elenchus, in which the activity of the interlocutors 
engaged in rational inquiry is governed by a set of rules that permit certain moves and prohibit others.  Aristotle 
gives two accounts of the fallacy: one in the Prior Analytics and the other in Topics.  Aristotle’s first account 
can be loosely associated with informal (epistemic) approaches to diagnosing the fallacy.  His second account 
can be loosely associated with more formal (dialectical) approaches.  Robinson takes both accounts to be 
mistaken: “…Aristotle’s Analytics account is a failure, and his Topics account makes it merely a rule of a game 
which nobody plays any more…”  Robinson thinks that since both accounts fail, the use of the phrase “begging 
the question” is “nearly always a muddle, or improper, or both” (117).  For helpful discussions of the distinction 
between the two approaches, see Walton (1994) and Hazlett (2006). 
99 In ‘‘Unbeggable Questions,’’ Sorensen suggests as much: ‘‘After all, Robinson has a viable reply to my 
argument. He should simply deny my premise’’ (51). But he fails to follow up on this admittedly ‘‘viable 
reply’’ to his argument and in doing so fails to follow his own advice in taking seriously Robinson’s 
perspective. 
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Sorensen (1996: 53) argues that (A) does not beg the question even though its single 
premise is reiterated as its single conclusion.  He argues for this surprising claim as follows: 
(1) To beg the question is to beg the question against someone. 
 
(2) An argument can only beg the question against someone who would not agree with all of 
the argument's premises and conclusion. 
 
(3) An argument can only beg the question against someone who can consistently object that 
the argument begs the question against him. 
 
(4) If argument (A) begs the question against someone, then he either agrees with all of its 
premises and conclusions or he cannot consistently object that (A) begs the question against 
him. 
 
(5) Therefore, (A) does not beg the question. 
The argument is valid.  Premise (4) is a consequence of (1), the relevant auxiliary argument 
(A) and the relevant features of the dialectical situation between Robinson and Sorensen.  
And (5) follows from (2)-(4).  By themselves, (2) and (3) imply that if an argument begs the 
question against someone, then that person does not agree with all the argument’s premises 
and conclusion and he can consistently object that the argument begs the question against 
him.  Accusing (A) of question-begging, however, precludes the possibility of satisfying both 
conjuncts of the consequent. 
Against (1)/(2) 
 
I take (2) to be obvious.  What about (1)?  One might think that one can beg the 
question against oneself and that this would undermine (1)’s plausibility.  But begging the 
question against oneself would still amount to begging the question against someone.  Plus, it 
isn’t clear that one could coherently beg the question against oneself.  What would this 
entail?  Well, for one, the subject S would propound the argument to herself, thereby 
committing herself to accepting the argument as rationally persuasive.  But in accusing the 
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argument of begging the question, S also rejects the argument as unpersuasive.  S therein 
contradicts herself.  Still, regardless of whether such an activity would be incoherent, in 
begging the question against herself S commits herself to belief in all of the premises and 
conclusion of the argument, contradicting (2).  
A position that viewed begging the question as a formal defect of the argument could 
at least get off the ground in its rejection of (1).  One might, for instance, assert that all 
arguments of the form ‘P, therefore, P’ beg the question as they merely restate their premise 
as conclusion.  If we can determine whether an argument is question-begging by appeals to 
its syntactic and semantic features only (and without appeals to the pragmatic features of 
argumentation) we might be tempted to say that such an argument begs the question full stop, 
regardless of whether it was propounded against someone.  If we could take the “perspective 
from nowhere” we would be able to evaluate arguments for the fallacy just like we do when 
we evaluate an argument’s (formal, deductive) validity. 
There are, however, good reasons to reject formal models of the fallacy.  Almost 
everyone agrees that question-begging arguments are rationally unpersuasive.  But whether 
an argument is rationally persuasive depends on who the argument is intended to persuade.  
The rational persuasiveness of an argument is not a monadic property of an argument, like 
the argument’s validity or soundness (given certain idealizations), but is indexed to a time 
and a person.100  As such, any account of begging the question will have to take into account 
pragmatic features of argumentation, such as what is known by each of the interlocutors, the 
                                                           
100 Of course, the same relativity to speaker and time affects the validity and soundness of arguments that 
contain indexicals, demonstratives, tenses and other “context sensitive” features, but these complications won’t 
arise in what follows. 
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aims and goals of the dialogue, and other features that bear on whether the argument would 
be found rationally persuasive by one or more of these parties.   
And there is another, independent reason to be dubious of formal accounts of the 
fallacy.  Sorensen provides several examples of arguments that are of the form ‘P, therefore, 
P’ which seem not to beg the question.  Consider just one such example:  
(I) There is at least one argument typed in black ink  
     Therefore, there is at least one argument typed in black ink.   
Acceptance of (I)’s premise confers justification on one’s belief in its conclusion 
because the argument instantiates the content of the conclusion.  Sorensen thus concludes 
that there are instances of arguments of the form ‘P, therefore, P’ that are not circular, i.e., 
that are not question-begging.  And since any formal view prohibits every instance of such an 
argument, the above example constitutes a counterexample to formal models of the fallacy.  
Any construal of the fallacy which prohibits appeals to pragmatic (or at least non-formal) 
features of argumentation is implausible.101  
Against (3) 
 
Someone might reject (3) because she thinks no arguments beg the question.  If no 
arguments beg the question, the argument fails because (3) is vacuously true.  Such a denial 
would be illegitimate, since it would render the above argument, which intends to show that 
(A) does not beg the question, superfluous.  If a rejection of the argument requires one to 
assert that no arguments beg the question, then there is a much more straightforward 
argument to its conclusion: no arguments beg the question, therefore, (A) does not beg the 
                                                           
101 Sorensen (1991: 248). Per an anonymous reviewer, a slightly more ambitious example from Sorensen (1999: 
498): (II) Some deductive arguments do not reason from general to particular. Therefore, some deductive 
arguments do not reason from general to particular. Both arguments (I) and (II) work for my purposes. 
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question.  So a response on behalf of Robinson along these lines fails because “attributing a 
defense that defeats the defender” is an explicit violation of the principle of charity.102 
Perspective Shift in Argument 
 
Nevertheless, even if we grant that (A) does not beg the question, Sorensen’s 
argument fails to be rationally persuasive.  To see this, consider what Sorensen calls 
“perspective shift in argument.”103  The person who advances the argument to another in 
good faith must do so in a manner that is rationally persuasive to this other party from this 
party’s point of view.  This process of “simulation”, when done competently, can be said to 
have met an important goal of discursive rationality.  The problem for Sorensen is that he 
fails to heed his own advice: he advances an argument he should have known would not 
persuade Robinson, since the falsity of its premise is entailed by Robinson’s position. 
Earlier I said that there are three responses Robinson could give to Sorensen’s 
argument (A).  In accepting (A) he concedes the point.  If he were to reject (A) on the 
grounds that it begs the question, he would also concede the point.  The only plausible 
response he could give, then, would be to reject (A)’s premise.  And why not?  After all, 
Robinson’s position commits him to a denial of the existence of the fallacy of begging the 
question, i.e., its truth entails the falsity of (A)’s premise.  There is good reason to think that 
any argument which purports to persuade someone of the irrationality of her position and 
utilizes a premise the falsity of which is entailed by her stated view is an argument she need 
not take seriously.  For her stated position would already rule out the argument as unsound.  
In fact, just as in the “ice-cream” case where Fran’s palate is partially constitutive of her 
                                                           
102 Sorensen (1996: 51).  The principle of charity is a principle constrained by our communicative and 
interpretive practices.  Roughly, charity requires us to interpret our audience as rational.   
103 Sorensen (1991: 505). 
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perspective, Robinson’s rejection of Sorensen’s premise is partially constitutive of his 
perspective.   
Now, some believe that Sorensen mischaracterizes the dispute between him and 
Robinson as a dispute about the existence of the fallacy of begging the question.  Teng 
(1997), for instance, believes the dispute is really about whether begging the question is 
fallacious: Robinson thinks no, Sorensen thinks yes.104  And Truncellito (2004) thinks the 
dispute revolves around the nature of the fallacy: Robinson takes it to be a logical fallacy, 
whereas Sorensen takes it to be rhetorical.105  I will not take these issues up here, since there 
is a live option on the table for Robinson that does not involve a re-construal of the dispute.  
Robinson can simply reject (A)’s premise and condemn (A) on the grounds that it is unsound. 
The dialectic thus far looks something like this: 
R: There is no fallacy of begging the question 
S: (A) There is a fallacy of begging the question. 
       Therefore, there is a fallacy of begging the question. 
R: (A)’s premise is false. 
Still, though rejecting A’s premise is Robinson’s best strategy, in the next section I 
argue that Robinson’s extraordinarily restrictive position on when we can properly condemn 
an argument prevents him from executing this maneuver.  Robinson believes that there are 
only two ways to properly condemn an argument: either an argument should be condemned 
on the grounds that it is invalid, or else the argument should be condemned on the grounds 
that it has a false premise, i.e., that it is unsound.  All other condemnations of an argument 
are, according to Robinson, improper.  In response, I advance an argument he cannot 
                                                           
104 Teng (1997). Sorensen on begging the question. Analysis 57: 220-22. 
105 Truncellito (2004). Running in circles about begging the question. Argumentation 18: 325-29. 
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consistently reject.  Robinson’s attempts to evaluate my argument lead to contradiction 
because his position permits for the construction of faulty arguments whose faultiness cannot 
be detected from his perspective on the evaluation of arguments. 
3. The Rational Persuasion of Robinson 
 
We can all agree with Robinson that “[i]t is absurd…to condemn an argument 
because its premise entails its conclusion…”  Our accusations of question-begging are not 
forceful if we base them on the entailment of conclusion by premises, or else any valid 
argument would count as question-begging.  This is why we should reject any account that 
implies an argument begs the question so long as its conclusion is “contained” in its 
premises.106  But Robinson should be wary of anti-deductivist paranoia.  Though he is right 
that sometimes people mistakenly condemn an argument as question-begging “just because 
[the] premise necessitates [the] conclusion” it is unfair to suspect that a person who 
condemns an argument for begging the question does so because it implies the falsity of their 
own view.  I hope that my argument below, which can be condemned for reasons other than 
being invalid or unsound, helps stave off this paranoia. 
Robinson’s position regarding the fallacy of begging the question is parasitic on a 
claim he makes about what it is to properly condemn an argument.  My argument is only 
effective against someone who endorses his stated position on this broader issue.  As such, it 
shows why abandoning this overly narrow position is paramount.  Consider what Robinson 
says in response to someone who condemns an argument as question-begging.  
                                                           
106 I here pass over the notorious difficulties that plague attempts to explicate the intended notion of 
containment. 
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There are only two proper ways of condemning an argument. One is to say 
that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. The other is to say that 
you do not accept the premises as true. Your begging the question appears to 
be neither of these. So it is not a proper accusation. (Robinson, 114)  
I reply that accepting Robinson’s minimalist position on when an argument can be properly 
condemned commits him to endorsing the following paradoxical argument: 
(B) 1. A deduction can be properly condemned just in case it is either invalid or unsound. 
2. This deduction can be properly condemned. 
Therefore, 
 3. This deduction is either invalid or unsound.107 
Clearly the argument is valid, as (3) follows by Modus Ponens from (2) and the left to 
right conditional of (1).  Is it sound?  If Robinson wants to properly condemn the argument, 
he must do so by rejecting one of the premises.  He cannot consistently reject premise (1) 
because he would thereby give up his definition of “bad deduction.”  By rejecting premise 
(1), he would thereby concede the point that a deductive argument can be properly 
condemned on the basis of something other than its being invalid or unsound.  
Must he accept premise (2)?  Suppose premise (2) is true.  If premise (2) is true, the 
argument’s conclusion follows from its premises via Modus Ponens.  So let us suppose that 
the argument’s conclusion is true.  The argument’s conclusion says that the argument is 
invalid or unsound.  Since we have already concluded that its premises are true, we can 
conclude that the argument is invalid. (This follows from the definition of ”soundness.”) But 
                                                           
107 Argument (B) bears a resemblance to the pseudo-scotus puzzle. Jaquette (2003). The soundness paradox. 
Logic Journal of the IGPL 11: 547–556. The pseudo-scouts puzzle, also known as the Validity Paradox, is 
generated from attempting to evaluate the following argument, (V): Argument (V) is deductively valid. 
Therefore, Argument (V) is deductively invalid. 
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the argument consists in a single application of modus ponens.  Thus, to deny the argument’s 
validity, Robinson would have to reject the validity of modus ponens.  And this is a high 
price to pay.  Indeed, even if there are exceptions to modus ponens (as has been argued by 
Forbes), these putative exceptions all involve the interaction of tense and various 
operators.108  To allege that the above argument begs the question is highly unintuitive. 
Suppose, to explore the other fork of our dilemma; that premise (2) is false.  If 
premise (2) is false, what it says is false, and what it says is that the deduction above can be 
properly condemned.  We can therein conclude that the deduction above cannot be properly 
condemned.  But if we conjoin this claim with premise (1), simple first-order reasoning 
(utilizing biconditional elimination) allows us to conclude that the deduction is neither 
invalid nor unsound.  Equivalently, the deduction is both valid and sound.  But applying the 
classic definition of “soundness” allows us to conclude that the deduction has true premises.  
This, however, contradicts the assumption that premise (2) of the deduction is false. 
To sum up, the argument can be used to derive a contradiction from Robinson’s 
definition of “bad argument.”  Robinson is unable to condemn arguments on any grounds 
other than their being invalid or unsound.  This forces him to accept arguments against this 
very conception that others might reject.  Since he cannot reject (1) without giving up his 
definition of “bad deduction” and he cannot reject (2) without generating a contradiction, his 
only plausible remaining option is to accept that the argument is a good deduction because 
rejecting Modus Ponens is implausible.  But if he were to accept (B) as a good deduction, 
Robinson would be committed to the conclusion that (B) is either invalid or unsound.  Back 
around the circle he goes. 
                                                           
108 G. Forbes. 1983. Thisness and vagueness. Synthese 54: 235–59. 
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So: Either Robinson accepts (2) and so must reject a clearly good instance of MP or 
else he rejects it and must endorse the contradiction that (B) is both sound and unsound.  
Neither option is rationally acceptable.  The argument (B) clearly must be condemned, but I 
have just shown that Robinson cannot condemn it for being either invalid or unsound.  What 
we have here is a deduction that is clearly condemnable, but because it is sound if unsound 
and unsound if sound.  We ought to condemn such arguments because they are self-
defeating.109  
The Liar110 
 
Earlier I said that (B) is valid.  But is it?  Can Robinson reject (B) on the grounds that 
its self-referential second premise does not denote a proposition and that this renders the 
argument invalid?   
To answer this question, first consider the traditional ‘liar’ sentence: “this sentence is 
false.”  Suppose Robinson were to deny that the ‘liar’ denotes a proposition because it is 
neither true nor false.  Such a view relies on an assumption of bivalence.  Under the 
assumption of bivalence, then, Robinson might reason as follows: “Since (2) cannot be true 
or false, (2) fails to denote a proposition.  But since MP relates propositions to propositions, 
(B) cannot involve an instance of MP.  But if (B) does not involve an instance of MP, then 
(B) is invalid.  Thus, (B) is invalid.” 
                                                           
109 Silva (2013) offers a definition of what he calls ‘epistemically self-defeating arguments’. “An argument is 
epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s 
conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of the argument’s premises.” Silva. 2013. 
Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition. Philosophical Studies 164: 579-89. 
110 Although I make the ultimate connection from argument (B) to the Liar, there may be intermediate steps 
through Curry’s Paradox. Curry. 1942. The inconsistency of certain formal logics. Journal of Symbolic Logic 7: 
115–117. One formulation of Curry’s paradox includes a list of sentences, where one sentence—let’s suppose 
the third sentence—says ‘‘If the third sentence in the List is true, then every sentence is true.’’ The paradox is 
generated in one’s attempts to determine the truth value of the third sentence in the list. Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
  
104 
But this line of reasoning also depends on Robinson’s acceptance of (1), which 
ultimately blinds him from seeing the possibility that (2) is true.  As I have argued, there is a 
far simpler way to condemn (B): condemn it on the grounds that it’s self-defeating.  If I’m 
right, then (2) is true and I need not make any controversial claims about liar sentences and 
their connections (or lack thereof) to propositions. 
The Mean 
 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean says that a virtue is the mean between two extremes: 
one, which is an excess, and the other a deficiency in a given magnitude.111  In the first 
chapter of this dissertation, I hypothesized that we can extend this idea from moral practice to 
the practice of argumentation and say that a good arguer finds the mean between two 
extremes: dogmatism and skepticism.112  The former is reflected in question-begging 
arguments, whose acceptance results in a deficiency of humility (or, equivalently, excessive 
confidence).  The latter is reflected in self-defeating arguments, whose acceptance results in 
an excess of humility (or, equivalently, a deficiency of confidence).  This conception might 
be endorsed by Sorensen, who posits a fallacy “opposite” to begging the question:  
Often my adversary has inferential resources that I lack. That means I can 
rationally persuade him by appealing to premises that I do not believe and 
inferential rules I do not accept. The argument will be rationally persuasive 
from his perspective, not mine. After all, the relevant resource base is his, not 
mine.113 
 
                                                           
111 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics: 1106a26-b28. 
112 In my (2018) paper “Breaking out of the Circle,” I hypothesized that the second vice corresponding to open-
mindedness is spinelessness.  I have since changed my mind on this matter and now count spinelessness as one 
of the two vicious epistemic attitudes (along with stubbornness) that define three separate argumentative virtues 
– open-mindedness, sincerity, and creativity – each of which have a corresponding set of two vices.  
Spinelessness is replaced by the vice of skepticism. 
113 Sorensen. An empathic theory of circularity. 508-509. 
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But Sorensen fails to heed his own advice.  He propounds an argument which is obviously 
unsound from Robinson’s perspective, since the falsity of its premise is entailed by 
Robinson’s position. 
In contrast, I have followed Sorensen’s advice (rather than his practice) by advancing 
an argument that utilizes resources that I lack but Robinson possesses, namely, the 
acceptance of (B)’s premise.  The argument is rationally persuasive from his perspective 
because it undermines his position about what it is to properly condemn an argument.  I have 
shown that his only rational option is to abandon his formal characterization of fallacious 
argumentation, and this leaves him with no obvious basis on which to deny the fallaciousness 
of begging the question. 
4.  Sincerity in Argumentation 
 
Am I irrational in advancing argument (B) against Robinson, since I do not accept its 
(false) first premise?  In response to this question, all I can say is that I am doing all I can do 
to embody Robinson’s perspective, one that turns out to be irrational, in an attempt to 
persuade him to abandon his position.  It is not always possible to propound a sound 
argument (or even a good argument) in order to rationally persuade someone.  Sometimes, in 
our attempts to persuade, rationality requires that we simulate what are in fact irrational (or at 
least unsound) positions.   
If we desire to interpret our audience as reasonable (and we do when engaging in 
discussions with others in good faith) we must find a balance between interpreting them as 
thinking exactly like us and interpreting them as thinking wildly different from us in a way 
that compromises their rationality.  Sometimes this is impossible; our interlocutors place 
themselves in positions wholly incongruent with our way of thinking.  But in some such 
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cases we are nevertheless justified in believing that their positions are faulty and we are 
rational in attempting to persuade them of this.   
Being Sincere 
 
Recall the example in which Sally’s attempts to persuade Fran that chocolate ice 
cream is delicious, even though she knows Fran does not like chocolate.  Now, suppose that 
Sally is well aware of Fran’s distaste for all things chocolate, but nevertheless persists in her 
attempts to persuade Fran that she should try chocolate ice cream.  Since Fran’s palate is 
partly constitutive of her perspective, Sally’s attempt to persuade Fran is bound to fail.  She 
does not take into account how chocolate ice cream tastes to Fran, but she should.  If she 
persists in her attempt to persuade, Fran can rightly call Sally irrational because she models 
Fran’s cognitive states as too close to her own.  In other words, her persuasive tactics are 
egocentric.  And in the domain of taste, it is extremely plausible that the truth (and perhaps 
even the content) of our “taste” judgments are relativized to the agent making the judgment.  
The assertion that x tastes good is often shorthand or elliptical: a truncated way of asserting 
that x tastes good to those who share the relevant aspects of the speaker’s aesthetic.  If a 
speaker does not implicitly relativize her claim but states simply that x tastes good without 
any relativization, then what she says is either false (because there are no sensibility-
independent facts of taste) or only relatively true: i.e. true relative to those who share the 
relevant aspects of the speaker’s sense of taste and false otherwise.   Because of this, we 
often should not attempt to persuade a dissenter of the judgments we make regarding whether 
such-and-such is delicious or disgusting.  If we know they just have a different sensibility 
from our own—a sensibility on which the object of evaluation is not as we experience it to 
be—we ought to simply accept their judgment, knowing full well that they have privileged 
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access to their own mental states about how things actually taste to them.  Any attempt to 
persuade someone along the lines of Sally’s attempt to persuade Fran, then, will be irrational 
because unduly egocentric.  
Just as the virtue of open-mindedness is the mean between two extremes, the virtue of 
sincerity can be defined as the mean between two extremes – mimicry and manipulation – 
where mimicry is an excess and manipulation a deficiency in coordination (or, equivalently, 
a deficiency and excess of self-reliance, respectively).  Both extremes offer us a way of 
connecting with others, but at a price.  Coordination requires giving up some control.  Self-
reliance requires taking control.  If Sally really wants Fran to like chocolate ice cream, she 
only has two options: either force Fran to try it or hope that Fran simply gives in to the 
insistence.  Neither tactic counts as persuasion, let alone rational persuasion, and both are 
clearly coercive.  Now, I admit that advancing an argument that I do not accept in an effort to 
rationally persuade Robinson does have a “lawyerly air of insincerity” to it.114  But unlike in 
the ice-cream case, the success of my persuasion does not rely on Robinson’s giving in and 
accepting my argument.  As I have argued, he cannot accept my argument. 
Self-Serving Arguments 
 
Why does Sally care that Fran like chocolate ice cream so much that she insists on it?  
Why does Sally care so much that she persist in this insistence?  Why do we beg the question 
against each other?  According to Sorensen, 
[Q]uestion-begging is a side-effect of the most efficient way of persuading 
one another.  So it is an inelimenable tendency in human thought, and indeed 
any thought by thinkers operating under a constraint of scarce resources i.e. all 
physically possible thinkers.  Given ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, the general 
tendency to circularity is an innocent feature of the human condition.115  
 
                                                           
114 Sorensen (1999: 509). 
115 Sorensen (1999: 506). 
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But even if the “tendency to circularity is an innocent feature of the human condition,” 
particular instances of the phenomenon can still be condemned on the grounds that they 
exemplify egocentricity and dogmatic insistence.  A deep desire for connection might drive 
us to do whatever we can to make others like what we like.  Some, even, may choose to use 
this fact about us to exploit us.  There are countless examples in advertising where companies 
look to win over potential customers by insisting that their product is the best (Think here of 
McDonalds’ “I’m lovin’ it!” campaign.)  Even worse, this fact can be used to take advantage 
of those who are relatively incompetent with regards to the issue at hand (for instance, some 
child who isn't aware that McDonald’s is trying to sell something to them).  If advertisements 
are arguments, then they are always self-serving. 
Consider an even more pernicious example drawn from political discourse.  In a press 
conference on the 15th of December, Donald Trump assured his audience that he knew a 
thing or two about words.  Here is his statement in all of its glory: 
President-Elect Trump: “I’m very highly educated. I know words, I have the best words…but 
there is no better word than stupid.”116 
If we understand the above quote as an attempt by Trump to persuade his base to 
think that the word “stupid” is the absolute best word, and we take Trump to be giving 
reasons in good faith for them to do so, then we can see that his stated reasons were simply 
an appeal to (what Trump takes to be) his own (perceived) expertise.  But assuring others that 
you know what you’re talking about when they have no independent reason to trust you as 
credible provides them with nothing better than stubborn insistence.  (And this is no accident 
in cases of people with a lot of power).  Of course, if a person can back up their claims of 
                                                           
116 Jones (2015, December 30). Yet another bold claim from Donald Trump: “I know words.” Retrieved from 
http://gawker.com/yet-another-bold-claim-from-donald-trump-i-know-words-1750331997.  
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expertise by displaying or manifesting this expertise to their audience in some way – in this 
case by being a bit more eloquent at the absolute minimum – then they would have a better 
chance of rationally persuading their audience.  When one’s “demonstration” is a mere 
assurance, it’s either no argumentative backing at all or an extremely poor one.  Accepting an 
obviously self-serving, vacuous “argument” for expertise (e.g. Trump’s ineloquent assertion 
of eloquence) is clearly irrational in the virtue theoretic sense I have identified in chapter 0 
above.117 
If an arguer’s attempt to persuade through dogmatic insistence is unsuccessful, the 
arguer may resort to manipulation of other sorts.  Suppose, for example, that Sally offers 
Fran some ice cream knowing that Fran will think it is coffee-flavored when in fact it is 
chocolate.  Her neglecting to mention that the ice cream is actually chocolate could very 
plausibly be underwritten by a hope that Fran will finally come to admire the deep, exquisite, 
bold flavors of chocolate ice cream, perhaps so that when they are chatting over a cup of 
coffee and see a child with an ice cream cone melting under the sweltering sun they can share 
in their love of chocolate decadence.  But though her insistence is an understandably human 
action, we can rightly say that she argues in an irrational manner when she uncritically 
reasons from her own aesthetic sensibility because doing so is egocentric and self-serving.  
It makes sense that we would not want to excuse such behavior, whether in cases of 
disputes about how we ought to condemn arguments, about whether we should try some new 
food, or about whether we should take claims of expertise seriously.  The tendency to 
circularity is a tendency we all have to get others to see the world like we see it so that we 
can better connect with them.  But how we help others understand and share our perspectives 
                                                           
117 In terms of disagreement, dogmatism precludes mutually recognizable epistemic peerhood.  More on this in 
chapter 2. 
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matters.  Self-serving arguments are elicit means to this laudable end.  The virtuous arguer 
takes a higher road and never loses sight of the intrinsic value of rational argumentation.  
There may be consequentialist justifications of tricking people into conformity with reason.  
Indeed, I have resorted to something like trickery in my efforts to convince Robinson of the 
deficiencies in his formal scheme for evaluating arguments.  More crucially, if rational 
discourse could not provide the means to avoiding Trump’s reelection, and some non-rational 
campaign of “advertising” (or propaganda) could achieve this end, those of us dedicated to 
argumentative virtue would have to make an all-things-considered judgment as to whether 
this vicious means were warranted by the political end in view.  But non-rational 
argumentation, that we know in advance to be unduly egocentric and manipulative, must 
always remain our last resort. Propaganda should never be employed without a special 
justification that can used to excuse or rationalize the techniques in question. 
5. Conclusion 
 
Sorensen’s response does not hold up in the face of scrutiny, but his idea of 
perspective shift in argument helps shed light on the nature of the fallacious nature of 
begging the question.  In section 1, I characterized the dispute between Sorensen and 
Robinson as being a dispute about the existence of the fallacy of begging the question.  
Something like: R: There is no fallacy of begging the question. 
S: (A) 
R: (A)’s premise is false (i.e., there is no fallacy of begging the question). 
I said earlier that I think Robinson would be wrong to reject (A) by denying its 
premise.  I do think this, but Sorensen’s argument fails to show it.  His response forces 
Robinson into a peculiar dialectical situation where the only rational thing for him to do is 
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reject (A)’s premise.   But Robinson would be wrong in doing so, as rejecting (A)’s premise 
amounts to asserting (without argument) that there is no fallacy of begging the question.  
Robinson would display objectionable dogmatism if he were to reject (A)’s premise.  He 
would, essentially, beg the question.  Sorensen, of course, could not say this once he 
advanced (A), for his criticism would hold no weight from Robinson’s point of view.  But I 
can say this Robinson, because I am not committed to accepting Sorensen’s argument, nor 
am I committed to accepting his argument to the claim that (A) does not beg the question. 
Does that render Sorensen’s argument superfluous?  And if it is superfluous, is that 
bad?  In an as-yet-unpublished paper, “Confessing to a Superfluous Premise,” Sorensen 
generates a paradoxical argument and offers a diagnosis that he says helps “minimize 
[attributions] of meaninglessness [and enrich] our conception of superfluous information” 
(24).  I do not intend to get into the details of this new argument here, but only want to 
diffuse a potential misunderstanding of the charge as one that criticizes Sorensen’s argument 
as superfluous and thus meaningless.  Although (A) might “not hold up in the face of 
scrutiny,” it points the way forward.  In the same paper, Sorensen says that 
“acknowledgements of superfluity are a natural side effect of working in stages.  After I 
introduce an argument, I can confess that the argument has a premise that is expendable - 
relative to a newly appropriate standard. Scaffolding that was needed earlier becomes clutter” 
(21).  Sorensen’s argument was necessary scaffolding, which becomes clutter upon further 
investigation. 
My response to Robinson’s skeptical thesis about begging the question can be 
summed up in the following argument: 
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i. If there is no fallacy of begging the question, then Robinson’s response to Sorensen is 
legitimate. 
ii. Robinson’s response to Sorensen is illegitimate. 
iii. Therefore, there is a fallacy of begging the question. 
The argument is valid and I see no reason why Robinson would ever dream of rejecting (i).  
It avoids self-defeat and it avoids inducing a paradox to the evaluator of the argument.  What 
about the truth of (ii)?  I’ve already argued that Robinson’s asserting his position is his most 
rational response to Sorensen but that in doing so Robinson commits himself to an unstable 
position.  Sorensen’s argument forces Robinson into a state of overconfidence, one that is 
irrational even from Robinson’s point of view.  Thus, a rejection of (ii) just amounts to 
Robinson maintaining his overconfidence. 
I have argued that Robinson ought to abandon his position about what it is to properly 
condemn an argument.  If he were to abandon this minimalist position, no obvious 
obstruction would stand in his way of admitting that begging the question is fallacious.  His 
attempts to evaluate my argument lead to contradiction because his position permits for the 
construction of faulty arguments whose faultiness cannot be detected from his avowedly 
minimalist perspective on the evaluation of deductions.  If he realizes that my argument 
undermines his position and he wishes to be rational, he ought to abandon his position.  Once 
he abandons his position, maybe he will be open to the idea that question-begging is more 
than just a ‘rule of an old-fashioned competitive game,’ that, in fact, it is an act of 
objectionable dogmatism associated with a failure to appreciate the perspective of others in 
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rational discourse.118  And sometimes the only way of being rational is to simulate the 
irrational: we must break out of our circles so we can pull others in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
118 One might object to my characterization of begging the question as objectionable dogmatism. Can’t an 
audience reject a premise without justiﬁcation without therein manifesting dogmatism? I hypothesize that in all 
such cases, there is some substantive reason why the audience cannot take the time and effort to inquire into the 
speaker’s grounds, reasons and point of view. Pragmatic considerations often warrant our sacriﬁcing discursive 
norms and ideals. As I’ve admitted above, dogmatism is sometimes the ‘‘lesser of evils.’’ 
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CHAPTER 2. How to Disagree about ‘How to Disagree about 
How to Disagree’ 
 
In this chapter, I examine the connection between dogmatism and disagreement to 
address ongoing debates over the proper response to peer disagreement.  What is the rational 
response when we find that we disagree with one of our peers about some proposition 
p?  According to the Equal Weight View (EW), we should suspend in p.  I defend this ideal 
from two charges: (1) that it is self-undermining, and (2) that it renders its adherents 
“spineless.”  Adam Elga (2010) argues that EW is incoherent because it undermines itself in 
certain special epistemic situations (viz., when the proposition under disagreement is EW 
itself).119  I argue that the Self-Undermining Problem is only apparent, and results essentially 
from a failure to appreciate EW’s status as a rule of rationality.  It is only in conjunction with 
premises about the believer’s epistemic situation that EW entails she ought to suspend in 
EW.  And the fact that one ought to give up belief in a view about disagreement in certain 
special evidential circumstances is not itself a problem for the view.  Even widespread 
disagreement amongst peers wouldn't force those who endorse the equal weight view into 
persistent agnosticism.  We needn’t compromise conciliation and cooperation, even when we 
find ourselves arguing with dogmatists who reject these cognitive virtues. 
 What is the rational thing for one to do in a given evidential situation?  How should a 
new piece of evidence affect the confidence one has in one’s original belief?   
                                                           
119 Elga, A. 2010. How to disagree about how to disagree, in Disagreement, Feldman R. and Warfield T. (eds.) 
175-185. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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We typically desire our beliefs to be true.120  If in taking into account a new piece of 
evidence in a given evidential situation we take the total evidence to support the truth of p to 
a sufficient degree, we ought to, rationally speaking, believe p.  But the evidence we take to 
support a belief in p can be and often is misleading.  Suppose Sally runs into her friend Fran 
who works at the library and asks Fran where she can find the books on epistemology.  Sally, 
knowing that Fran has worked at the library for years and has a passing familiarity with the 
subject, trusts Fran’s judgment when she says that one can find books on epistemology on the 
5th floor of the library.  Still, Sally might walk up four flights of stairs and find that the 
epistemology books are not on that floor. 
Even though her belief was false, Sally was epistemically responsible in the way she 
formed her belief in response to the evidence.  When Fran tells her where the books can be 
found, Sally’s total evidence consists in her awareness of Fran’s general reliability in the past 
and Fran’s current belief that the books can be found on the 5th floor.  At first Sally had no 
belief about where the epistemology books could be found, but after taking into account the 
evidence, she reasonably comes to believe that they can be found on the 5th floor.  Evidence 
can be misleading and fully justified beliefs can be false.  
Often our reasoning involves not just first-order evidence like the form of testimonial 
evidence in the above example, but higher-order evidence, evidence about the evidentiary 
strength of the first-order evidence.  And just as we are sometimes misled by what we take to 
be the first-order evidence, we are sometimes misled by higher-order evidence.  Suppose that 
after Sally talks to Fran, but before she reaches the 5th floor, she hears two librarians talking 
                                                           
120 Sometimes, when these beliefs concern more or less subjective matters (like the deliciousness of chocolate 
ice cream discussed above), the truth we desire for our beliefs is itself relative or relational.  (For example, I aim 
to believe that x is delicious just in case it is true that x is delicious relative to my sensibility.)  But these 
complications for the claim that belief often aims at truth will not affect the discussion that follows.  
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about Fran’s ineptitude at directing people to books.  Sally’s belief that the epistemology 
books are on the 5th floor is rational given the original evidence.  But after hearing the two 
librarians talk about Fran’s (alleged) ineptitude at directing people to books, the support for 
her original belief is undermined, as she now has good reason to doubt her original belief 
about Fran’s reliability. Thus, it seems like the rational thing to do would be to suspend in the 
belief that the epistemology books can be found on the 5th floor.121  
The above example is meant to be a very rough sketch of the kinds of reasoning 
involved when we are presented with new higher-order evidence that bears on the truth of a 
proposition.  There is a special type of evidential circumstance that involves the acquisition 
of a particular sort of higher-order evidence.  The circumstance involves someone who you 
regard as an epistemic peer and as having the same evidence reaches a contrary conclusion to 
the conclusion you have drawn from this same evidence.  Does this new, higher-order 
evidence undermine the support for your original conclusion?  My intuition – and the 
intuitions of those who advocate the Equal Weight View (EW) – is that the rational response 
to such cases of disagreement is to suspend belief in one’s original conclusion.   
In section 1, I explore the motivations behind two families of views – Conciliatory 
and Steadfast – that aim to respond to the disagreement question.  This sets the stage for a 
clear presentation of my main concern, the Self-Undermining Objection to EW, in section 2.  
Adam Elga (2010) argues that belief in EW entails that in certain epistemic situations, viz., 
situations in which EW’s truth is the matter of disagreement, EW undermines itself and is 
thus incoherent.  In section 3, I argue that Elga fails to appreciate EW’s status as a rule of 
rationality.  Contrary to what he says, mere belief in a rule like EW does not lead to 
                                                           
121 So long as we assume that Sally has no reason to ignore the librarians and no reason to think Fran is close to 
infallible. 
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incoherence.  A problem only seems to arise in special cases.  But it is not a problem for a 
view about the proper epistemic response to peer disagreement to entail, in conjunction with 
premises about the current epistemic situation, that one ought to give up belief in that very 
view, so long as those conditions do not obtain in the context in which the view is actually 
being advanced.  In section 4, I argue that there is no obvious way to establish peerhood in 
the decidedly philosophical context in which the truth of EW is the subject of disagreement.  
If this is right, the rational thing to do when one finds out a supposed peer disagrees with one 
about EW is to suspend on one’s belief about the status of their peerhood.  In section 5, I 
square the conclusion made about the epistemology of disagreement with the virtue-theoretic 
approach to argumentation developed in chapter zero and make some closing remarks. 
1. The Problem of Peer Disagreement 
 
Consider the following scenario:  Adam believes some proposition P on the basis of 
evidence E.  When he runs into Tom, Adam finds out that although they have both gone 
through the same evidence, they have arrived at different conclusions regarding the truth of 
P.  Given E, Adam and Tom disagree about P – Adam believes P on the basis of E whereas 
Tom believes ~P on the basis of E.   
In such a situation, what is the rational thing for Adam to do?  On the one hand, 
Adam thinks he has pretty good reason to think he is right in reasoning from the (first-order 
evidence) E to P and adopting the belief that P.  But he realizes that Tom thinks the same of 
himself.  Now, if Adam had reason to doubt Tom’s rational credibility – if, say, he had good 
reason to suspect Tom had taken a drug that affects his reasoning capabilities – then he 
would have good reason to remain confident in his original belief.  But suppose that Adam 
has no reason to doubt Tom’s credibility on this occasion.  On the basis of reflecting on his 
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own fallibility, Adam might then believe that it would be irrational to completely ignore the 
fact that he and Tom disagree.   
The driving intuition behind conciliationism in general is that in light of new (albeit 
higher-order) evidence against one’s belief in some proposition p, one ought to become at 
least a little less confident in p.  Suppose Adam went through the kind of reasoning described 
above and chose to be conciliatory.  He therein takes Tom’s belief in P as (higher-order) 
evidence against the truth of P and reasons that the rational thing to do is to become at least a 
little less confident in his original belief that P.   
The first example I presented (i.e., Sally & Fran at the library) is just one of countless 
examples in which higher-order evidence seems to undermine one’s original belief by giving 
one reason to doubt the strength of the first-order evidence in its support.  Can the same be 
said in cases in which one’s knowledge that someone disagrees with one takes the form of 
the higher-order evidence?  It would, I think, be objectionably dogmatic to say that there are 
no circumstances in which one should become less confident that p is true based on the 
evidence that others disagree with one about the truth of p.  To see this, consider the 
(extremely) plausible principle, Minimal Humility (MH): 
Minimal Humility: If S thought casually about whether P for 10 minutes and decided 
it’s correct, and then finds out that many people, most of them smarter and more 
familiar with the relevant evidence and arguments than she, have thought long and 
hard about P, and have independently but unanimously decided that P is false, S 
should become less confident in P. 122 
                                                           
122David Christensen. 2009. Disagreement as evidence: the epistemology of controversy. Philosophical 
Compass, 4/5: 763. 
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If MH is true – and I cannot think of any reason to doubt such a principle – then there are at 
least some evidential circumstances in which one learns about disagreement where one 
should become less confident in one’s original belief.  And I do not think it is too much of a 
jump to say that a conciliatory response would be rational in a case where, say, one discovers 
she disagrees with only one person who is smarter and more familiar with the relevant 
evidence than she.  But on what grounds can we say that Adam ought to take the conciliatory 
response as well when he is faced with a disagreeing “peer” rather than an epistemic superior 
or group of such? 
The proper response to their disagreement clearly depends on the attitude Adam holds 
toward the proposition that Tom is, “smarter and more familiar with the relevant evidence 
than he.”  Adam might consider Tom to be incompetent.  If he does, he probably should not 
give much weight to Tom’s opinion.  On the flip side, if Adam considers Tom to be an 
expert, with more knowledge and reasoning ability with respect to the target proposition than 
he, Ada, should give at least some weight to Tom’s opinion and maybe even adopt this 
alternative belief.  But suppose Adam believes Tom’s epistemic credibility to lie somewhere 
in between incompetence and expertise.  Indeed, suppose Adam thinks that he and Tom share 
roughly the same amount of knowledge and expertise with respect to the proposition under 
dispute.  Intuitively, then, his response to the disagreement should lie somewhere in between 
complete deference and dismissal.  
 A view on peer disagreement is conciliatory if the view entails that one should 
become less confident in one’s belief in p when one finds out one disagrees with someone 
who one takes as one’s epistemic peer about some proposition p based on the same evidence 
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e.123  Conciliatory views on peer disagreement can differ according to how much they say the 
newly acquired evidence counts against the original belief.  One, particularly strong, 
conciliatory view – and the view I defend in this dissertation – is The Equal Weight View 
(EW), which councils us to weigh a peer’s belief equally with our own when determining our 
doxastic attitude toward the proposition under disagreement.124  In cases of peer 
disagreement, EW says that the disputants should suspend.  More formally:   
(EW):  For all propositions p, S should suspend in p if S comes to find out she disagrees with 
her peer about p based on the same evidence. 
Now, EW provides us with rational prescriptions on what to do in cases of peer 
disagreement.  By giving equal weight to one’s own and one’s peer’s belief with regards to 
some proposition, EW tells one to suspend.  To get an idea of the kinds of cases that lend 
weight to EW, consider the following: 
Racetrack: Finn and Jake are at a horse-racing track.  They attend many races 
and always sit as close as they can to the finish line so they can determine 
which horse won the race.  Both are very adept at judging which horse won 
the race in a nose-to-nose finish.  In fact, they consider each other as just as 
reliable when it comes to judging such things.  Today’s race ends in a dead 
heat between Seabiscuit and Secretariat.  Finn is confident Secretariat won the 
race, but Jake is equally as confident Seabiscuit won the race.  
 
                                                           
123The term “conciliatory” is adopted from Elga (2010), though others have since taken up using the general 
notion of conciliationism to describe their views on peer disagreement.  See Christensen (2007) and Feldman 
(2006). 
124The Equal Weight View was first advanced by Elga (2007), although Elga has since given it up in favor of a 
partially-conciliatory view on disagreement, as can be seen in Elga (2010). 
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Should Finn hold on to his belief that Secretariat won the race?  Finn has no better 
evidence for the claim that Secretariat won the race than Jake has to believe that Seabiscuit 
won the race because he has no reason to trust his own perceptual judgment over Jake’s.  
Intuitively, then, Finn should give equal weight to Jake’s belief as he does his own.  In other 
words, the rational response in Racetrack lines up with being conciliatory in general and, 
more particularly, seems to line up with what EW says we should do in such a case.  In 
giving equal weight to his own and Jake’s belief, it seems clear that Finn should suspend 
judgment about which horse won the race.  And this makes sense, since, given the setup, they 
consider one another to be peers with regards to judgments of which horse won the race in a 
nose-to-nose finish.   
Epistemic Peerhood 
 
Up until now I have remained cagey about exactly what it is that constitutes epistemic 
peerhood.  In short, the notion of epistemic peerhood is meant to capture the middle ground 
between greater incompetence and more expertise than a given person or subject.  In a case 
like Racetrack, it seems fair to assess Finn and Jake as epistemic peers with regards to 
propositions concerning which horse won a race in a nose-to-nose finish.  By stipulation, 
they consider each other as just as reliable at judging which horse won the race in a nose-to-
nose finish.  We might even take this as reason to say that they are peers with regards to 
propositions concerning perceptual judgments in general.  
But one driving force behind the epistemology of disagreement debate, and one of the 
main reasons philosophers have adopted views like EW, is to somehow inform us on what we 
ought to do in philosophical disagreements, in particular, philosophical disagreements that 
persist among seemingly rational interlocutors.  For example, Peter van Inwagen helped 
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spark the contemporary debate over the proper response to peer disagreement by asking 
whether he and David Lewis are peers with regards to a controversial philosophical thesis 
concerning free will.  In a widely cited passage, van Inwagen says, 
I ask you to consider the case of David Lewis and me and the problem of free will.  I 
am an incompatibilist and David was a compatibilist. David and I had many 
conversations and engaged in a rather lengthy correspondence on the matter of 
compatibilism and incompatibilism, and, on the basis of these exchanges – not to 
mention his wonderful paper “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” – I am convinced 
beyond all possibility of doubt that David understood perfectly all the arguments for 
incompatibilism that I am aware of – and all other philosophical considerations 
relevant to the free-will problem...It seems difficult, therefore, to contend that, in this 
matter, he was in epistemic circumstances inferior to mine (23-24).125 
 
Is van Inwagen reasonable in taking Lewis as his peer with regards to the issue of free 
will?  Unlike in cases like Racetrack, how one might establish peerhood in debates as 
complicated and contentious as the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate is far from clear.  
Does Lewis really have the same evidence as van Inwagen?  He surely doesn’t have the same 
total evidence as the two philosophers surely differ in some of their background beliefs and 
knowledge.  And what, according to van Inwagen, explains why Lewis draws a diametrically 
opposed conclusion from this evidence?  If he does not conclude that it is bias, or error, or a 
distorting eccentricity, how can van Inwagen remain so confident that Lewis is in error?  This 
is probably why most in the literature have relatively little to say about what constitutes 
epistemic peerhood with regards to particular philosophical issues.  Most, however, believe 
we have enough of an informal grip on epistemic peerhood to endorse van Inwagen’s belief 
that Lewis was his peer on the issue of free will’s compatibility with determinism.126  (Given 
                                                           
125 Van Inwagen, P. 2010. We’re right, they’re wrong, in Disagreement,’ Feldman R. and Warfield T. (eds.) 10-
28. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
126 In “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” Kelly lays out the conditions that must be met in order for 
two individuals to count as epistemic peers with regards to a particular question.  First, they must be “equals 
with respect to their familiarity with the evidence and arguments which bear on that question.”  And second, 
“they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom 
from bias” (2010: 120).  These conditions are extremely difficult, if not impossible to confirm in practice.  For a 
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what he says about Lewis, it seems like van Inwagen might believe that Lewis is in fact his 
peer with regards to philosophy in general.)  Still, though it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to say too much about how we might establish epistemic peerhood, we must remember that 
the notion plays an important role in answers to the disagreement question because it 
constrains the types of cases that might lead to application of a view such as EW.127   
Conciliatory vs. Steadfast Views on Peer Disagreement 
 
Opponents of conciliatory views like EW hold what we call “steadfast views” on peer 
disagreement.  The most minimally steadfast view on disagreement says that there are at least 
some cases of peer disagreement in which one is rationally permitted to hold on to one’s 
original belief.128  A view of the proper reaction to knowledge of peer disagreement is 
steadfast to the degree that it permits or even requires entrenchment.  A steadfast view 
councils conservatism permitting us to continue on as before, registering the differing views 
of an acknowledged peer without loss of confidence in the disputed claim.   
In order to better understand the debate, let’s look at two cases.  First, consider the 
case of Mental Math:129 
Mental Math: Sally antecedently counts her friend as being just as good as her 
at mental arithmetic.  They both think through the same arithmetical question 
(e.g., how much to tip at a restaurant), and find that they have arrived at 
different answers. 
 
                                                           
detailed account of how difficult it is to sustain judgments of peerhood and how this poses problems for the peer 
disagreement literature, see Bundy (2013).  
127 Let me say a word about why I have been and will continue to speak in terms of outright belief rather than 
credences.  With regards to outright belief, the only attitudes we can hold about any proposition are belief (that 
the proposition is true), disbelief (belief that the proposition is false), or suspension.  This is just for ease.  For 
the purposes of this paper, whether we speak in terms of credence or outright belief does not matter.  Speaking 
in terms of credence would complicate matters and the arguments from Elga on which I focus discuss beliefs 
only in terms of outright belief.  Moreover, the same types of problems arise whether we speak in terms of 
outright belief or credence.  
128 For a defense of a steadfast view on disagreement, see Kelly (2005). 
129 My version of Mental Math is adopted from Christensen (2009:757).  
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Suppose Sally has been going out to dinner with Fran for years.  Though they agree 
they should tip 20% of the bill upon receiving the check, every once in a while they come to 
find they disagree in their computations of the sum.  On the occasions when they disagree, 
sometimes Sally is wrong and sometimes Fran is wrong.  Assume that they disagree by a 
minor amount on an occasion on which they have antecedent reason to believe that neither of 
them is drunk nor cognitively impaired.  What should Sally do when she finds out Fran 
disagrees about how much to tip?   
Sally, who antecedently believes that Fran is an epistemic peer regarding mental 
arithmetic, first becomes very confident that the correct tip is, say, $42.  Fran then 
confidently announces that the correct tip is $43.  Upon hearing this, Sally begins to put the 
pieces together.  Because she believes that Fran is an epistemic peer with regards to 
propositions concerning the answer to an arithmetical question, she believes that she has no 
more reason to favor her own reasoning than Fran’s.  She will immediately lose some 
confidence in the correctness of her computation of the tip.  If she’s sophisticated, she might 
wonder precisely what attitude she ought to take toward the proposition she believed before 
hearing Fran’s dissent: i.e. the proposition that the correct tip is $42.   
Intuitively, it seems to me that  the rational thing for Sally to do in Mental Math is to 
become much less confident that her original belief was correct.  At any rate, the rationality 
of this reaction to peer disagreement is a natural implication of the virtue theoretic approach 
to epistemic evaluation I’ve been outlining in this dissertation.  Dogmatism is a vice.  Open-
mindedness is a virtue.  One could try to push back at this point and say that it is not rational 
for Sally to be much less confident in her original belief.  One might even have this 
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“intuition.”  But I do not share this reaction to the case I’ve described.  The conservative or 
steadfast stance seems to me to stem from dogmatism: an epistemic vice.   
So Sally ought to be conciliatory.  The conciliationist thinks that our judgments of 
what is rational for Sally to do in cases like Mental Math gives prima facie reason to 
generalize to other cases of peer disagreement.  One might take the steadfast response and 
say that Sally has special reason to favor her own belief over her peer’s.  But notice, if Sally 
believes her peer is in general as good as her at mental arithmetic (and she does given the 
setup), she has no special reason to favor her own belief this time.130  Sally cannot simply say 
that she favors her own belief because her belief is correct.  Nor can she rationally believe 
that because Fran believes that the correct tip is something other than $42, Fran has made a 
mistake on this occasion.  This is why a steadfast response in cases like Mental Math is so 
counterintuitive.  If Sally were to appeal to her own belief in order to establish that Fran 
reasoned incorrectly, she would beg the question at issue in their dispute.  
Absent any positive argument in favor of a steadfast response to Mental Math, there’s 
no reason to think that a steadfast response is anything but dogmatic.  A second case, 
however, has been offered as grounds for endorsing steadfast views on philosophical cases of 
disagreement.  Consider the case of Careful Checking: 131  
Careful Checking: Sally antecedently counts her friend as being just as good 
as her at mental arithmetic.  They both think through the same arithmetical 
                                                           
130 It seems natural that you should not privilege your own belief simply because the belief is yours.  So, with 
regards to our original example of a disagreement between Adam and Tom, Adam’s belief counts no more for 
the truth of p than Tom’s belief counts against it.  Intuitively, this is what EW advocates.  See Kelly, T. 2010. 
Peer disagreement and higher-order evidence, in Feldman and Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press for one such view, the Total Evidence View. 
131 One might respond simply by noting that Sally should just go back to the written-out calculations in order to 
determine who was right.  The rational thing to do if the original calculations were available would be to re-
check the calculations on both sides.  But in doing so, one should suspend until one finishes evaluating the 
original calculations of one’s considered peer.  For this example, however, suppose that they do not have access 
to the original written-out calculations. 
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question (e.g., how much to tip at a restaurant) before carefully checking their 
respective conclusions with paper and on a calculator, and still find that they 
have arrived at different answers. 
 
This case seems to lend support to the claim that in some cases of peer disagreement one 
need not be conciliatory. One might say that because Sally was diligent in her reasoning 
process, making sure to write her calculations down before checking them, double-checking 
them, and triple-checking them with a calculator, she thereby has reason to stand her ground 
on her original belief.  Those who hold steadfast views on disagreement think that our 
purportedly shared intuitive judgments about such cases give us prima facie reason to 
generalize the steadfast response to other cases of disagreement.  Whether or not they are 
right that these intuitions are widespread, one might think, that as a methodological matter, 
one’s views on peer disagreement result from our generalizing from such intuitions.  The 
difference between those philosophers who embrace conciliationism and those who endorse 
steadfastness can be attributed to a difference in intuition: what one thinks about the correct 
thing to do in cases of disagreements in general (and philosophical disagreements in 
particular) can be abstracted from one’s judgments about what one ought to do, rationally 
speaking, in cases like Mental Math and Careful Checking.     
The advocate of a steadfast view might say that Sally should be steadfast because she 
has reason to favor her own reasoning over Fran’s.  But just as in Mental Math, it seems like 
it would be irrational for Sally to infer that Fran must have gone wrong somewhere in her 
calculations because Fran’s belief is incorrect.  David Christensen (2009) argues that it is a 
mistake to assume that the only available reason for thinking that Fran did something wrong 
in this case relies on the reasoning that led Sally to her original belief.  Instead, Sally could 
say that in such cases “[i]t would be incredibly unlikely for two people to clear-headedly go 
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through the sort of extensive checking described and come up with different answers” (2009: 
759).132  In such a case, Sally can more reasonably infer that something “screwy” didn’t go 
on with her own reasoning.  The reason is that (putting aside failures of self-knowledge) 
Sally has more or less direct access to her own reasoning process and on the basis of this she 
knows that she is not herself lying or being insincere, that she is not severely cognitively 
impaired, and so on.  She has no comparable access to Fran’s reasoning process as she must 
rely on what Fran says and does for information about how Fran calculated and recorded the 
results of her calculations.  If this is right, Sally has reason to believe that Fran reasoned 
poorly in this case.  Although Sally has better access to her own reasoning process in Mental 
Math as well, she cannot make the same inference.  Mental arithmetic is more liable to error 
than the sort of process described in Careful Checking in which both disputants go through 
extensive double-checking.  
 The Equal Weight View theorist can account for our judgments about what Sally 
should do in Careful Checking without begging the question against the opponent.  But EW 
need not admit that Careful Checking is a case of peer disagreement in which one should not 
suspend in one’s original belief.  Instead, one might say that Sally’s belief that Fran reasoned 
poorly in this case gives Sally the new piece of higher-order evidence that bears on the truth 
of the proposition that Fran is her peer with regards to careful calculations.  If after 
acquiring this new piece of higher-order evidence, Sally is rationally required to suspend in 
her belief that Fran is her peer in this sense, then the peer disagreement question does not 
arise.  If Sally knows that Fran calculated and checked her calculations just as carefully as 
                                                           
132Christensen (2009: 759-760).  Why can't we say the same for the case of Mental Math?  Because it wouldn't 
be incredibly unlikely for two people to clear-headedly go through a mental arithmetic exercise and come out 
with opposing answers.   
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she did, then she should judge Fran a peer and suspend until further calculations can resolve 
the discrepancy.  If Sally does not know this, she is not in a position to judge Fran a peer, and 
thus not in a position to apply (or follow) EW’s advice to suspend in cases of disagreement 
with a genuine epistemic peer.   
2. Disagreement about Disagreement 
 
I have thus far explored peer disagreements with regard to simple cases and have 
touched on how difficult applying a view on peer disagreement might be to disagreements in 
philosophy.  In both types of cases, EW says that the rational response is suspension in one’s 
original belief.  But what does EW rationally require of us in cases of peer disagreement in 
which the disagreed-upon proposition is EW itself?   
Consider the earlier case of peer disagreement between Adam and Tom.  Suppose 
they have both become familiar with all of the relevant evidence and arguments that weigh 
on the truth of EW.  Adam becomes convinced that one should suspend in one’s original 
belief in response to a case of peer disagreement.  That is, Adam comes to believe EW.  Tom, 
on the other hand, has been moved by his steadfast intuitions to believe ~EW.  What is the 
rational thing for Adam to do when he comes to find out that Tom disagrees with him about 
EW?   
The natural thing to say here is that Adam should reflect on the view he actually holds 
and act in accordance with it.  If Adam held a steadfast view that advised him to not take into 
account the opinions of his peers at all, no problem would seem to arise; Adam could simply 
hold steadfast in his belief in his view.  But Adam believes that the correct view on 
disagreement is EW, which entails that he should give equal weight to Tom’s belief as he 
does to his own.  This would in turn seem to rationally require suspension in his original 
belief in EW, the very belief that spurred the disagreement with Tom in the first place.   
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A bit more slowly: Adam believes EW, and what EW says is that for all propositions 
p, S should suspend in p if S comes to find out she disagrees with her peer about p based on 
the same evidence.  It seems as though one who believes EW is committed thereby to 
abandoning belief in its truth in certain special epistemic situations.  
The Self-Undermining Objection  
 
Adam Elga (2010) argues that we must reject EW because it cannot coherently 
account for cases of “disagreement about disagreement.”  Elga argues that EW is self-
undermining because it “calls for its own rejection” in response to certain special cases of 
disagreement among peers like the one I described between Adam and Tom.133  Call this the 
Self-Undermining Problem.  As Elga puts it: 
The trouble is this: In many situations involving disagreement about 
disagreement, [EW] calls for [its] own rejection.  But it is incoherent for a 
view on disagreement to call for its own rejection. So [EW] is incoherent.  
That is the argument (2010: 179). 
 
To support his contention that there are “many situations in which [EW] calls for its 
own rejection,” he relies on the Consumer Reports (CR) analogy, which is supposed to show 
why a view that sometimes offers inconsistent advice is incoherent: 
CONSUMER REPORTS:  Suppose there are two magazines that offer advice 
on what home appliances to buy.  One such magazine is Consumer Reports 
(CR).  In addition to the advice it offers on which appliances to buy, CR offers 
advice on which consumer magazine’s advice its readers should follow.  
Suppose that CR advises its readers to (i) “Buy only Toaster X” and (ii) 
“Follow the advice of Smart Shopper (SS),” whereas SS advises its readers to 
(iii) “Buy only Toaster Y.”134 
 
                                                           
133 The problem Elga alludes to is what he calls the Self-Undermining Problem which claims that the type of 
inconsistent/incoherent self-underminingness exhibited by conciliatory views (in cases of disagreement about 
disagreement) is “rationally unappealing.”  As it will become clear later, EW does not fall prey to The Self-
Undermining Problem. 
134 Elga (2010: 180) presents the Consumer Reports example as adapted from Lewis’s Consumer Reports 
analogy (1971: 55). 
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Suppose I typically look to Consumer Reports for advice on which appliances to buy.  If I 
were to follow only the first piece of CR’s advice, then I would buy only Toaster X.  But I 
cannot cherry-pick which pieces of advice I follow and which ones I ignore.  If I want to be 
as informed as possible in my toaster-purchase, I should take into account the total evidence 
available to me at this time that bears on the matter in question.  Since CR also advises one to 
follow the advice of SS, which advises one to buy only Toaster Y, CR also indirectly advises 
one to buy only Toaster Y.  So if I were to attempt to follow CR’s total advice, I would be 
lost about which toaster to purchase; such advice is inconsistent advice as it’s impossible for 
me to both buy only toaster X and only toaster Y.  It seems incoherent, however, for a ratings 
magazine that purports to give its readers good advice on which appliances to buy, to offer 
such blatantly contradictory prescriptions.  
Elga’s idea is that similar reasoning can be applied to views on disagreement that 
purport to give good advice about how to respond to cases of peer disagreement. He claims 
that EW similarly “calls for its own rejection” by sometimes advising one to suspend in EW 
and thus takes this as reason to give up EW altogether.  
As we will see, Elga is mistaken in attributing such internal incoherency to EW.  
Contrary to what he says, EW does not “call for its own rejection,” nor does EW give 
inconsistent advice.  In fact, I will argue that it’s unclear that CR is incoherent in the way 
Elga describes.  But first I want to give Elga’s purported solution to the objection that EW is 
incoherent.   
Elga’s Solution 
 
Elga claims that the Self-Undermining Problem is only a problem for EW because it 
“requires one to be conciliatory about absolutely everything, even [its] own correctness” 
  
131 
(183).135  Aiming to preserve the intuitively appealing notion of conciliation that grounds the 
EW and views of its ilk, but avoid the apparent pitfall of the Self-Undermining Problem, Elga 
offers a partially conciliatory view on disagreement that treats cases of disagreement about 
disagreement in a special way.  By constraining his view so that conciliatory prescriptions 
are given only in cases of peer disagreement about matters not concerning disagreement 
itself, he believes he avoids the problem.  Is this move arbitrary and/or ad hoc?  Here’s what 
Elga says: 
[T]he real reason for constraining conciliatory views is not specific to 
disagreement.  Rather, the real reason is a completely general constraint that 
applies to any fundamental policy, rule, or method.  In order to be consistent, 
a fundamental policy, rule or method must be dogmatic with respect to its own 
correctness.  This general constraint provides independent motivation for a 
view on disagreement to treat disagreement about disagreement in a special 
way. (2010, 185) 
 
The idea is this: the only way for a conciliatory view on disagreement to give consistent 
advice is if it treats disagreement about disagreement in a different way.  And since all good 
epistemic views give consistent advice on how to respond to the evidence in certain 
situations, we have independent motivation for constraining a conciliatory view on 
disagreement such that it applies to all matters except disagreement.136 
Problem Solved? 
 
Elga’s modified version of EW, which I call Elga’s Equal Weight View (EEW), seems 
to have the built-in advantage of avoiding the type of incoherency that allegedly plagues a 
fully conciliatory view like EW.  In cases of disagreement about anything other than 
disagreement (i.e., the “first level” of disagreement), EEW calls for the same response as EW 
                                                           
135 Elga (2010: 183).  
136 Borrowing from Field (2000, appendix), Elga describes a fundamental method as a method “whose 
application is not governed or evaluated by any other method” (2010: 185, n.11).  
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- to suspend.  In cases of disagreement about disagreement (i.e., the “second level” of 
disagreement), however, EEW calls for a dogmatic response and so does not “call for its own 
rejection” as EW allegedly does. 
Let us grant for the moment that there is nothing ad hoc or arbitrary in the way Elga 
has restricted his view on the proper response to peer disagreement to propositions in 
domains other than disagreement.  Nevertheless, there is independent reason to doubt EEW.  
In short, Elga’s view implies the very unintuitive consequence that upon finding oneself in 
successive disagreements with one’s peers about the topic of disagreement, one should 
remain absolutely certain that EEW is the correct view on disagreement.  But this is 
implausible.  To see why, consider the following scenario: 
Adam and Tom take each other to be peers.  Suppose they come to find out that they 
disagree about which view on disagreement is correct.  Adam believes that EEW is the 
correct view whereas Tom disagrees.  Since Adam holds EEW, and since EEW tells Adam to 
be dogmatic in cases of peer disagreement about disagreement, he does just that.  A short 
while later Adam runs into another dissenter from EEW who independently came to believe 
that EEW is not the correct view on disagreement.  Adam need not worry, since his view tells 
him to be dogmatic at the “second-level” of disagreement.  But the dissenters keep on 
coming.  
You get the picture.  Following EEW leads to the unpalatable consequence that no 
matter how many peers disagree with Adam about the truth of EEW, he should, rationally 
speaking, remain just as confident as before with regards to its truth.  This kind of 
stubbornness is the exact same type of stubbornness proponents of conciliatory views 
repudiate on the first level of disagreement.  EW, on the other hand, runs into no such trouble 
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here, as one would suspend on EW after running into the first peer.  Even if we were to grant 
Elga that there is no arbitrariness required in treating disagreement about disagreement in a 
special way, it seems like we have a different, independent reason for rejecting EEW. 
3. Unraveling the Self-Undermining Objection 
 
Elga’s attempt to save the spirit of conciliationism from the self-undermining 
objection proves to be unsuccessful.  The self-undermining “problem”, however, is only 
apparent.  Contrary to what Elga says, EW is not internally incoherent – it does not “call for 
its own rejection.”  Nor is he right to say that EW gives contrary recommendations in the 
same way CR does.  For Elga fails to appreciate EW’s status as a rule of rationality that 
ranges over a very special, idealized set of evidential circumstances.   
EW is not Internally Incoherent 
 
A view might be incoherent by explicitly stating that it is not true.  Suppose view V 
says ‘V is not true.’  If V were true, the proposition expressed by ‘V is not true’ would be true 
as well.  But this is just the proposition that V is not true.  So suppose that V is not true.  
Since this (that V is not true) is what V says, what V says is true.  But this contradicts our 
assumption that what V says is not true.  Thus, V is internally contradictory or self-
undermining.  A view that says of itself that it is not true is self-undermining in a clearly 
problematic way.  Such a view is internally incoherent. 
Is CR incoherent in this way?  If CR explicitly recommended that one “Buy only 
toaster X and buy only toaster Y,” then (given X≠Y) CR would be incoherent because it 
would offer obviously inconsistent advice.  But CR does not offer such advice.  CR advises 
one to “buy only toaster X” and to “follow SS.”  CR is incoherent only in conjunction with 
the fact that SS says, “Buy only toaster Y.”  CR (i) directly tells one to “buy only toaster X” 
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and (ii) directly tells one to trust SS, and it is only when these pieces of advice are conjoined 
with the external fact that (iii) SS directly advises one to “buy only toaster Y” that 
incoherence arises.  CR is incoherent only insofar as advice (i) - (iii) are not jointly 
satisfiable, where (iii) is not internal to CR but external to it.   
Consider again V, which says that ‘V is not true’.  Suppose another view, U, says that 
‘V is true.’  If what U says is true, then V is true.  But if V is true, then what it says is true, 
and what V says is that V is not true.  U is not internally inconsistent or self-undermining.  
The advice U offers is inconsistent only because of the incoherent nature of V.  The same 
point can be made at the level of argumentative practice on which I have focused in 
advancing an Aristotelian, virtue-theoretic account of good and bad argumentation.  Suppose 
that S knows that R is a highly reliable and honest informant on some matter.  Suppose, for 
example, that R has given driving directions to S that have always been accurate.  Now 
suppose that S hears R give driving directions to Z but doesn’t hear precisely what was said.  
If Z asks S whether she should heed R’s directions, S would be rational to says yes on the 
basis of her past interactions with R even if R has made a mistake this time and the directions 
she gave Z are inconsistent.  The irrationality in this case is entirely R’s fault.137       
CR is no more incoherent than U.  (Indeed, it is in some sense less incoherent because 
SS is not incoherent.)  Notice that U is incoherent because it says to follow V and V is self-
undermining.  CR says to follow SS, but SS is not incoherent, as there is no way for it to 
undermine itself by offering the one piece of advice it gives.  The incoherence in the case 
                                                           
137 An even simpler case: R is a world renown mathematician and S trusts that she (i.e. R) is right in asserting 
the truth of a complicated mathematical theorem T, which in fact implies a contradiction in a wholly non-
obvious way.  In this case, S is clearly not at fault, and her rationality in trusting R is in no way suspect even if 
she has endorsed a contradiction.  Indeed, if the contradiction is sufficiently difficult to detect, the rationality of 
neither S nor R need be impaired in the case.  The idea that endorsing a contradiction (or what entails a 
contradiction) is invariably irrational stems from the kind of overly formal approach to argument evaluation that 
I reject in this dissertation.    
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Elga describes resides in the conjunction of CR and SS, given the stipulated facts about the 
two magazines’ advice.  There is no incoherence in Mom’s saying, “Stop!” and Dad’s saying 
“Go!”  One cannot infer from the facts so described that there is anything wrong with Dad’s 
command nor can one conclude that there is something wrong with Mom’s.  The only 
incoherence in such cases arises when one tries to follow the advice of both Mom and Dad. 
Is EW incoherent in any of these ways?  Elga is wrong to say that EW is incoherent 
because it calls for its own rejection.  Clearly EW is not incoherent in the way in which V is 
incoherent, as it does not say that ‘EW is not true.’  EW is not incoherent in the way U is 
incoherent either, as it does not refer to another view which is itself incoherent.  Elga’s 
argument obviously relies on the analogy between CR and EW, so he must have meant that 
EW is incoherent in the third way described above.  But EW is not incoherent in the same 
way that CR is incoherent.  
EW does not say anything about its own truth value.  Moreover, it does not say 
anything like ‘S should always suspend in EW.’  EW does not even say that ‘S should 
sometimes suspend in EW.’138 And it certainly does not say that ‘S should sometimes both 
believe EW and suspend in EW.’  All EW says is that for all propositions p, S should suspend 
in p if S comes to find she disagrees with a peer about p based on the same evidence.  EW 
implies, in conjunction with one’s beliefs about one’s current evidential circumstances, that 
in certain special circumstances – that is, in cases of peer disagreement about EW – one 
should suspend in EW.  But it’s not incoherent for a view one currently holds, in conjunction 
                                                           
138 One type of vicious incoherence a view might have is like that of the global skeptical thesis (when it is 
asserted rather than entertained as a mere doubt-inducing possibility).  If the skeptical thesis is true – that we are 
not justified in any of our beliefs– then it seems like we wouldn’t be justified in believing the thesis itself.  
There are no cases in which we can rationally believe that the skeptical thesis is true.   
 
  
136 
with one’s beliefs about certain possible future circumstances, to imply that one would be 
rationally required to give up said view were such circumstances to obtain.  In fact, such 
would be a virtue of the view insofar as it is indicative of open-mindedness in those who 
endorse it. 
In sum, there are possible circumstances in which someone who believes EW would 
be rationally required to suspend in EW.  Is this a problem?  No; any view that tells us to be 
conciliatory in certain evidential circumstances has this feature.  Not only are there potential 
circumstances in which one would be rationally required to give up one’s belief in the 
intuitively plausible principle I called Minimal Humility above, but we can come up with 
such circumstances for virtually all epistemological views.  If this were a problem for EW, it 
would be a problem for pretty much every other epistemological view.  But it is not a 
problem at all, as those who currently endorse EW should regard such cases as potential cases 
of misleading higher-order evidence. 
If I believe philosophical thesis T and then come to find out hundreds of philosophers 
who I take to be my epistemic superiors with regards to T have come to believe ~T, then I 
should suspend on T.  This does not, however, show that T is false, as such circumstances 
might not obtain.  And if they did, they might very well be cases of misleading higher-order 
evidence in which I rationally abandon belief in a true thesis.   
4. How to Disagree about How to Disagree 
 
Might the advocate of EW just say that Adam and Tom, who hold different views on 
disagreement, are not peers with respect to the topic of disagreement?  One might say that 
simply discounting one as a peer (with regards to disagreement) upon finding out they 
disagree with one about EW is begging the question in favor of conciliationism.  If it were 
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right to say that Adam could discount Tom as his peer in such a case, what would stop us 
from responding in the same way in any case of disagreement about a difficult philosophical 
(or otherwise) proposition?  Can we refuse to acknowledge someone as an intellectual peer 
simply because they hold a different view?  As Brian Weatherson (2007:56) puts it:  
If we declared anyone who doesn't accept reasoning that we find compelling 
not a peer, then the EW view will be trivial.  After all, the EW view only gets 
its force from the cases...where our friend rejects reasoning we accept, and 
accepts reasons we reject.  If that makes them not a peer, then EW view never 
applies.  So we can't argue that anyone who rejects EW is thereby less of an 
expert in the relevant sense than someone who accepts it, merely in virtue of 
their rejection of EW.139 
 
If, in order for Adam to call Tom his peer in the “relevant sense” – i.e., with regards to issues 
concerning disagreement – Tom must adopt the same belief as Adam about the particular 
topic in question, EW would never be applied.  Adam can only apply EW in any situation if 
he considers Tom a peer.   
But Weatherson is just wrong that this is a problem for EW.  It might be wrong for 
Adam to believe that Tom is “less of an expert” (and so not his peer) based merely on the fact 
that Tom rejects EW.   But it certainly seems like Tom’s belief should count at least a little 
against the truth of the claim that Tom is his peer with regards to philosophical issues.  
Imagine Adam came to believe Tom was his peer with regards to philosophy when they were 
back in graduate school.  Then, 20 years later he comes to find out he and Tom disagree 
about a number of philosophical matters.  There must be some point at which the higher-
order evidence defeats the first-order evidence that supported his belief that he and Tom are 
peers in the technical sense at issue, which, if you recall, implies that they have all the same 
                                                           
139 Weatherson, B. 2012. Disagreements, philosophical and otherwise, in The Epistemology of Disagreement, 
David Christensen D. and Lackey J. (eds.) 54-75, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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evidence or reasons with respect to the claim at issue.  If Tom has come to accept a dogmatic 
approach to disagreement in the 20 year time period in question, while Adam has come to 
believe in the virtue of conciliationism, Adam would reasonably suspect that Tom has missed 
some of the relevant evidence or reasoning: i.e. the evidence or reasoning that lead him (i.e. 
Adam) to embrace the conciliationist approach. 
The Difficulty in Establishing Peerhood (with regards to philosophical issues) 
 
The fact that we find ourselves in genuine peer disagreements regarding perceptual 
beliefs (e.g., Racetrack) and mental arithmetic (e.g., Mental Math) is unsurprising because 
the evidential bases and reliability on which we based epistemic peerhood are relatively easy 
to establish in such cases.  In hypothetical cases of peer disagreement, it is stipulated that the 
two people involved are equally reliable when it comes to judging propositions concerning 
the issue at hand.  In Racetrack, one can appeal to one’s own and one’s peer’s track records 
of perceptual belief formation in order to establish peerhood.  In Mental Math, one can 
appeal to one’s own and one’s peer’s track record of forming beliefs on mental arithmetic.  
One can only appeal to track records, however, if one first has a determinate way of 
ascertaining who was in fact right in the past.  In both cases, we need only wait for new 
evidence, which is often readily available, that bears on the truth of the proposition under 
disagreement in order to determine who was right.  In the perceptual case, one can check 
whether one judged correctly by simply waiting for a slow-motion replay of the race or an 
announcement by the racetrack officials.  And one can determine whether one’s mental 
arithmetic was correct by simply checking with a calculator once the server returns with the 
check and comparing it to one’s original response. 
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We have no obvious avenue for determining one’s status as our peer with regards to 
philosophical issues.  Philosophical theses are intricate knots of many claims making it 
difficult to determine where to ground the evidential bases of the claim that a person is one’s 
peer with regards to issues concerning philosophy.  Sarah McGrath (2007) discusses the 
difficulty in determining genuine expertise with regards to issues in the domain of 
morality.140  In order to determine who is an expert in some domain, she says we must first 
have some way of gauging their rational credibility.  The same point holds for identifying 
those who are our epistemic peers in some domain.  In certain cases we might simply take for 
granted someone’s credibility, as is the case when we trust a weather forecaster when we 
want to know what the weather will be like.  But in this case there are many institutional 
markers of the expertise in question.  We trust that this person wouldn’t be paid to forecast 
the weather and his forecasts wouldn’t be broadcast, unless he had the relevant expertise. 
Often, however, as McGrath points out, “in actual, real-life cases, others do not typically 
wear their relative levels of competence on their sleeves” (97).  In most cases, “identifying 
those with genuine expertise in some domain will be most straightforward when we have 
some kind of independent check, one not itself subject to signiﬁcant controversy, by which 
we can tell who is (and who is not) getting things right” (98).  For instance, if his expertise 
came into doubt, we could determine whether the weather forecaster is credible by 
comparing his weather predictions to the actual, recorded weather.  In cases like Racetrack 
and Mental Math, we can determine the rational credibility of our alleged peers by appealing 
to an independent check like past track records.    
                                                           
140 McGrath, S. 2007. Moral disagreement and moral expertise, in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics, 3: 87-107.  
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McGrath recognizes the difficulty in determining the rational credibility of others 
with regards to more complicated issues.  In particular, she inquires about how we might 
identify moral expertise.  Clearly we have no obvious independent check for determining 
some moral theorist’s rational credibility, as we do in the simpler cases.  She suggests that 
perhaps “the possession of certain academic credentials, or professional concern with ethics, 
is good evidence that one possesses reliable moral judgment” but concludes that at most this 
would be a “relatively meager basis on which to conclude” that one possesses reliable moral 
judgment (97-8).141  A similar point can be made when it comes to establishing peerhood 
with regards to philosophical issues, since the type of disagreements with which we are 
concerned often involve very well-respected philosophers (e.g., Van Inwagen and Lewis).  
How we might establish peerhood with regards to philosophical issues for philosophers very 
familiar with the material is much less clear than in the simple cases presented in the 
literature.  In order to determine whether they are peers with regards to a metaphysical thesis, 
we must determine their relative rational credibility when it comes to evaluating 
metaphysical theses.  This is much more easily said than done. 
Respecting EW’s Status as a Rule of Rationality 
 
EW implies one should suspend belief in EW only in conjunction with premises about 
one’s current epistemic situation.  This involves not only recognizing EW as a rule, but 
applying and following it as well.  In order to apply the rule one must reason about one’s 
                                                           
141 One might argue that knowledge of moral theory is irrelevant.  To check someone’s moral expertise we must 
evaluate her past judgment and behavior to see whether she’s given what we take to be good advice on moral 
matters in this past and whether she’s regularly displayed what we take to be moral excellence in her 
interactions with others.  But even if we adopt this anti-theoretical or non-theoretical stance toward moral 
expertise, the excellence will remain more difficult to verify than expertise in say math or surgery.  Intuitively, 
there will be more unclarity, vagueness, and indecision in our efforts to make an assessment of the moral quality 
of a person’s past advice and behavior than will arise when we try to assess the quality of her mathematical 
proofs or medical surgeries.     
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current evidential circumstances.  In failing to appreciate EW's status as a rule, Elga leaves 
out some important evidence. 
Suppose Adam, who holds EW, antecedently takes Tom to be his peer with regards to 
philosophical issues and takes this as reason to count Tom as a peer with regards to issues 
concerning peer disagreement.  When he runs into Tom, the total evidence consists in (i) 
Adam's belief in EW, (ii) Tom's belief in ~EW and (iii) Adam's belief that Tom is his peer 
with regards to peer disagreement.  What is the rational response?  One option is that he 
applies EW to itself and suspends in EW on this basis.  As I have argued, there is nothing 
wrong with this kind of response.  But there’s another option: in taking into account the new 
evidence that Tom believes ~EW, Adam suspends on his belief that Tom is his peer with 
regards to issues concerning the epistemology of disagreement.  Before he found out that 
Tom disagreed with him about EW, he counted Tom as a peer with regards to propositions 
concerning peer disagreement.  But he only did so because he took the fact that Tom is his 
peer with regards to philosophical issues as reason to count Tom as a peer with regards to 
issues concerning peer disagreement.  Thus, respecting the evidence requires Adam to 
reassess the original reasoning that led him to the belief about his and Tom’s (apparent) 
peerhood.  
Adam knows something he did not know before.  He now knows that Tom disagrees 
with him about EW.  This surely counts as evidence against the fact that Tom is his peer with 
regards to propositions concerning peer disagreement.  (And we can say this without saying 
that Fran’s divergent result in mental math provides strong evidence that she isn’t Sally’s 
peer with respect to computing a tip.)  The fact that Tom disagrees with him so starkly on the 
proper response to peer disagreement might even give Adam good reason to doubt that he 
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established peerhood correctly in the first place.  First, Adam might have mistakenly 
reasoned that he and Tom are philosophical peers.  Second, he might have mistakenly 
inferred from the first fact to the fact that he and Tom are peers with regards to peer 
disagreement.  After all, if Tom has published papers denying the truth of EW, he now has 
extra-evidential or pragmatic reasons to deny its truth: professional credibility, an aversion to 
retraction, etc.  Either way, Adam seems to have little, if any, reason to believe that he and 
Tom are peers with regards to peer disagreement at this point. 
Should Adam suspend in EW or should he suspend in his original belief that he and 
Tom are peers with regards to propositions concerning peer disagreement?  I think that as the 
case currently stands, Adam ought to suspend in the latter.  Sure, Tom’s peerhood on the 
matter at hand seemed plausible to Adam absent any evidence against it, but given new 
evidence about how they reason with regards to (actual cases of) peer disagreement, Adam 
should doubt the conclusion of the original reasoning that led him to believe he and Tom 
were peers on this issue.  In reassessing the evidentiary basis of one of his beliefs by 
reflecting on it and his newly -acquired evidence, Adam (and so EW) respects the evidence.  
Unlike EEW, Elga’s partially conciliatory view, which builds in an arbitrary restriction, EW 
is not vulnerable to a charge of dogmatism.  Adam does not beg the question against the 
opponent; he does not refrain from suspending in EW because EW tells him to do so.  Rather, 
Adam ought to refrain on suspending in EW because he has no better reason to suspend in 
EW than reason to suspend in his belief that he and Tom are peers with regards to peer 
disagreement. 
What is the rational response in cases of disagreement about disagreement?  Non-
conciliatory, steadfast views tell us to be dogmatic at both levels of disagreement (i.e., 
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dogmatic in cases of disagreement about disagreement and in cases of disagreement about 
anything else).  I find that such views are lacking in evidential support.  I have been 
concerned with how a conciliatory view might answer the question, a view which at first 
glance seems to be committed to one of two options.  Either the correct (conciliatory) view 
on disagreement rationally requires us to suspend on both levels (like EW) or else to suspend 
on the first level while remaining dogmatic at the second (like EEW). 
According to Elga, a view that recommends the former option – as a fully 
conciliatory view like EW does – is self-undermining.  Elga chooses instead to amend EW 
such that the resulting rule says that one should be dogmatic in cases of disagreement about 
EW itself.  His solution seems ad hoc because it is ad hoc.  He fails to appreciate EW as a rule 
of rationality and mistakenly assimilates EW to self-undermining theses like V.  But as we 
have seen, EW is neither internally incoherent nor even self-referential.  It remains entirely 
silent on its own truth value. 
Does EW lead to Philosophical Spinelessness? 
 
Some have criticized EW on the grounds that belief in it leads to the seemingly 
unacceptable conclusion that we must give up many of our most deeply -held philosophical 
beliefs.142  In other words, belief in a view like EW forces us into a kind of philosophical 
spinelessness.  Now, it’s true that not every philosopher who argues in favor of some view or 
another actually endorses that view, but in many (if not most) cases the arguer seems to hold 
a firm belief in a proposition that expresses his or her view.  And for a great number of 
issues, there are philosophers on both sides.  Take your favorite contentious philosophical 
thesis and you are bound to find very smart, very credible philosophers who genuinely 
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144 
respect each other’s opinions on both sides of the debate.  Insofar as the disputants know of 
the disagreement and insomuch as they believe one another to be peers, it seems like if the 
disagreement persists, then they are being less than fully rational.  If they follow EW, 
therefore, they should lower their confidence in their original beliefs until the disagreement 
no longer persists.   
It is worth noting that the claim that widespread reasonable disagreements among 
peers exist is consistent with both the approximate truth of EW, and the viability of a policy 
of conciliation with peers over both first-order issues and the viability of EW itself.  It’s not 
enough that one believe in the existence of such disagreements; one must believe one is 
currently in such a disagreement before EW kicks in.  Someone who accepts EW is rationally 
required to suspend in her original belief if and only if she knows (or rationally believes) that 
the conditions of a peer disagreement are met.  In particular, one must have good reason to 
believe that the other person is one’s peer with regards to the matter in question even after 
one learns of the disagreement.  But it is consistent with the claim that widespread reasonable 
disagreement among peers exists that we are rarely in the place to rationally assess the status 
of our peerhood with regards to propositions concerning philosophical issues.  As we have 
seen, it is relatively easy to establish peerhood in some domains, but it is not clear how we 
might go about establishing peerhood with regards to philosophical issues.143    
If we cannot establish peerhood, then the disagreement question does not arise.  Even 
if one antecedently counts someone as one’s peer with regards to propositions concerning 
                                                           
143 Is it possible that this is true by definition?  If a question is scientific, experimental evidence should resolve it 
or leave us in agreement as to why it can’t be resolved.  But we don’t call a question “philosophical” unless its 
answer can’t be entirely settled with experiments.  So it may be that if the question is philosophical equally 
reasonable, intelligent people can draw incompatible conclusions from the same evidence by taking different 
directions within the substantive space of admissible answers insured by our appropriately labeling it 
“philosophical.” 
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peer disagreement, then taking into account the new piece of evidence that this person 
disagrees about the truth of EW might defeat the original evidence that led one to establish 
peerhood in the first place.  In such cases, EW could not be applied and so the disagreement 
question would not arise. 
Even if we did have a reliable and consistent method for establishing peerhood in 
philosophical disagreements, this would not be a problem for EW.  Suppose that tomorrow a 
group of philosophers comes up with a reliable and consistent method for establishing what 
they all agree is philosophical peerhood, amongst each other with regards to some 
philosophical issue on which they are equally expert: e.g. pick your favorite example..  With 
this new method in mind, S discovers that many of the disagreements she finds herself in 
with her mutually acknowledged fellow “experts” are in fact genuine cases of peer 
disagreement in the idealized sense sketched above: i.e. they actually share exactly the same 
body of evidence and are equally adept at applying it to the philosophical questions they are 
trying to answer.  In these cases where S regards someone as her philosophical peer even 
after she comes to find out she disagrees with them about philosophical thesis Q, if S holds 
EW, the rational thing to do is to suspend in Q.  But this does not mean that going forward 
the rational thing to do is remain agnostic about the truth of Q.  Given the current evidence, 
of course, S ought to suspend in Q.  Absent any new evidence that bears on the truth of the 
disagreed-upon proposition, S ought to remain agnostic.  But it is not as if S is stuck in a state 
of agnosticism.  There are many ways in which S might come to adopt belief in Q once 
again.  For instance, S might try to adduce new evidence.  Or she might try to reason in new 
ways from the total relevant evidence that (ex hypothesi) she and her peer disagree on.  In 
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short, she might continue investigating, thinking, and reasoning about the matter at hand.  For 
surely she can do things while suspending belief in the matter at hand. 
Simply being conciliatory based on the belief that the total evidence does not favor Q 
or ~Q is not an epistemic vice.  Philosophical spinelessness is an epistemic vice because it 
seems to lead to skepticism about philosophical theses in general, something that is not 
entailed by following EW.   
In fact, we can actively avoid persistent agnosticism by reflecting on the original 
evidence even if we hold and follow EW.  If you and I disagree about some philosophical 
issue, we can re-evaluate the support for our original beliefs independent from one another.  
Of course, there might be little reason to think we would find something we had not already 
thoroughly considered.  Still, we could re-evaluate the evidence together (surely two minds 
can be better than one!) and try to explain exactly how it could be that two peers 
independently came to contrary conclusions based on the same evidence.  We would be 
speaking from importantly unique perspectives; I was originally moved to believe that Q 
(and you ~Q) based on the very same evidence.  Perhaps we can help each other see the 
evidence in a new light.  Even better, we could attempt to reconcile the disagreement by 
asking someone who both of us consider as our epistemic peer (in the way that you and your 
colleagues take each other to be peers) for a new, unbiased perspective.  The claim that one 
should, rationally -speaking, further one’s investigation as such into the truth of the 
disagreed-upon proposition is consistent with the truth of the Equal Weight View. 
5. Conciliation as a Virtue 
 
An enticing model of the virtue of open-mindedness might appeal to talk of experts 
and incompetent people: to exercise open-mindedness in cases of disagreement in such a way 
that the virtue manifests itself in complete deference (or as near to complete as reasonable) to 
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the experts in cases of disagreement between non-experts and experts, complete dismissal (or 
as near to complete as reasonable) of the incompetent in cases of disagreement between the 
competent and the incompetent, and conciliation in peer disagreement.  A failure to 
capitulate to the experts results in the epistemic vice of dogmatism, i.e., someone who is 
deficiently humble and excessively confident.  On the other hand, a failure to dismiss 
someone judged to be incompetent in the face of a disagreement results in the epistemic vice 
of skepticism: she is overly humble, not confident enough. 
But when S1 considers S2 an epistemic peer with regards to propositions like P, and 
S1 finds out she disagrees with S2 as to whether P, and sincere, empathic argumentation has 
failed to resolve the disagreement, the epistemically appropriate action to take is conciliation, 
a response that is captured by EW’s advice to weigh one’s own opinion and one’s peer’s 
opinion equally.  On this picture, we ought to give extra weight to our interlocutors’ opinions 
proportional to their level of expertise and little to no weight to incompetent opinions.  Just 
as we can conceive of conciliation as the middle ground between complete deference and 
complete dismissal, we can conceive of the notion of epistemic peerhood as the middle 
ground between incompetence and expertise.   
The idea behind conciliation is that it allows one to take seriously the opinions of 
others, not because they are right (or because one’s own are wrong) but because they are 
beliefs held by a rational agent who argues in an effort to get at the truth.  This makes sense 
only if one assumes that one’s interlocutor is arguing in good faith; only then is one able to 
hit the mean between deference and dismissal.  The most conciliatory view on peer 
disagreement councils one to weigh a peer’s belief equally with one’s own when determining 
one’s doxastic attitude toward the proposition under disagreement.  A minimally steadfast 
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view on disagreement says that there are at least some cases of peer disagreement in which 
one is rationally permitted to hold on to one’s original belief.  The steadfast view, then, says 
that it is at least sometimes okay to completely dismiss one’s peer.   
There are no doubt people we may reasonably judge as experts and people we may 
reasonably judge as incompetent with respect to some matter.  Expertise comes from 
research, practice and good habits and incompetence comes from ignorance and bad habits, 
among other things.  Under a traditional understanding of expertise, then, it makes sense to 
say that sometimes it is rational to defer to an expert.  However, I think the attempt to hold 
expertise as the ideal foments more of what divides us in the first place, privileging those 
who are already considered experts.  Instead, we should attempt to conceive of epistemic 
peerhood itself as an ideal to work towards.  Doing so would promote our supporting one 
another to improve, epistemically speaking.  It would make sense of our deference to and 
trust in experts, since deferring to the experts would in practice bring us closer to them.  It 
would make sense of our dismissal and distrust of manipulators, since dismissing them would 
separate us from them.  It would make sense of the existence of reasonable disagreements, 
since, after all, experts who disagree on some matter are sometimes epistemic peers.  And, 
most importantly, it would make sense of the requirement for active participation in our 
cooperative endeavors to improve our epistemic standings through rational argumentation.   
Blind deference and paternalistic dismissal are vices we must attempt to avoid. 
Suppose S1’s belief B is put into question when S2 advances a good argument A against B.  
S could (i) blindly accept A and revise beliefs/actions to maximize coherency or (ii) 
completely resist the undermining force of A (e.g. by ignoring it).  But both options would be 
irrational.  In (i), S1 relinquishes her ability to process the information for herself and in 
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effect compromises her own rationality.  S1 exemplifies the epistemic vice of mimicry, a 
form of insincerity.  In (ii), S resists the uptake of information that would improve her 
epistemic status.  S1 would be stagnant, a vice of creativity.  What S1 should do is consider 
the argument and try to better understand it from S2’s perspective.  This involves getting 
input from S2 and simulating S2’s position (and perhaps much more) before S1 (iii) engages 
in the cooperative activity of rational argumentation.   
Closing Remarks 
 
When a disagreement arises between two individuals (or groups) about which attitude 
we should take, rationally speaking, with respect to a given proposition, and the participants 
to the dispute attempt to rationally persuade one another, they engage in the activity of 
rational argumentation.  Typically, success in the activity is thought to exist only if at least 
one person advances an argument that rationally commits the other person to revise their 
beliefs in the direction of the successful arguer's circle of opinions.  Conciliation, it might be 
thought, precludes this type of rational persuasion, since it calls for a change in attitude to 
both participants to the dispute.  But to think that rational argumentation serves its purpose 
only in cases where one of the participants “wins” and the other “loses” precludes the type of 
sincere, open-minded, and creative attempts at persuasion that constitute virtuous 
argumentation and real intellectual progress.  Even in cases where both parties to the dispute 
give ground to one another by, say, suspending in their original beliefs, rational persuasion is 
achieved just in case suspension is the rational attitude to take after learning of the peer 
disagreement.   
The steadfast view is dogmatic because it leads to the stubborn dismissal of one’s 
peer in so many cases.  But its spineless cousin is not EW.  The skeptical correlate to the 
steadfast view would be a view that advises its proponents to at least sometimes defer 
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completely to one’s peer in the face of a disagreement.  But conciliationism on peer 
disagreement (of which EW is a special kind) is the open-minded alternative, the mean 
between dogmatism and skepticism.  The virtue of such views can be derived from the fact 
that dismissal of and deference to one’s interlocutor in the face of a peer disagreement is 
rationally condemnable. 
Creativity is defined as the mean between two vices: stagnation and instability.  
Sincerity is defined as the mean between manipulation and mimicry.  If one always 
capitulated to one's peers when finding out they disagreed with one in such a way that one 
replaces one's original belief with the belief of one's peer, one exemplifies the spineless vices 
associated with these virtues.  Such behavior would be irrational because excessively critical 
of one's own ability for creative construction.  It is not epistemically excellent to rely entirely 
on others when it comes to what one believes.  On the other hand, if one always stood one’s 
ground in the face of a dissenting peer, then one would be rightly judged as irrational because 
one’s overly dogmatic, conservative behavior exemplifies the stubborn vices associated with 
sincerity and creativity.  Such behavior is irrational because it undermines the type of 
coordinative critique that ought to be the first step in resolving our disputes. 
Both instability and stagnation lead to the erosion of one's capacities to creatively 
construct perspectives different from their own, the former because empathy requires a stable 
starting point and the latter because empathy requires adaptability.  The erosion of these 
capacities in turn contributes to the further entrenchment of the vices themselves.  If we don’t 
get moving, we’re doomed to spin in circles. 
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